


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A STUDY

OF

KANT'S PSYCHOLOGY

WITH REFERENCE TO

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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


Es ist schwer, den Menschen ganz abzulegen.

—*Kant.*

Es kann nicht etwas erkenntnistheoretisch wahr und
psychologisch falsch sein.

—*Carl Stumpf.*



PREFATORY.

Most studies of the Critical philosophy proceed historically, logically, or metaphysically. They trace the external influences upon it, and its development in Kant's mind; or, they inquire into its consistencies and test its strength from its own principles; or, taking it as truth-expressing, they search its metaphysical validity. In this way there has accrued during the past century a large amount of psychological material in Kantian criticism, turning chiefly on the two points, whether the critical method is psychological, and, the scope of Criticism falls within psychology. Most of these helpful, many-sided interpretations have been necessarily omitted in the following study, owing to the limitations of time. A like cause is responsible for the unsatisfactory treatment given in chapter IV., as, also, for the non-elimination of various discussions.

Citations in Kant's writings are made by volume and page from Hartenstein's 'chronological' edition, excepting the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where the two-volume translation of Max Müller is followed.

E. F. B.

NEW HAVEN,
June, 1893.




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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY: THE IDEA OF PROPÆDEUTICITY, AND KANT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

Nature rushes onward to intricacy, while reason pushes backward for simplicity. Life and its complexity surround us, but we satisfy ourselves only in constant reductions. All history, whether manifold in being or thinking, is one grand comment on these antithetic endeavors of mind and reality. The infinitude of numerical quantities and spatial forms are the rational multiplex of primal digits, points and lines, and a minimum of equalities. The surging spectacle of a mechanical universe is simplified in the physicist's quanta of force and mass. The discommoding dust and the beautiful crystal, the blooming plant and the psychosating cell are phantasmagoria coming from nature's adjustment of elemental atoms in their infinite valencies. Protoplasmic specks are the last insight into that power which differentiates into the moving, seething masses where nature crowns herself with the phenomena of life. That evanescent and never-to-be-recovered sensational bit given to a unifying *actus* is the primordial fact at the core of this incomparable complex that we ourselves are. What atoms are to chemical nature, and cells to life, such is the valency of feeling in the last work of all life and being.

But reason itself is an item occurring in nature's inventory. It too is a complexity. Its characteristic search for a unitary somewhat comparable with the data of any phenomenal group has come out of manifold experiences. Intellect, in the beginning, does not believe in the reality of whatsoever it may endeavor to simplify. Only as it has struggled over frequent frustrations in infantile attempts to relate things in a truth-expressing manner does it come to the attainment of 'scientific' knowledge. While all history reveals the great forth-putting

that nature is, and the essence of reason as persevering with the complication of all reality, it contains no less the fact that reason becomes reason only as it is natural, an evolving of that unique synthesis of adjusting an explanation to a phenomenon. The separation of any sense-element in a childish perception is logically at one with that act which posits great, yet determinable stellar orbits, or finds a supreme reality implicated in a most obscure sand in the desert. But the mind that knows the *rational* of experience is as psychologically and really unlike the transitory psychosis that pathetically calls for infantile sustenance, as being is unlike knowledge. The difference between the Newton telling us of great truths and the Newton prattling his gleeful tale, is obviously the difference of time and growth which all education is. But reason in its becoming feeds on the pabulum of knowledge. Instruction is the empiristic term admirably expressing the relations in question; so that, however the evolving of the complexity of being, nature, or ultimate reality, may be expressed, the development of reason from the primal discrimination of the babe to the analysis and synthesis of him who contends with the enigmatic, can be formulated only in terms of the knowledge that is its product.

The unfolding of reason, as indicated in this difference, is explicable in the biological principle of growth. It is merely the way the organism is helped to its full development. But, to be of any service, the principle must be rendered into terms comparable with the nature of the object. It is thus that we get 'the morphology of knowledge' as an expression indicating what happens to reason when it is considered as subject to the process of all nature. This phrase, however, is highly complex and becomes intelligible in an analysis relating it to a variety of elementary views which may be taken of that knowledge.

Probably three points exhaust the features characterizing reason set in the flow of nature, wherein it is finally brought to an attainment of its right as searching for causes or reducing to simplifications. *Psychologically*, everything depends upon the degree of maturity which reason has attained at any one time. It has no right to abide the judgments of youth. The philosophy of the world's childhood is swept away by the de-



veloped reflections of its manhood. The mind of the boy does not operate with the surety that may characterize it when all sides of his being are stored with experiential pabulum. Everything that makes for attainments depends upon the comparative age. *Logically*, (and this is the objective aspect, as it were, of that which is given subjective recognition in the psychological consideration) the full and complete activity of reason is conditioned by the concatenation of knowledges. No 'royal pretender' can here usurp the rational throne. There obtains such a descent in its activities that reason goes against itself in attempting to make a leap for which it is not properly prepared. To be warrantable, any act of relating demands a certain amount and quality of known facts. Physics presupposes its mathematics, biology its chemistry, physiology its anatomy. This logical feature is just that great law that is valid in all developments where knowledge is at stake, viz.: to pass from the known to the unknown. The every-day questions inquiring as to what must be in hand before acts can be performed, or, as to what and how much knowledge is presupposed by any subject that is made an ideal for future acquisition, merely express obeisance to this necessity of all mental life.

But these two facts remain isolated, except they be united in a third. That the activity of the subject is conditioned upon his own ripeness as well as upon the logical sequence of the object-matter is meaningless without a teleological fusion. It is *pedagogically* that the development of reason, as it hurries on to the time when it shall seek the elementary, has a unified significance. Agreeing that the biological principle is expressive of the way reason comes to itself, we, at once meet the profound relation wrapped up in the term 'method.' This is the logic of education and metaphysic of pedagogy. Method is always the arrangement of thought with reference to some end. But this has meaning and can be set into reality only as it is an experiential expression of the principle of becoming, at the basis of which lie two conditioning facts. Only as the fact of change is characteristic of reality can we orientate ourselves with reference to an ideal attainment, whether intellectual, ethical or aesthetical. Were this a static universe, method

in any form whatsoever could never have come, even as an idle dream. Were it also a chaotic universe the facts in question would have no *a priori* possibility. So far as law is not a mere fiction, so far can we, as rational beings, institute a proceeding. Without the fact of uniformity we can have no assurance of what would follow upon our endeavors. This thing of certainty, however, is the great point in all method. Orderliness throughout changing relations, but subject to progressive discovery, is the great presupposition here. Changing causality, then, reducible to formulæ, is a term of reality that gives deeper meaning to the common phrases, growth of mind and development of reason.

But it appears that the foregoing analysis has arrived at the idea of propædeuticity. It is properly a pedagogical conception, and the very etymology of the term might have suggested the same treatment. We, too, are philologically wise in having received into our language, from the ancient Greeks, the essential word of that side of human knowledge and endeavor which had its genuine rise among them. *Προ-παιδεύειν* is its original, and means to give instruction beforehand with reference to what may follow. It is a dealing with knowledge having reference to some rather ultimate form of the same. As soon as there is a dim awareness of the fact of mental development, of a correlation between bodies of knowledge that may have a close affiliation with the apprehending mind, then is there possible the rise of the idea that certain knowledge is a fit, natural and necessary introduction to what may follow. The notion that a certain procedure is necessary in the discovery of truth, and that instruction in that truth follows a method comparable with the mode of discovery, is true logic, real psychology and genuine pedagogy.

The idea of propædeuticity has been traced in the foregoing manner that it may be turned to account in estimating the relation of psychology to philosophy. We affirm that psychology is the true propædeutic to philosophy, and that in this instance there occurs the highest and ultimate application of this pedagogical conception. By psychology, one can mean only that body of scientific truths expressing the phenomenal relations of

the individual human consciousness as attained by all those methods of research applicable to such phenomena. By philosophy, one may understand that sum of the attainments of reflective analysis and synthesis, pertaining to reality, however expressible, as it sweeps over 'the facts of life.' The one is rational and feels a satisfaction when it has accounted for all that is contained in experience; the other employs the scientific mind and fairly completes its task when an explanatory adjustment has been made between known facts and any group of obscure psychological phenomena. Just as all knowledge is variously yet closely related, so is all knowledge reciprocally helpful. But between these two endeavors there obtains this propædæutical relation that has not its like in any other phase of human activity. For it is intimately related to the conceptions of nature and reason that have preceded. Nature is the one great enigma upon which philosophy feeds. Its life is enriched in proportion as the former is revealed in a progressive complexity. But the attainments of philosophical inquiry as to the constituents, or 'nature' of nature, are merely the utterances of reason in its advancing efforts to reduce that complexity to the elementary in terms of the real. Herein appears the psychological proximity of the particular science to the rational discipline. The chief method of psychology is the analysis carried on by a developed consciousness, while the one mode of resolving philosophical problems is reflective analysis. Yardsticks and measures are of no aid in either. But the analysis of the latter only comes out of the former. One reasons as to reality when he has first come to a recognition of self and to that belief which has won its way through the strata of adolescent doubt. The proceedings in the two instances are so closely related that the one easily shades into the other. It is this stage in the development of reason that has psychological pertinence to both endeavors.

Though it is the same reason that develops the science and puts forth a philosophy, it approaches the problems of nature in a somewhat characteristically different manner. The ends to be attained in the respective instances are different: the one is individual, phenomenal; the other is universal, noumenal; the

one correlates appearances; the other posits a reality. But in their content the two products stand logically related. This is the vital point in the propædeuticity of psychology. Its considerations lead to and shape the solutions of reason. Indeed, there is no philosophical problem that does not take its rise in the science of mind. It is not that we would have a philosophy 'of consciousness' from the start; but no inquiry, as to what reality is, can advance a little way without encountering on every hand the question of what a thing is as it appears to us men. The orientation about the self is the unique feature common to psychology in its latter stages and philosophy in its initiation. When we have analyzed mere processes we naturally press on to ultimate inquiry. It is well-nigh impossible to refrain from raising these problems. Such are 'content-wise' considerations which indicate the logical relation between psychology and philosophy as is expressed in the introductory character of the former. What are the various phases of this relation may appear to some extent throughout the ensuing study.

Just as matter and form never have meaning in separation, so the logical and psychological aspects of the dependence of ultimate inquiries, and their solution of one's knowledge of self, are fruitless for a systematic endeavor. They are significant when solidified and intermingled in the pedagogical relation of propædeuticity. Here the philosophical value of psychology becomes *real*. Whether in the original discovery of metaphysical truths, or in their impartation to a developing mind, the essential relation is not changed. It comprehends all the anterior relations in which the pursuit of philosophy stands, thus deepening the conviction that we place methodical certainty on the one basis possible for us men as we endeavor to make intelligible the intricacy of nature.

The service of psychology for philosophy is not exhausted in the foregoing relations. This handmaid of reason not only makes an open way and conducts her into her domain, but also can turn guard and repel all civil assault. Against any freak of scepticism or absolutism true philosophy has a safeguard. This protective service of psychology is a truth than which none other is more plainly revealed in the ebb and flow of human

confidence. To the far-seeing observer the path of philosophy is winding and ledgy. Now it has lain in broad, unbounded fields where the eye had no Polaris, and eager feet would lose their way only to wander in cusps. Again it has led to ledgy heights where reason's vaunting self would be dangerously near to a precipitating doom. Now it is a path of onward movement and unfaltering step; then a time of rest in distrust. Now a dubious reconnaissance is the safeguard to a conquering attack on the real, or the preliminary of a withdrawal from the field of the unknown. As reason casts a furtive glance at her past, there echoes to the historic ear her repentant loreley:

Prone to wander, oh, I feel it,
Prone to leave the truth I seek.

The optimistic faith is, indeed, not left to meagre sustenance. As often as there was a wandering, there came a quickened recognition of it. The individual subjectivism of the Greek Sophists repelled the Socratic 'demon' to call men to knowledge and moral insight. Their later frivolity died away in the serious calm of Platonism, revealing the purity and reality of archetypal ideas, whose universality is cognitive, and whose purity is expressive of the perfect, ethical good. The Pyrrhonian sceptic selfishness that would secure peace of mind in withholding judgment and esteeming everything indifferent, was avenged in the Plotinian Platonism which brought back the ideal 'nous' and its supportive relation to the sensible soul who has been estranged from this *ἐν καὶ ἀγαθόν*. Cartesian doubt is summarily displaced by Cartesian dogmatism. Hume's halting (a scepticism without a motive) is unpegged in the painstaking Scottish realism and the long withheld Critical philosophy. Kant endeavored to sweep away his own limitations of the sensible by the reëstablishment of the practically super-sensible, and was seconded by the unique faith of Jacobi, the realism of Herbart, and the conservatism of Lotzean idealism.

No less is the truth instanced in reason's reaction against dogmatism and absolutism. It has found virtue in the demand of Criticism that dogmatism shall first render an account of man

and his powers to know and act. Her abhorrence of absolutism still lingers in our ears. Is it not Lotze and Schopenhauer who recall Hegelianism to a more empiric study of man? Thus, speculation may be cautious in its doubt, or wild with its unlimited possibility of converting thought into reality. From either snare, protection lies in a rational self-knowledge. In every instance where reason has gone astray she has harked back to truth with a psychologic call. When her 'proneness' has become pathological, a draft for the *materia medica* is made upon her own realm of consciousness. Now it is with an instinctive feeling for the right composition; then, a purposive, long-wrought-out formula whose administration is designed to be effective. Psychology, as it were, brings man back to his senses. The Critical philosophy is a supreme instance of this unique, protective service of the analysis of consciousness for that later rational synthesis which is the sole and distinctive right of philosophy.

Man's rationality and the unity of metaphysics are the absorbing themes of philosophical discipline. These are the keystones let into the arch resting on the buttments of Socratic wisdom and Hegelian dialectic. The history of reflective thought is rather a chronology of the sublimation of these truths into rational consciousness than a record of developments in the way of accretions to the various departments forming philosophical discipline. 'Eras' and 'epochs' in philosophy thus become the times when the strength of some minds was focused upon particular speculative problems. The accuracy herein attained and the limits set to the problems give characteristics to the ramifying developments within the respective periods.

Ancient philosophy, true to the psychologic age of its reflective mind, spent its force upon the *cosmos*. Its 'world wisdom' comprised a theoretic knowledge of that which was posited as 'external.' Nature, as the subject-matter of 'physics,' and man, whose objectivity manifesting itself in the state, as the subject-matter of 'politics,' were the great facts of experience which appealed to the speculative mind in antiquity. Those principles were sought which were thought

adequate to rationally account for that which was *presented* in man's experience. Unable to overcome that 'warmth of feeling' which attaches itself to any stream of consciousness, early philosophy is marked by its emphasis of the real, of that which is 'here and now.'

The departure from 'the here to the hereafter,' the rejection of the natural and the acceptance of the supernatural, marks the second great period in the unfolding of speculative reason. Epicurean and Stoic dogmatism found reactions in 'the Pyrrhonic form of doubt' and the milder scepticism of the so-called Middle Academy. A second reaction of the historic mind restored reason's self-confidence. The influx of Jewish and Oriental ideas, precipitating attempts to blend Judaism with Hellenism, resulted in that mystical tendency of the Theosophists prior to the rise of Christianity, and in the development of Gnosticism succeeding the establishment of Apostolic churches. After running the gauntlet of revived Platonism and 'orientalized Pythagorism,' Christianized reason emerges under the wavering form of scholasticism—now as an attempt to fuse religion and reason, then as an effort of the one or the other to maintain a speculative superiority. In spite of the rapidly moving lights and shades of these arid attempts to unite philosophy and theology, there is, indeed, a common object found as the subject-matter of the thinking of this period. Religion, theology and ethics were searched by 'unpractical students' in order to arrive at a systematic, formal knowledge of *God*. In marked contrast with antiquity, the historic mind in mediæval philosophy filled its repository of 'theological wisdom' by brooding over the ideal.

Thus, philosophy in its two main branches—the real, as comprehended under the speculative use of reason, or the philosophy of nature, and the ideal, as that which relates to what ought to be, or the metaphysic of morals—had repeated the process of development, maturity and decay. By means of a dialectic not unknown in the empiric employment of reason, and still more valid in the objective progress of mind, there is to be recorded of the latter an attempted synthesis of the content of the earlier periods.

Modern philosophy contents itself with the 'knowledge of man.' It finds him a *microcosmus* and a *microthecos*. Noëtics and metaphysic, ethics and æsthetics, all center in man as the content of philosophic pursuit. From this mosaic of the real and the ideal, reason, under the garb of religion, reaches up to the Ideal-real—the supreme object of all rational discipline. The scholastic spell was broken by the philosophic doubt and 'cogito' of Descartes. From him issued those myriad insular and continental streams of speculation that eddy about the *ego*. But the keynote of our era was not sounded until, from an outpost of Germanic civilization, there was raised the cry: '*Was ist der Mensch?*' This question not only 'unites in a systematic whole' the Critical philosophy itself, but also serves to link the speculative past with its present. "For a survey of all philosophical investigations," says Lotze, "one must classify the questions to which one seeks answer." The systematic answers given by Kant to his supreme question, justify Rosenkranz in likening the Criticism of Reason to the head of Janus in the temple of philosophy—fusing all preceding truth in its own conquests, and signaling the points of attack in all future attempts. They comprehend critical investigations, not only of cosmology, the essence of ancient philosophy, and of theology, the essence of mediæval philosophy, but, also, of psychology, which forms the essence of modern philosophy. Thus, while man's rationality finds its highest expression in the latter, the unity of metaphysic is discernible in the two former. How these stand related in that ultimate unity, which philosophy claims to be real, is only to be discovered in the execution of that discipline itself. In this historic attestation to the unity of reason, it has been seen very briefly how reason must take up the same problems in its progressive endeavors.

The development of philosophic pursuit in the individual, as well as the progress of speculation itself, is conditioned upon the multiplicity of problems raised, and the clearness with which they are defined. Doubt in the individual is convertible with a recognition of problems. Dogmatism marks no progress. It only treasures past attainments. When the spirit is grieved with misgivings, and turns with critical boldness upon

threatened tenets, then becomes possible that which makes for speculative advance. It is his hearty recognition of great problems that links Kant with the past, as, on the other hand, it is the profound thoroughness of his solutions that binds us to him.

'What is man?' is the comprehensive inquiry to which the Critical philosophy was wrought out as an answer.¹ To have set a greater goal was impossible. This question draws all others to it. Their answers contribute to and are lost in the ultimate reply permitted to this most profound problem. "The whole interest of my reason," says Kant, "whether speculative or practical, is concentrated in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?" These three express the last reduction to which the field of philosophy is possible.

The value and completeness of this classification of the questions which confront reason is seen both from what should be the guiding impulse to speculation and from the basis and content of the discipline itself. Speculation that is wild by reason of a conspicuous absence of any goal to be reached rightly loses its title as a rational endeavor. As Lotze approves, a recognition of ends "keeps a firm and vivid recollection of the needs for the satisfaction of which all speculation is undertaken." Speculation, too, that pushes forward to its goal in utter disregard of the life of man must likewise be banished from among those efforts which undertake to satisfy the philosophic instinct. Philosophy, in its objective content, as it were, possesses naught else than 'the facts of life.' It must not only remain in touch with practical, every-day experience as found in the life of conduct and feeling, but it must also go down into the haunts where certified knowledge of fact and formulæ are kept. This two-fold appeal to the nature and con-

¹That this is the *real* question uppermost in Kant's mind, is to be inferred from the relative position given to the concepts of God and Immortality, and the function they serve as speculatively practical tenets. Though he insists (*Werke* V. 487) that God, Freedom and Immortality are the real problem of metaphysics, yet the position left to God—to realize in a mechanical manner the *Summum Bonum* dictated by the 'Categorical Imperative,' and how perfunctorily a future state is to admit of this realization, throw a dark shadow over Kant's assertion.

tent of speculation yields to Kant a warrant for claiming that the chief duty of philosophy is to answer man's self-centered question: what am I?

In this glance at the historical setting of Kant as a philosopher, there appeared a statement of the comprehensive problem to whose solution he turned the patient reflections of a clear intellect. First and foremost, his answers are philosophical. He labored to unearth the structure of knowledge in its dealings with reality. The problem thus became, how are possible certain judgments, given in experience, yet, utterly unlike the ordinary associations of concepts which merely explicate what is acquired in various empirical ways? "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible" as to the knowledge of things and selves, as to the reality of ethical relations, and as expressing the objectivity of unique feelings in which we lose ourselves in contemplating the beautiful and sublime? The resolution of these enigmas was Criticism's gift to the world. But, back of its solutions, developing in its progress, and consciously explicated at its close, lies another problem implicated in the inquiry, 'What is man?' Critical philosophy is metaphysical in a rigid sense, but does not cut loose from 'our' reason, 'human' reason. In that it *does* build upon experience to satisfy its problems, there appears its psychological problem, viz., so to make an empirical analysis of man as shall best harmonize with the explication of metaphysical needs. 'What is man?' centers the empirical and rational sides of Criticism, which fuse in such a way as to shape and color the latter. To what extent these influences interact and how far the conclusions of Criticism may be justifiable, it is the chief purpose of the ensuing study to estimate, leaving the development of points to the progress of the discussion.

CHAPTER II.

PSYCHOLOGY IN KANT'S CONCEPTION OF 'WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ENCYCLOPÄDIE.'

Whatever may be said for the exhaustiveness of any search for first principles, it cannot be maintained that the field of empirical knowledge is closed. Nowadays, it is the fashion to cast obloquy on 'the old, traditional psychology.' It knew not the rights of science, nor grasped the value of methods. It was filled, we are constantly reminded, with 'crude observations,' and these were thrown into severely 'speculative moulds.' It is not designed to challenge any seeming affront to the historic foundations of psychology as it is now rapidly striding to the rank of a 'natural science.' Her devotees may wrangle over her methods and assumptions. The present task is to inquire how far this charge is true against Kant. If he be guilty of purloining the heritage and rightful power of psychology, then it must be determined how far and in what particular points. The unity and extensity of modern 'scientific' knowledge of the mind warrants the assurance that the entirety of any historic doctrine can best be traced by this comparative vision. Herein lies the value of a detailed study of Kant's psychology. Taking as given and allowed much that can be proved only by special investigation in the respective departments of psychology, we merely propose in general to submit Kant's views to the test of psychology as it is now generally agreed upon, inquiring at the chief points their relation to philosophy and the sciences involved. It is not intended that on this basis there shall be a reconstruction of the Critical philosophy. It is only hoped that there will be laid an admitted ground from which some of the chief defects in Kant's analysis and synthesis may be appreciated.

The students of Kantian psychology encounter serious diffi-

culties. Some are individual, biographic; others are impediments characteristic of his age. As perhaps with no other thinker, his periods of development and the various phases of his maturity have introduced variations into his products, spread consternation among his critics, and given rise to antithetic extensions of his influence. Though there were ends reached, the patient tracing of the windings through the 'scientific,' 'speculative,' and 'practical' periods begets a useless weariness.¹ Neither at all times is there a fixity of tenets. The asseverations of one epoch are swept away by the long-nursed reflections of a succeeding period. The dogmatism of youth was perfected in the criticism of manhood, and revealed in the ethical exoterism of old age. Yet, with all the multifarious content of his thinking, and the chameleoned forms it was led to assume, there runs through it all a common trait. The attitude to the problems is ever taken from one general point of view. The tenor, even, is quite always the same; the 'critical awakening' from dogmatism being no exception. Kant is *par excellence* the psychologic philosopher, and Criticism is imbued with the same spirit. It is such a fact that invites and encourages the study here undertaken, and counteracts the difficulties arising from the vagaries in the developing of Kant's own mind; while the variety of successive tenets only invokes a constant cautiousness.

There remains another source of perplexities more appalling. Kant wrote no distinct treatise on psychology, though he, more than any other philosopher of the eighteenth century, has profoundly influenced that science since his time. This lack of avowed psychological material is what we miss.² Yet, he often makes an introspective whisk and lands out some psychologic catch. Now he heaps weighty criticism against attempts to pry into the nature of the soul, or mitigates his speculative prowess by collecting anthropological observations, or turning out witty aphorisms. Empirical observation is at times held in distrust, and he despairs of any hope for a scientific knowledge of mind. But he does not remain true to his opinions of this science's

¹Hastie, *Kant's Politics*, tr. p. X.

²Cf., Drobisch, *Empirische Psychologie*, p. 309.

weakness. His psychology in many respects (and this is true of the initiation of all psychology) is only pious and witty reflections on his own life and mind.¹ He was faithful to the doctrine of subjectivity, but frequently pleads the attainment of universality. Sully's observation with reference to Schopenhauer,² "that philosophers no less than other men, have their intellectual conceptions most powerfully influenced by the facts of their own personal experience," finds a truth in that element of suppressed melancholy in Kant's temperament which was so conducive to the introspection goaded on by incessant physical pain. Indeed, his psychologic spirit finds an autobiographic bit when he writes in the 'Anthropologie'³ of the emotions of wonder and astonishment: "Ein Neuling in der Welt verwundert sich über alles." It is this factor of intellectual curiosity turned inward that is one of the sunken piers on which psychology rests; it too was a passion with Kant, expressing itself in the profound inquiries as to the possibility of *a priori* judgments, or in the passing empiric phenomenon of the 'Eigenlicht.'⁴

Kant, also, did not engender a closet psychology. He linked himself to his predecessors, and by academic means helped tide over this science's experience during his career, lecturing on psychology either from such handbooks as Baumgarten's 'Metaphysik' and Meier's 'Logik,' when empirical psychology was 'peculiarly the metaphysical yet experiential science of man,'⁵ or on 'Anthropologie,' a mixture of studies on human nature. It was this pedagogic interest which laid the foundations for the literary forms into which he variously cast his opinions and reflections.

Of course, the chief writings to be considered as sources are those embodying the Critical philosophy. The three Critiques abound in psychological material, and particularly the first, which is preëminently psychologic in a non-Kantian sense.

¹ Stuckenberg, *Life of I. Kant*, pp. 106 ff., 219.

² *Pessimism*, p. 436.

³ *Werke*, VII., 582.

⁴ *Werke*, VII., 428.

⁵ *Werke*, II., 316; Erdmann, *Reflexionen Kants zur Anthropologie*, Lpzg. 1882, p. 63.

Among the pre-critical writings there are principally the essays 'Beobachtung über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen' (1764), 'Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik' (1766), 'Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes' (1764), and the two important Latin dissertations (1756, 1770). The post-critical essays and treatises are such as are explanatory of the critical views, or contain the empirical tenets on which they rest, and frequently embody the materials gathered during a life-time, but published by his academic friends; such are the 'Beantwortung der Frage; was ist Aufklärung?' (1784), 'Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte' (1786), 'Ueber Philosophie überhaupt zur Einleitung in die Kritik der Urtheilskraft' (1794), 'Zu Sömmering: über das Organ der Seele' (1796), the later ethical and political treatises, 'Der Streit der Facultäten' (1798), the 'Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht' (1798), 'Logik' (1800), 'Ueber Pädagogik' (1803), 'Die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat' (1804), and Poelitz's posthumous 'Vorlesungen über Metaphysik' (1821). His correspondence is also invaluable in tracing the growth of certain psychological tenets.

In addition to the difficulties that may appear throughout the study, it must be remembered once for all, that any attempt to gather Kant's psychological views must beware of distorting doctrines and their mutual consistency, rendered possible so easily because of the various character of the sources. It will, however, be found upon inquiry that there is presented a fair unity of tenets, though one must ever regret that 'that great observer of the pathology of the human soul,' as Herder called him, did not take enough interest in empirical psychology so as to articulate its ascertained truths into a science.

No inquiry can proceed a brief way without encountering cross-purposes, unless there are at least provisional conceptions which shall indicate the results desirable and provide limits to the undertaking. "Definitions," says one, "are fatal; they make good back-doors only." The mere playing with them is a very hazardous manner of appreciating sciences and their in-

ter-connection. Nevertheless they are handy and bind down aimless feet. Indeed, definitions must be taken as the counters of students. Upon these they justly light as the linguistic necessities of developed rationality. Yet, the variations remain so constant, that what is lost in one point is gained in another. Thus, in a study of this kind the inquiry must be raised at the beginning: What is Kant's conception of psychology—its nature, aims and method? An answer cannot be given directly. It must be felt for, and in a round-about way. Psychology with Kant does not stand alone, but is severely linked to conceptions wider and architectonic. It requires a determination of his view of science and a presentation of philosophic system, in which will be found the position given to psychology by its separation from metaphysic and logic on the one hand, and from ethics and æsthetics on the other. This, however, yields only his *negative* conception of psychology.

Kant's opinion as to the nature of science is bound up with his speculative verdict as to the fate of knowledge, either experimental or systematized. His earliest and pre-critical expression¹ gives a broad extension to scientific knowledge, classifying it as either the work of the historic or the mathematical understanding. There appears, however, a clear-cut sentence as to the nature of science only when Criticism had completed its task and investigated the highest certainty as to knowledge itself. In the preface to the 'Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,'² he says: "Eigentliche Wissenschaft kann nur diejenige genannt werden, deren Gewissheit apodiktisch ist; Erkenntniss, die bloß empirische Gewissheit enthalten kann, ist ein nur uneigentlich so genanntes Wissen. Dasjenige Ganze der Erkenntniss, was systematisch ist, kann schon darum Wissenschaft heissen, und, wenn die Verknüpfung der Erkenntniss in diesem System ein Zusammenhang von Gründen und Folgen ist, sogar rationale Wissenschaft. Wenn aber diese Gründe oder Principien in ihr, wie z. B. in der Chemie, doch zuletzt bloß empirisch sind, und die Gesetze, aus denen die gegebenen Facta durch die Vernunft erklärt werden, bloß

¹ *Werke*, II., 314; cf. VIII., 72.

² *Werke*, IV., 358.

Erfahrungsgesetze sind, so führen sie kein Bewusstsein ihrer Nothwendigkeit bei sich (sind nicht apodiktisch-gewiss), und alsdenn verdient das Ganze in strengem Sinne nicht den Namen einer Wissenschaft, und Chemie sollte daher eher systematische Kunst, als Wissenschaft heissen."

Certainty must characterize the knowledge that would aspire to a scientific claim. Experiment and observation can never be reduced to universality. The practical phases of 'natural philosophy' result in an *Unding*, rather than science.¹ The clear articulation of a body of truths, whether of *Körperlehre* or *Seelenlehre*,² can never come by way of testing and the defence of hypotheses.³ Science, as such, demands 'einen reinen Theil' from which must spring its certainty. Only so far as science is applied mathematics can it be recognized. Quantitative estimations alone go for any worth. "Ich behaupte aber, dass in jeder besonderen Naturlehre nur so viel eigentliche Wissenschaft angetroffen werden könne, als darin Mathematik anzutreffen ist."⁴ By this conception Kant held fast. Though it were hard to explain what should properly come under science,⁵ or to demand that the nature of science requires the careful separation of the empirical from the rational part⁶ and the determination of its method, which is something other than mere '*Manier*,⁷ the former resting on certain principles that make the content of the *modus logicus*;⁸ there is no departure from the demand that the *Wissenschaft* (that etymologically comes from *Wissen*⁹), and is to become *Wissen* in the thorough-going meaning of the term, must come to it by way of the *a priori* constitutiveness of the understanding that puts forth those bodies of knowledge. And in those sciences which are to contain nothing but the *a priori* there can be no 'Wissen' under the

¹ *Werke*, VI., 377.

² *Werke*, IV., 357.

³ *Critique*, II., 659 ff.

⁴ *Werke*, IV., 359-360.

⁵ *Werke*, VIII., 22.

⁶ *Werke*, IV., 236, 113-119.

⁷ *Werke*, V., 157.

⁸ *Werke*, V., 329.

⁹ *Werke*, VIII., 72.

spurious form of 'Meinen.' "Denn es ist an sich ungereimt, *a priori* zu meinen."¹

This opinion did not stand alone, but, as was said above, is closely connected with his speculative verdict on knowledge in which the conception of the *a priori* plays a great role.² Its function and the estimation of 'rational knowledge' articulate science and philosophical system with Kant, and furnish him with the clue to an encyclopædia of the sciences. The distinction, made in 1770, between the sensible and the intelligible worlds,³ and the doctrine of noumenality, which Schopenhauer⁴ justly applauds as Kant's greatest service, both have their basis in the discernment of the *a priori*. Phenomena and noumena are the objectification, as it were, of this difference between empirical and rational knowledges. The distinction also enters into the favorite tripartition of 'criticism,' 'doctrine' and 'science.'⁵ 'Criticism' is the ferreting-out by an analysis of mind, of those concepts whose totality constitutes the circle of *a priori* knowledge.⁶ When these concepts have been so far treated as to yield principles which are guiding in systematic knowledge, a body of truths is had which make up 'doctrine,' *e. g.*, such knowledge as it is possible to have of the æsthetic judgment. Wherever experience, or facts of nature, may be subsumed under the *a priori* certainty, which is possible only from the complete admixture of mathematics and a consequent reduction to measurement, then 'science' is possible. Such are the fruits ripened on the well-tilled distinction of the *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The pedagogically well-meant expressions, that reason was to be tested standing alone, "when all the material and assistance of experience is taken away, etc.,"⁷ have always borne a mystifying

¹ *Werke*, VIII., 67.

² *Werke*, VII., p. 451, Sec. 6: In true science "bedarf es wissenschaftlicher Principien *a priori*;" in most knowledges "aber können es auch Erfahrungen, d. i. Urtheile sein, die durch Versuch und Erfolg continuirlich bewährt werden." Cf. VI., 121, note.

³ Cf. Letter to Herz, *Werke*, VIII., 688, et al.

⁴ *Sämmtliche Werke*, I., p. 534 f.

⁵ *Werke*, VI., 400; v. Vaihinger, *Comm. zu Kants K. d. r. V.*, Stuttgart, 1881, I., ii., pp. 534 f.

⁶ Cf. *Werke*, VI., 43, 491 f., VIII., 32, 548 f.

⁷ *Critique*, II., p. XXIV.

sense, and especially when the treatment of reason is to provide an '*a priori* possibility.'¹ But knowledge *a priori* and the cognitive satisfaction of reason are one and the same.² And rational knowledge is the mere knowledge of principles which results from the analysis of concepts,³ not concepts that come by way of intuitional construction, but an analysis carried on by abstraction and reflection, and 'known immediately through self-observation.'⁴

Philosophy consists in the analytic treatment of reason, deducing the principles of science from those rational concepts which subsume themselves under that which is and that which ought to be. ' Thus understood, logic and metaphysic, ethic and æsthetic (so far as the latter can lay any claim to a unifying relation between the others) compose the philosophical system. Nature, art and morals are the experimental products which rest on the submerged *a priori* principles of 'legality,' 'purposiveness,' and a 'purposiveness that is at once a law or obligation,' respectively, and whose sources are the rational faculties.⁵ It is not in place to justify, nor in our present disposition to quarrel with this conception of philosophy and the perfect articulation of all rational knowledge into such a system where "every science must have its place in the encyclopædia of sciences."⁶ The former is beyond our limits, and the latter would involve an analysis which can be pointed out only later. What remains in question, though it does stand in such intimate relation to the speculative whole, is the conception of science, as such, and from this point to estimate Kant's view of psychology.

Whatever may be the intrinsic warrant to be found in the nature of science by which Kant remanded it to the severe treatment which it must receive at the hands of philosophy, we fancy that much that enters into his opinions is a splash from

¹*Critique*, I., 398 ff.

²"Vernunftkenntniss und Erkenntniss *a priori* ist einerlei." *Werke*, V., 12; *cf.*, VIII., 23.

³*Critique*, II., 611.

⁴Meyer, *Kant's Psychologie*, Berlin, 1870, p. 129.

⁵*Werke*, VI., 399 ff, V., 204.

⁶*Werke*, V., 429; *cf.*, VIII., 14, 43f, 49.

his age. It must be stoutly maintained that science cannot render an account of itself when brought before reason's legitimate question as to the warrant of scientific procedure and the nature of that proportion of ultimateness in answering problems which such solutions may have. Science is not the last step in rational inquiry, and only transcends its proper function when it would have the inquirer be satisfied with its discernments. The 'nature' of things and events is omitted in the proper task of noting their behavior and succession. And in so far as Kant demands that science shall truly resolve the former questions, he is in the face of what *has been* the essence of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, he is perfectly defensible in maintaining that scientific principles—those stepping-stones of empiric explanation—are of metaphysical origin, though exception may and must be taken to certain forms of his treatment of them.

It is at that point, however, where he demands certain features of scientific knowledge, that a protest must be entered. All science must be exact, mathematical. From this outlook Kant's complaint against psychology, that it is not an exact science, is logical. As long as science remains the mere application of number to causation, a science of consciousness is impossible. 'Retain causation in consciousness,' says Hodgson,¹ 'and you make psychology illusory (since causation by consciousness is incalculable).' On the ground of his speculative doctrines Kant was justified in placing physics first in preference to psychology; for 'the former,' as Meyer says,² 'requires the thoroughgoing application of the space and time forms, the latter not,' it being subject to the intuitive form of time only. These limitations, however, are undoubtedly mere splashes from his contemporaries, and the spirit of his time is guilty of recognizing only one form of scientific knowledge. The rigid exclusion of all unmathematical formulæ is a petrified pulse throbbled by the elation from the cosmological triumphs of physics. The success of the mechanical sciences appealed to Kant. His first view of metaphysics (1747) saw it 'nur an der

¹ *Philosophy of Reflexion*, London, 1878, II., 65.

² *Op. cit.*, 288; cf., *Werke*, IV., 361.

Schwelle einer recht gründlichen Erkenntniss;’¹ and in 1764 he attained the conviction that “die ächte Methode der Metaphysik ist mit derjenigen im Grunde einerlei, die Newton in die Naturwissenschaft einführte und die daselbst von so nutzbaren Folgen war.” In 1787, with the second edition of the *Critique*² it appeared in rational consciousness that Criticism was the adoption of this method.³

Kant is culpable only in so far as he accredited the opinion of the day, and linked with it his insight into the nature of science, and circumscribed it far within the limits to which this form of knowledge has been extended by the intervening century’s developments. Kant’s limitation holds good of only one form of science (and indeed a small portion, the chief of which is abstract mechanics). “If science,” says Bosanquet,⁴ “meant exclusively the sciences which grow out of the one-sided forms of measurement, then we should rightly deny that there is a science of history, and, for the same reasons, that there is a science of art, of political form, or of religion.” However priceless may be the rigid formulæ to which ‘partially unified knowledge’ aspires, it must remain true that science seeks a generalized expression of the facts “of the world as our human modes of consciousness reveal it to us; a knowledge of the laws of objective existence as that existence appears to man expressed in general terms.”⁵ Demonstrativeness is a mark of a portion of such knowledge *only in so far as* the realities considered find themselves immersed in those forms which are susceptible of quantitative treatment. Science lurches a metaphysical right when it advances the Pythagorean claim that in phenomena reside the principles of number, and denies the ‘scientific’ reality of such groups of facts as are not reducible to those principles. “It is the systematizing of experience by explaining the different groups of phenomena through the discovery and the verification of the existing uniform relations.”⁶ Science, as

¹ *Werke*, I., 29.

² *Preface*, I., 370 f.

³ Cf. *Werke*, Dieterich, *Kant und Newton* Tübingen, 1876, pp. 2, 72 ff., et al; cf., *Werke*, II., 288, 294 f.

⁴ *Logic*, Oxford, 1884, I., 277.

⁵ Hodgson, *Phil. of Reflexion*, I., 80.

⁶ Ladd, *Introduction to Philosophy*, New York, 1890, p. 66.

such, is to be satisfied when the heterogeneity of isolated phenomena has been converted into the homogeneity of a law which expresses the uniformity of their behavior.

Such a conception, however, did not prevail with Kant; and psychology, far from being a science, was given only a *negative* significance in the philosophical system. As 'Seelenlehre,' it fell within the precincts of metaphysics, where the course of Criticism brought it under the ostracizing ban, expelling it from any legitimacy as an object for human research.¹

The attainment of Kant's conception of psychology requires a further elimination. The admitted sciences, logic, metaphysic, ethic (and æsthetic) were so closely articulated under the idea that 'alle Erkenntnisse stehen unter einander in einer gewissen natürlichen Verknüpfung,'² and so firmly bound with the ligaments of philosophic architectonic,³ that they need dissecting and an estimation of his separation of psychology from these three respectively.⁴

With the growth of Kant's insight, there appears an increasing extension of the domain of metaphysics, while there remains a tolerably constant element as to what constitutes the particular task before it. In 1764⁵ 'die Metaphysik ist nichts Anderes, als eine Philosophie über die ersten Gründe unserer Erkenntniss.' A more specific determination that 'die Metaphysik ist eine Wissenschaft von den Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft'⁶ appears in 1766. While in the important dissertation (1770) the chief element of *a priori*, or a purity from all empirical dross, appears in the conception that 'Philosophia autem prima continens principia usus intellectus puri est Metaphysica.'⁷ When Criticism had matured we find metaphysic to

¹Notwithstanding, there is a sense in which 'die Psychologie.....ist ein Theil der philosophischen Wissenschaften, zu denen die Logik die Propädeutik sein soll.' *Werke*, VIII., 18-19. What significance this has, will appear shortly when the relation of psychology and logic are treated of. Philosophy, however, merely remains as 'Metaphysik und Logik.' *Werke*, VII., 426; cf. IV., 236.

² *Werke*, VIII., 49.

³ *Werke*, VII., 27, 49.

⁴Vide *Critique*, II., 714-730.

⁵ *Werke*, II., 291.

⁶ *Werke*, II., 375.

⁷ *Werke*, II., 402.

be 'in reality nothing but an inventory of all our possessions acquired through pure reason systematically arranged.'¹ When this 'inventory' has been tabulated, "metaphysic, in the more limited sense of the word, consists of *transcendental philosophy* and the *physiology* of pure reason. The former treats only of understanding and reason themselves in a system of all concepts and principles which have reference to objects in general, without taking account of objects that *may be given*: the latter treats of nature, *i. e.*, the sum of given objects, and is therefore *physiology*, although *rationalis* only." The principles of metaphysic having been wrought out, there followed an application of them to objects, resulting in "the whole system of metaphysic: 1. Ontology, 2. Rational Physiology, 3. Rational Cosmology, 4. Rational Theology. The second part contains two divisions, viz., *physica rationalis*, and *psychologia rationalis*."² Additional passages, of which there are many,³ merely explicate in more detail the already noted definition of metaphysic—chiefly in determining 'the objects' which properly belong to it, or in delimiting the field of metaphysical knowledge from that empiric sort which is gone over by psychology. The chief passage⁴ which maintains the deviation of metaphysic from psychology, has special reference to the source of the data of which each science treats. Again, in the *Critique*,⁵ in circumscribing the limits of metaphysic, the ejection of psychology is more cruel. "Empirical psychology must be entirely banished from metaphysic, and is excluded from it by its very idea." Yet it does not stand

¹ *Critique*, II., p. XXIX.

² *Critique*, II., 725-727.

³ Briefly told, metaphysic investigates "die Möglichkeit der Erkenntniss *a priori*." VIII., 454. Cf. Kant's own excellent commentary notes scattered throughout his essay entitled 'The Progress of Metaphysic since Leibnitz and Wolff,' VIII. cf. 520, 524, 576, etc.,

⁴ "Was die Quellen einer metaphysischen Erkenntniss betrifft, so liegt es schon in ihrem Begriffe, dass sie nicht empirisch sein können. Die Principien derselben (wozu nicht blos ihre Grundsätze, sondern auch Grundbegriffe gehören), müssen also niemals aus der Erfahrung genommen sein; denn sie soll nicht physische, sondern metaphysische d. i. jenseit der Erfahrung liegende Erkenntniss sein. Also wird weder äussere Erfahrung, welche die Quelle der eigentlichen Physik, noch inneré, welche die Grundlage der empirischen Psychologie ausmacht bei ihr zum Grunde liegen. Sie ist also Erkenntniss *a priori*, oder aus reinem Verstande und reiner Vernunft." IV., 13.

⁵ II., 728.

an isolated body of 'artful' knowledge. "It has its place by the side of applied philosophy, to which pure philosophy supplies the principles *a priori*; thus being connected, but not to be confounded with it." The complete disregard for psychology, even as then developed, could not be more pathetic than when he suddenly reinstates it, doubtless influenced by an undercurrent of cherishing memory of his earlier academic programmes.¹ "We shall probably have to allow to it (though as an episode only) a small corner in metaphysics, and this from economical motives, because as yet, it is not so rich as to constitute a study by itself, and yet too important to be banished entirely and to be settled in a place where it would find still less affinity in metaphysic." One can scarce suppress the regret that Kant so underestimated the value of psychology in the solution of metaphysical problems as he understood them. "Fortunately," says Hodgson,² "we possess a genuine *a posteriori* experimental psychology, a true science, which is daily yielding results of the highest value to many able and distinguished investigators. Fortunately for the world, and fortunately also for metaphysic, for metaphysic will derive from that psychology an independent support and verification." Yet that regard should be seasoned with a remembrance of the facts that those very problems, whose difficulties melt away as psychological theory advances, were first raised by Kant himself; and the meagreness of a true psychological doctrine was one source of his difficulties; and, on the other hand, that this 'genuine *a posteriori* psychology' as 'a true science' is to be regarded as an offspring of Criticism itself.³ Still, after all is said, one feels disposed to muse, whether even an indefinite extension of 'modern experimental' psychology will ever clarify the speculative obscurity of those 'metaphysical' problems which take their rise in psychological phenomena. We wonder.

Kant is, also, as stringent in his demand that there shall be

¹ *Werke*, II., 316f; Erdmann, *Reflexionen Kant's zur Anthropologie*, p. 63; cf., Carl du Prel, I., *Kant's Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 5-6, 12-50.

² *Phil. of Reflexion*, I., 227.

³ Cf., A. Classen, *Ueber den Einfluss Kants auf die Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung u. d. Sicherheit ihrer Ergebnisse*, Leipzig, 1886, *passim*.

a wide gap between logic and psychology. Indeed, on the former disparateness of psychologic 'opinion' and 'metaphysical' science rose the whole structure of Criticism itself; while the divergence of logic from psychology provided the foundations of that edifice on the former science. Having once determined what the 'sure' science of Criticism required, Kant looked about for some corner stone which should have the inherent potency of shaping the structure, and not merely the kindliness of a propædæutic. Accordingly, this was to be had in the logic of Aristotle which 'has not had to retrace a single step; so that to all appearance, it may be considered as completed and perfect.'¹ Logic, in itself, deals with the 'necessary rules' of the understanding. It answers the question, not how we *do* think, but how we *must* think.² General logic is either 'pure or applied,' 'analytic or dialectic,' 'elementary logic or an organon' of a particular science. In a passage recommending certain rules to logicians there is expressed the specific difference between logic and psychology: "1. As general logic it takes no account of the contents of the knowledge of the understanding nor of the difference of its objects. It treats of nothing but the mere form of thought. 2. As pure logic it has nothing to do with empiric principles and borrows nothing from psychology (as some have imagined, *i. e.*, of the influence of the senses, the play of imagination, the laws of memory, the force of habit, the inclinations, and, therefore, the sources of prejudice also), because psychology has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. It proceeds by way of demonstration and everything in it must be completely *a priori*."³ The transformation of this general logic into absolute universality gave the 'Transcendental Logic' whose explication resulted in the medley of philosophical divisions which the *Critique of Pure Reason* really presents.

Thus it is seen that psychology has as little to do with the logical foundations of metaphysic as it has share in the latter science. And, while Kant is so careful in eliminating all psy-

¹ *Critique*, I., 364-5.

² *Werke*, VIII., 14, 16; II., 318; *Critique*, II., 46-54.

³ *Critique*, II., 46-7.

chological elements in transcendental logic, he is also aware of a pretty close and definite relation between general logic and psychology.¹ No less is he lenient with the defects of psychology, and allows it a possible value; but he remains in agreement with former sublimations of logic as the true propædæutic to philosophical inquiry.

While the first duty is to explain our author and to note his own inherent consistency, criticism has no birthright in this preliminary work, much less to foist upon him the developed conceptions of a century later. Of all the empirical sciences—and logic must be classed as such—logic, no doubt, was the one having a most finished form in the time of Kant; and for his purposes he was right in drawing the fixed line we saw him to have marked between it and the vagarious psychology then in vogue. Notwithstanding, the impulse to turn aside and briefly consider the relation of these two sciences cannot be withstood.

Perhaps no more serious debate—though less verbose—has been carried on during the century than that which has engaged psychologists, logicians and epistemologists as to the functions of their respective disciplines. Logic, in the fixed Aristotelian form, has suffered considerable breaking up since Kant's time. A most recent "conception of logical science is that of an unprejudiced study of the forms of knowledge in their development, their inter-connection and their comparative value as embodiments of truth." Logic is no longer the abstract, rigid rules for the attainment of truth, but is 'the morphology of knowledge.'² Psychology does not only describe and classify the facts known by introspection, but it must now dip down into 'the genesis' of every conscious state. Noëtics, too, is out of harmony with the empirical sciences from which it gathers its data, unless it gives due cognizance to the forms of ideation, processes of cognition, etc.

All this change in viewing the various knowledges has come about by admitting into the sciences, and 'working it for all its

¹*Reflexionen*, etc., p. 70, No. 24; *Werke*, VIII., 14; VIII., 18-19; cf., *Critique*, I., 365; VII., 445, note.

²Bosanquet, *Logic*, 1884, Title page, and Preface, p. V.

worth,' that very conception of which Kant was one of the earliest defendants. He, himself, did a great service (though disputed by the friends of Laplace) to modern cosmogony by weaving in this conception in an explanation of the origin of the stellar universe.¹ He also made a somewhat fanciful, yet partially defensible psychological application of the same hypothesis in his 'Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte.'² It is the conception of evolution, whose 'doctrine he enunciated, if he did not formulate.'³ Standing as he does, at the source of that doctrine, which has been at least one of the greatest factors in recent scientific developments, it would be an unpardonable injustice to turn a flaw-searching glance even upon his tenets which were developed long after his success in applying the conception and formulating a satisfactory doctrine.

As to the self-sufficiency of logic, or its subsumption under psychology, there has been no little contention. There has been reached, however, a tenable agreement as to the proper relation which neither detracts from the historic virtue of the Aristotelian form, nor shelters any disparagement to the worthy attempt of this science to progressively establish an organon of truth. In one sense, logic is a propædæutic to every science. In their procedure, and as forth-puttings of the understanding, they must go to logic for their vindication. Logic has confessedly to do with thinking; and wherever thoughts are arranged with reference to an ideal, as the attainment of particular or general truths, there is logic's proper domain, whatever may be the content of that logic. In this (limited) meaning, logic is propædæutic to psychology, but the exact character of that propædæuticity must be established by aid from the psychologist. This, however, is only a formal relation, and is unproductive of advance within logic itself or in any other department of knowledge. In so far as Kant's separation of logic

¹ Cf., *Werke*, II., 207-345, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*, 1755.

² *Werke*, IV., 313-329.

³ Cf., *Werke*, IV., 188, V., 432 f., VI. 340; also Dieterich, *Kant u. Rousseau*, Tübingen, 1879, p. 26 f., 98; Bax, *Kant's Prolegomena*, etc., London, 1883, p. LXX; Bernard, *Kant's K. of Judgment*, London, 1892, p. XXVIII.

from psychology, with reference to philosophical system itself, is made from this formal standpoint, he is right. For, in this formal aspect, philosophy, from the days of Thales to the hour of 'the final philosophy,' could never even step within its rightful domain, if psychology were the introduction. But a defensible exception might be taken to Kant's emphasis of 'form' over 'matter.'

Fortunately, there remains another side to the relation between these two sciences. It has reference to the material with which they deal respectively. This, we take it, has been 'the bone of contention,' and, wherever philosophical investigations have grown up from the acceptance of one view or the other, they have invariably been diametrically influenced by that credence. With respect to its content logic is dependent upon psychology. We must, as it were, have gone through psychology, before logic has any right to appear. What is it to think? What are the processes involved in thinking? are the preliminary questions to which psychology must, in the first instance, return any answer. By a description of the variations which occur in the so-called thinking processes, logic receives a contribution which it treats in its unique manner. Logic is regulative of the forms of cognition of which it learns in psychology. In so far as logic is regulative, or "deals with the correct method of discovery and verification in the particular sciences, it is but an apartment of applied psychology."¹ And Kant is certainly in error in wielding his cleaver so forcefully on this relation as to deny² that even logic is responsible to psychology for its material. For the moment granting a special character to logic, one must say with Porter,³ "it is through psychology that we reach the very sciences to which psychology is subject and amenable."

There yet remains a third possible relation, directly from which springs philosophical systems either as logical or psychological. In reality it is a fusion of the two already mentioned, with a metaphysical claim added. Logic often appears, *c. g.*,

¹Ladd, *Introd. to Phil.*, p. 99.

²*Werke*, VIII., 14.

³*Human Intellect*, New York, 1884, p. 15.

in Kant, as treating of cognition in the forms of the universal, or, with metaphysical reference, as in Hegel. Now the special task of theory of knowledge is to investigate the problem of knowledge with respect to its reality. Logic has also reference to the validity of cognitions, *i.e.*, objectively, but only with reference to their formal truthfulness. Psychology deals with knowledge and the processes of cognition subjectively.¹ It is this relation of their respective intent, or purport of the treatment which each provides. But, as Baldwin says,² "as a formal skeleton or framework of thought, logic misses the meaning, the motive which is alone valuable to psychology." Here is Kant's error, since the content of Criticism or philosophy proper was received directly from logic.

So far the cognitive aspects of psychology and those sciences which confessedly deal with cognition and the real, have been considered as to the distinction Kant makes between them. Psychology also treats of impulses and actions—which Kant will soon be seen to have recognized—and there is a 'science' which treats of them in their 'objective' aspect; while psychologic emotions have their philosophic correlative in æsthetic. A brief mention of the disparity placed between these by Kant will permit us to come to a more definite and empiric conception of psychology and to the divisions he made.

In conformity with the effective idea of *a priori* as it was carried out in metaphysic, separating the pure from the empirical-psychological logic, Kant introduces the same division in the ethical sphere. The first passage showing the influence and possible outcome of Criticism expressed doubt as to a pure rational treatment of ethics. "Although the highest principles of morality and their fundamental concepts are *a priori* knowledge, they do not belong to transcendental philosophy, because the concepts of pleasure and pain, desire, inclination, free will, etc., which are all of empirical origin, must here be presupposed. . . . Everything practical, so far as it contains motives, has reference to sentiments, and these belong to empirical sources of knowledge."³ Only when the Critical doctrines confront the

¹Cf., Sully, *The Human Mind*, London, 1892, II., 350 f.

²*Handbook of Psychology*, New York, 1890, I., 271.

³*Critique*, II., 13.

persistent Antinomies does the difference between psychological and transcendental freedom emerge.¹ In the 'Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten' it appears as the special problem of ethics to establish this transcendental freedom as a function of rational beings.²

The practicality of such a reason must lie in the possibility of will being law-giving, unhampered by the empirical conditions and processes of motivation. Since 'empirische Principien taugen überall nicht dazu, um moralische Gesetze darauf zu gründen,'³ it becomes needful to separate 'Ethik' like 'Logik,' 'wiewohl hier der empirische Theil besonders praktische Anthropologie, der rationale aber eigentlich Moral heissen könnte.'⁴ Ethics, as such, deals with the concept of freedom *a priori*. "Vorausgesetzt, dass ein Wille frei sei; das Gesetz zu finden, welches ihn allein nothwendig zu bestimmen tauglich ist."⁵ Such a principle Kant will find without any reference to empirical principles of morality.⁶ It is in this will itself that the determinative quality of an end and action is to be found. On *a priori* grounds, in so far as it is seen that 'reine Vernunft ist für sich allein praktisch, und gibt (dem Menschen) ein allgemeines Gesetz, welches wir Sittengesetz nennen,' is it possible to derive the objectivity of the law. "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne."⁷

With great passion Kant defends ethics from any admixture with psychology and appears not a little jealous of the self-sufficiency of *a priori*. Psychology, however, has ethical bearing and significance when the rule of pure ethics would be set in the causal, phenomenal life of man; that is, when the 'Moralische Anthropologie' would formulate 'Rechtslehre' and 'Tugendlehre.'⁸

¹ *Critique*, II., 388 f., 417 f.

² Cf., *Werke*, IV., 237, 294 ff., V., 3 f.

³ *Werke*, IV., 290.

⁴ *Werke*, IV., 236 ff., cf. 275.

⁵ *Werke*, V., 30, Sec. 6.

⁶ Cf., *Werke*, V., 43 f., 21 ff.

⁷ *Werke*, V., 32, 33.

⁸ *Werke*, V., 98-99; *Reflexionen*, etc., p. 70, No. 24; Cf., VII., 12-18; VI., 395, 'Die Sittenlehre verlangen von den Psychologen,' etc., V., 9, foot-note, gives

Natural science, or 'Physik' in the broad sense as dealing with that which is, is science only so far as it is mathematical; from this it gains that certainty which is universal. Ethics, however, obviously admits of no mathematical treatment, though "man kann also einräumen, dass, wenn es für uns möglich wäre in eines Menschen Denkungsart, so wie sie sich durch innere so wohl, als äussere Handlungen zeigt, so tiefe Einsicht zu haben, dass jede auch die mindeste Triebfeder dazu uns bekannt würde, imgleichen alle auf diese wirkenden äusseren Veranlassungen, man eines Menschen Verhalten auf die Zukunft mit Gewissheit, so wie eine Mond-oder Sonnenfinsterniss anrechnen könnte."¹ Yet 'pure ethics' is claimed to have that same universality which belongs to the speculative half of metaphysics. The discovery of the moral law by the critical method finds attached to it the quality of being 'categorical,' which makes its unconditional universality. When this is found to be its *a priori* element, the 'science' ceases to be metaphysical and must drop to an empiristic level.

In this relation of psychology to ethics Kant has overlooked the true relation between them. The former must first bring to our cognizance the ethical elements of consciousness. The origin and individualistic nature of the conception of an ideal which is recognized as good and worthy, and desirable over and above that which is actually existent, needs first to be traced. The moralist vitiates his science when he erects an ideal in utter disregard of what are the common sentiments of mankind. Their approval of actions and ethical relations does not stand aloof from the character given it by its development. No ethics, not even Kant's, carries itself a little way without calling in psychological discussions on the possession and comparative quality of those sentiments and motivations which contribute in the realization of the ideally good. Ethics, on the other hand, becomes distinct only as it takes these unique sentiments and their inter-developments as revealed in psychology,

an excellent statement as to what psychological presuppositions enter into ethics, and their limits, viz., the definitions of the ethical faculties, the conceptions of good, pleasure, etc.

¹ *Werke*, V., 103 f.

and tries to determine the validity of their empirical claims. To find their 'objective import' is quite a different thing from noting their rise. What they mean, however, can never be told with contempt for what they are.¹ Even the 'Imperative' can be shown to be a generalization from ethical experiences in which many of the truly 'ethical data of feelings and judgments' are not taken account of.²

The sum of true philosophy, according to Kant, is found by adding 'metaphysic' and 'ethics.' When this point is reached the 'scientific' content of metaphysic is at an end. Yet the Critical philosophy comprehends a third critique. But æsthetics is not a 'science.' It is merely 'the criticism of taste.' The attempt to bring 'the critical judgment of the beautiful under rational principles and to raise its rules to the rank of a science is a vain endeavor.'³ For, 'weil alle Bestimmungen des Gefühls bloß von subjectiven Bedeutung sind (and never can be elevated above their empirical origin), so kann es nicht eine Ästhetik des Gefühls als Wissenschaft geben, etwa wie es eine Ästhetik des Erkenntnisvermögens gibt.'⁴ Judgment, or æsthetics, however, possesses a principle *a priori*, but it is only subjective.⁵ Hence this lack of 'objectivity' proscribes its share in the transcendental philosophy. It is a subsumption of the particular under a universal, but a universal that has its essence in the feelings, either of the beautiful or the sublime. "So kann es mir erlaubt sein in der Bestimmung der Principien eines solchen Vermögens, dass keiner Doctrin, sondern bloß einer Kritik fähig ist, etc."⁶

Æsthetics, nevertheless, has a unique relation in the system of the sciences of pure reason. Unity is the constant aim of philosophy, and the hierarchy of the 'sciences' is wont to express the relations the bodies of truth hold to the knowing mind. But understanding (cognition) stands separated from reason (morals). The phenomena of causality have been so dirempted

¹Cf., Sully, *op. cit.*, II., 362 f.

²Cf., Ladd, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff.

³*Critique*, II., 19 note.

⁴*Werke*, VI., 387 f.

⁵Cf., *Werke*, V., 192, 271, 417; VI., 380, 389 ff.

⁶*Werke*, VI., 400.

from the realm of freedom that there appears an impassable gulf between the sensible and the super-sensible. Criticism can only complete her task in endeavoring to span this chasm and make possible this realization of the ideal and intelligible in a real and sensible world. It searched for that 'Erkenntnisvermögen' which shall unite all rational elements.¹ In the judgment is found the unique 'faculty' dealing with the subjective feelings of beauty. Though, as here intimated and as will appear fully in the sequel, æsthetic deals with a 'faculty' of empirical origin, Kant has yet vigorously maintained his attack upon all attempts to introduce empirical elements which would spoil the 'purity' of all the principles. This is likewise the case in the psychological basis of the æsthetical feelings.² Psychology can never assume the function of testing the *a priori* validity of whatever consciousness may apprehend as having reference to the beautiful. This requires special philosophical criticism.

The relation of philosophical æsthetics to psychology is about the same as that which obtains between it and ethics. In fact, the working out of any theory of the beautiful constantly runs back to the explanation offered for the rise of such phenomena. Psychology answers the very same questions which appear before an æsthetical theory, *viz.*, what are the distinguishing marks of æsthetic pleasure, etc.? The latter inquires as to the 'objective' nature of beauty: what is it really to be beautiful? But the only way of coming to the beautiful is through the æsthetic delight which we experience. Thus, no philosophical account of that which is pleasing to us, and has an agreeableness common to all, can be adequate without closely linking itself to the analysis and genetic account of those states of consciousness which are uniquely pleasurable. Kant is to

¹ "There must be a ground of the unity of the super-sensible which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no particular realm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other." V., p. 182, Sec. ii. (Bernard's trans.)

² V., 274; cf. VI., 395.

be seconded in denying to any account of *how* I happen to have a 'beautiful' feeling or a cognition of the sublime, the character of philosophical explanation. But metaphysical æsthetics lies much nearer the despised psychology than he is wont to admit. Even his own æsthetical theory has adequacy only as he invokes the psychological data accessible in this department of mental science.

Thus, it is seen, by 'wissenschaftliche Encyclopädie,' Kant means the hierarchy of philosophical truths as they are contained in the three 'sciences' of metaphysics, ethics and æsthetics, and not such a coördination of the empirical sciences as has been attempted since his time. Metaphysics is to be the 'matron' who apportions to each of them the principle or principles which are to guide research in experience. In attaining positively the 'scientific' elements in philosophy according to Kant's views, we have also found that psychology is pushed out on every hand, virtually yielding the negative aspects of this forlorn body of truth. In its scientific limitations, both as respects its function as a propædæutic to philosophical system, and its inherent virtue claiming for it a distinct place within the system of the science of pure reason (though we shall find a certain aspect of psychology does come within the limits of rational science), or even a right entitling it to a sector within the encyclopædia of the sciences—*on these three points Kant was firm in the negative*. To what extent he was justifiable is appreciable in the light of the general handling which psychology received previous to him. Whether the relations he affirms between psychology and philosophy can remain unquestioned may be seen in the course of this study.

CHAPTER III.

KANT'S POSITIVE CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND THE FORM OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

It was comparatively easy in the previous chapter to arrive at Kant's notion of what constitutes 'science,' and to exhibit what he means to comprehend in philosophical system. In so doing there were half-furtive, half-heedless glances cast towards psychology, or again, a passionate vigilance in keeping off surprises from the begging empiricism which constantly appeared under the cognitive or affective aspects of psychological doctrines. Now careful inspection must be the prelude to an answer. Kant always entertained psychological interests, but he never developed them into a literary form. What he meant by a knowledge of the soul, what its scope and how far subject to methods, all this is to be gathered in the bits and crumbs scattered throughout the active half century after 1755. What that means has already been estimated. The nature of the data makes it necessary that, even in a search for positive results, there be a remanent examination of what has preceded.

The determination of Kant's idea of what constitutes psychological inquiry is further embarrassed by a two-fold encounter. First, and what must ever be a source of apprehension as to the adequacy of these representations, and of misapprehension of the data to be gone over, modern psychology poses as a definite science. It assumes, as Sully says,¹ 'the modest title of Empirical Psychology,' because it draws inferences respecting the laws of the analyzed facts which fall within its domain, and properly separates from itself and hands over to another department of human activity the consideration of such ultimate problems as the nature of mind, its relation to the world of

¹ *Op. cit.*, I., pp. 3 f.

reality, etc. This is a demarcation that must be accredited to the developments in recent psychology (though it ought to be confessed that its devotees have not always endeavored to maintain it in their discussions). The difficulty here becomes a tendency to interchange Kant's and present-day notions of psychology.

The second difficulty grows out of the first, but has a larger historic background, *viz.*, the confusion of the two or three aspects of psychology. It was after the precedent set by Wolff, says Meyer,¹ that psychology considers two separate disciplines, *viz.*, empirical and rational. This division was accepted by Kant in the form into which it had been modified by the various phases of the Wolffian school. But Kant does not rest the distinction upon what we may call a 'scientific' basis. The division appears to take its rise in his general theory of knowledge.²

In general, rational psychology has to do with the 'logical *ego*, the subject of apperception,' and empirical psychology with the 'subject of perception, the psychological *ego*.'³ There appears a further separation of empirical psychology from anthropology, the latter being 'eine Lehre von der Kenntniss des Menschen, systematisch,' etc.⁴ A consideration of these interrelations and separations must first be made. We have, then, two couplings; 1, Empirical Psychology and Rational Psychology; 2, Empirical Psychology and Anthropology.⁵

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 207.

² The constant epistemological character of Kant's opinions, as they here, *e.g.*, appear on the surface, is worthy of far more than a way-side note. For the most part Kant actually fails to maintain a distinction between the psychological and epistemological aspects of any question, a distinction which it is so difficult to keep above 'the threshold of consciousness.' Many scientific and philosophical considerations are valuable only in proportion as this vital relation is constantly in mind. The absence of it in Kant—and he is not blameworthy, for it is chiefly through him that there is the possibility of this relation being discerned—is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, inherent difficulty continually assailing the integrity of this study. So far as possible and necessary, it is aimed that the discussion shall be aware of this double-faced aspect of many of the salient points with which it must deal.

³ *Werke*, VIII., 531.

⁴ *Werke*, VII., 431.

⁵ This latter separation has been overlooked by Meyer (*op cit.* 267) though he has, as we shall see, Kant's own expressions for their identification.

Coupling first is 'Empirical Psychology *vs.* Rational Psychology.' The first distinct mention Kant is found to make of psychology is rather an anomaly. It is quite a mixture of psychological and *noëtic* implications turned to a fanciful account. It has chiefly a biographic value in showing how completely, in one sense, Kant changed his opinions (though no rare thing for the immature man). Here is expressed not only the complete dependence of the soul on the body; but even the mental life is a forth-putting of the force in the universe. "Es ist aus den Gründen der Psychologie ausgemacht . . . dass, mit der Lebhaftigkeit des Leibes, . . . die Hurtigkeit des Gedanken, die Klarheit des Vorstellung, die Lebhaftigkeit des Witzes und das Erinnerungsvermögen werden kraftlos und erkalten." The imperfections of man "findet sich die Ursache in der Grobheit der Materie, darin sein geister Theil versenkt ist, in der Unbiegsamkeit der Fasern, und der Trägheit und Unbeweglichkeit der Säfte welche dessen Regungen gehorchen sollen," and even "nach dem Verhältniss der Abstandes ihrer Wohnplatz von der Sonne." The value of rational consciousness as a means for the study of animate beings, especially man, and the genesis of that consciousness and its various contents, which is the chief problem of the psychologist, are estimated when he says: "Der Mensch ist dasjenige unter allen vernünftigen Wesen, welches wir am deutlichsten kennen. Des unendlichen Abstandes ungeachtet, welcher zwischen der Kraft zu denken und der Bewegung der Materie, zwischen dem vernünftigen Geiste und dem Körper anzutreffen ist, so ist es doch gewiss dass der Mensch, der alle seine Begriffe und Vorstellungen von den Eindrücken her hat, die das *Universum* vermittelt des Körpers in seine Seele erregt, sowohl in Ansehung der Deutlichkeit derselben, als auch der Fertigkeit, dieselben zu verbinden und zu vergleichen, welche man das Vermögens zu denken nennt, von der Beschaffenheit dieser Materie völlig abhängt, an die der Schöpfer ihn gebunden hat."¹ Such were the views of Kant, *the scientist*, trying to understand the universe from the standpoint of matter and force. Psychology is made amenable to astronomical mechanics.

We shall not meet such expressions again. The next time

¹ *Werke*, I., 333 f., 337.

(1765) there appears a suffusion of those metaphysical explanations which were beginning to brew in the awakening Kant. There is a separation of the two parts of psychology, but both fall within metaphysics.¹ Empirical psychology always fell within metaphysics during his pre-critical lectures, as Erdmann says,² and only diminished in importance as he built up material for anthropology. He writes to Herz³ (1778): "Empirische Psychologie fasse ich jezt kürzer nachdem ich Anthropologie lese." In the already quoted passage in the *Critique*,⁴ empirical psychology is allowed to have 'a small corner in metaphysic,' but only 'from economical motives.'⁵

After the critical epoch, empirical psychology is sharply severed from rational psychology and can never pass within the *a priori*.⁶ They have a common basis laid in that experience which expresses itself thus: "Ich bin mir selbst bewusst;" but they begin to diverge in so far as there advances a treatment of the 'Ich' in 'der erstern' or 'der zweiten Bedeutung.'⁷

But psychology, *i. e.*, empirical psychology,⁸ in its positive aspect (for we shall see later that rational psychology is a science, but only in a negative sense), can never be a science. It can never be more than 'bloße Meinen.' If psychology cannot be a science and contains nothing *a priori*, what can it be and of what does it treat? An answer to this question is found, among others, in a long passage in the preface to the 'Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.'⁹ It contains his views

¹On which his lectures for that year and following were to begin 'nach einer kleinen Eintheilung, von der empirischen Psychologie an, welche eigentlich die metaphysische Erfahrungswissenschaft vom Menschen ist; denn was den Ausdruck der Seele betrifft, so ist es in dieser Abtheilung noch nicht erlaubt, zu behaupten, dass er eine habe." II., 316.

²*Reflex.*, p. 63.

³*Werke*, VIII., 706-7.

⁴II., 728.

⁵In Kant's *Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, reprinted by du Prel, 1889, almost half of the treatment of 'Psychologie' is bestowed on empirical psychology.

⁶*Cf.*, *Werke*, V., 274, VIII., 547.

⁷*Werke*, VIII., 530-531.

⁸*Cf.*, *Werke*, VI., 395: 'Psychologie-darunter man immer nur die empirische versteht.'

⁹*Werke*, IV., 361.

on the problems of psychology, its relation to the sciences, its standpoint with reference to its material, and the nature and limitation of the modes of inquiry (points to which we shall refer shortly), that it must be quoted at length. "Noch weiter aber, als selbst Chemie, muss empirische Seelenlehre jederzeit von dem Range einer eigentlich so zu nennenden Naturwissenschaft entfernt bleiben, erstlich, weil Mathematik auf die Phänomene des inneren Sinnes und ihre Gesetze nicht anwendbar ist, man müsste denn allein das Gesetz der Stetigkeit in dem Abflusse der inneren Veränderungen desselben in Anschlag bringen wollen, welches aber eine Erweiterung der Erkenntniss sein würde, die sich zu der, welche die Mathematik der Körperlehre verschafft, ohngefähr so verhalten würde, wie die Lehre von den Eigenschaften der geraden Linie zur ganzen Geometrie. Denn die reine innere Anschauung, in welcher die Seelenerscheinungen construirt werden sollen, ist die Zeit, die nur eine Dimension hat.¹ Aber auch nicht einmal als systematische Zergliederungskunst oder Experimentallehre kann sie der Chemie jemals nahe kommen, weil sich in ihr das Manigfaltige der inneren Beobachtung nur durch bloße Gedanken-theilung von einander absondern, nicht aber abgesondert aufbehalten und beliebig wiederum verknüpfen, noch weniger aber ein anderes denkendes Subject sich unseren Versuchen, der Absicht angemessen, von uns unterwerfen lässt, und selbst die Beobachtung an sich schon den Zustand des beobachteten Gegenstandes alterirt und verstellt. Sie kann daher niemals etwas mehr, als eine historische, und, als solche, so viel möglich systematische Naturlehre des inneren Sinnes, *d. i.*, eine Naturbeschreibung der Seele, aber nicht Seelenwissenschaft, ja nicht einmal psychologische Experimentallehre werden. . . ."

Psychology treats "von dem Erstehen der Erfahrung, sondern nicht von dem, was in ihr liegt. Das Erstere würde selbst auch da, ohne das Zweite, welches zur Kritik der Erkenntniss gehört."² It "erklärt das was geschieht, und beschäftigt sich mit Gemütskräften."³ It considers the nature of cognition in its

¹Cf., *Werke*, VI., 395.

²*Werke*, IV., 52, Sec. 210a.

³Erdmann, *Reflex.*, p. 70, No. 24.

genesis and resources, and the conditions under which it is modified;¹ the source of the various feelings and emotions and how they are affected by the developments in the individual and in society;² and "die Handlungen und Bedingungen des menschlichen Wollens überhaupt."³ Psychology, then, with Kant merely describes 'unseren Vorstellungen des inneren Sinnes,' going back to the genesis of experience and classifies its various products as they appear, in the one intuitional form of time,⁴ to that observation which marks out the 'Stoff zu künftigen systematisch zu verbindenden Erfahrungsregeln sammeln, ohne sie doch begreifen zu wollen.' Such is 'die einzige wahre Obiegenheit der empirischen Psychologie.'⁵

Yet both empirical and rational psychology bear a common fate. They suffer the noëtic verdict estranging them from genuine knowledge, *i. e.*, science. In the one case, there *lacks* the *a priori* element, which leaves it *far behind*, arising from the inherent impossibility of the subject-matter being treated that way; while in the other, there is the well-known criticism that it *steps beyond* the limits of true knowledge, arrogating the attainment of truth respecting a certain portion of the supersensible.

Rational psychology, however, differentiates itself from empirical observations as to its method, its content and its aims. It at least wins for itself a claim to be considered as a 'science' by the method with which it proposes to deal with its subject-matter. "In der rationalen Psychologie wird die menschliche Seele nicht aus der Erfahrung, wie in der empirischen Psychologie, sondern aus Begriffen *a priori* erkannt."⁶ Observation, or mere appearance, counts for nothing here. Every step is to be apodictically secured by the *a priori* analysis of concepts; and the science is to be made up of '(transcendental) propositions which are synthetical knowledge acquired by reason according to' such concepts.⁷ That is, by means of her syllogisms, reason shall

¹ *Critique*, II., 48; *cf.*, VIII., 18.

² *Werke*, VI., 395.

³ *Werke*, IV., 238.

⁴ *Werke*, IV., 361, VI., 395.

⁵ *Werke*, VI., 396.

⁶ *Vorlesungen*, p. 52.

⁷ *Critique*, II., 619.

determine a totality of phenomena as they are rendered in that unconditioned which bears 'a relation to the subject.'¹

The aim in all this is to ascertain "wie viel wir von der menschlichen Seele durch die Vernunft erkennen könne . . ." But, "die einzelnen Sätze der rationalen Psychologie sind hier nicht so wichtig, als die allgemeine Betrachtung der Seele von ihrem Ursprunge, von ihrem zukünftigen Zustande und der Fortdauer;"² or, as the *Critique* puts it, its assertions "can only be of any value in so far as it enables me to distinguish the soul from all matter, and thus to except it from that decay to which matter is at all times subject."³ To reach this end it is proposed to apply this method to its conceptual content. Whatever theoretical or practical aims they may have in common, the two branches of psychology fall asunder in so far as one is limited and the other capable of any indefinite experiential extension of its method and content. For rational psychology can deal only with 'cogito' or 'ego cogitans.' "The term *I*, as a thinking being, signifies the object of psychology which may be called the rational science of the soul, supposing that we want to know nothing about the soul except what, independent of all experience, can be deduced from the concept *I*."⁴ There must not creep in any empirical element, "because the smallest empirical predicate would spoil the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience." There is, however, a certain relation to experience which this conception bears. "We take nothing from experience beyond what is necessary to give us an object of the internal sense. . . . This is done through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical internal representation I think)."⁵ This concept is the only one possible, and is selected, "because this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, I think, without which all, [even] transcendental concepts would be impossible."⁶ Although the object of rational psychology is of empirical extrac-

¹*Ibid.*, 280, 290.

²*Vorlesungen*, 52.

³II., 310.

⁴*Critique*, II., 298.

⁵*Ibid.*, II., 728.

⁶*Critique*, II., 298.

tion, "it must be observed, that if I have called the proposition, I think, an empirical proposition, I did not mean to say thereby that the *ego* in that proposition is an empirical representation; it is rather purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general."¹ The almost infinitesimal proximity of the two branches of psychology is seen in the caution that "the smallest object of perception (even pleasure and pain), if added to the general representation of self-consciousness, would at once change rational into empirical psychology." Nothing is left but the 'I think—the only text of rational psychology out of which must evolve all its wisdom.'²

The limitation of rational psychology is further seen in the fact that the 'psychological idea' is never given in any experience as such, but is born of pure reason.³ Treating only of the '*ego* of apperception',⁴ it can go no farther than to exhibit the concepts of the immateriality of a thinking substance, its changes, and the identity of the person within these changes. It necessarily remains a small science.⁵ It remains to be said that it is only a pretended science. "There is no rational psychology as a doctrine, furnishing any addition to our self-knowledge, but only as a discipline, fixing impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, partly to keep us from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, partly to warn us against losing ourselves in a vague, and for this life, baseless spiritualism."⁶

A critical consideration of empirical psychology we shall pass over until the second couple has been noticed, while the relation of the two branches of psychology with a study of Kant's conception of the same will be taken up when we come to treat of the latter.

Our second coupling was 'Empirical Psychology *vs.* Anthropology.' Its significance is not so great as that of the former

¹*Critique*, I., 503 note.

²*Critique*, II., 299.

³*Werke*, IV., 97.

⁴*Werke*, VIII., 531.

⁵*Werke*, VIII., 547.

⁶*Critique*, I., 502; cf. *Werke*, IV., 110; V., 475.

couple.¹ But the difference goes for something, though Kant is vacillating in his expressions of the distinctions he made. These cannot be taken entirely as they stand, but must be appreciated in the light of the historical developments attending Kant's anthropology, which have been painstakingly traced by Erdmann.²

In his early 'scientific' period, Kant engendered a taste for physical geography which developed throughout his life, resulting in the cosmopolitic anthropology of old age and bearing with it distinct traces from each successive epoch in his own mental development. When he began lecturing on anthropology is not well made out. In 1793³ he writes Stäudlin that these lectures have followed annually more than twenty years; and in 1798 he appended a note to the preface of the then published work in question, saying that for 'more than thirty years' he lectured on anthropology and physical geography in the summer and winter semesters respectively.⁴ However that may be, his physical geography had been assuming such proportions during the three preceding decades that in 1773-4 it is divided and a portion is given the name 'Anthropologie' for the first time. 'Out of moral and political geography sprang this new science,' which, as he wrote Herz (1774),⁵ he wished to make a regular academic study. And, in fact, Kant was the first in Germany to raise anthropology to an academic rank. The true object of anthropology is not man as an individual, who merely represents the species, but, as a member of the totality of the human race. Man, writes Kant (1775),⁶ should be studied not as he is, *i. e.*, as an object singly regarded—for of this treats empirical psychology; but he must be considered

¹ Yet one can say, from an experiential point of view, that Kant's anthropology is a sort of a self-erected center pole, around which hangs what is truly Kantian. Cf., Bastian, *Die Vorgesch. d. Ethnologie*, p. 62 note, on the relation of anthropology to metaphysic and philosophy.

² *Reflexionen*, etc., pp. 37-61.

³ *Werke*, VIII., 791.

⁴ Emil Arnoldt in *Altpreuss. Monatschr.*, 1890, pp. 97-110, makes out that B. Erdmann (*Reflex.*, I., i., p. 48) is in error when saying Kant began to lecture on anthropology in 1773-74, it being rather in 1772-73.

⁵ *Werke*, VIII., 696.

⁶ *Werke*, II., 447.

'cosmologically,' 'in ihr Verhältniss im Ganzen.' This gave the new science an indefinite extension, and there was no problem in psychology, logic, æsthetics, ethics, pedagogy, jurisprudence, etc., which did not have its value in this totality. As here hinted, anthropology is entirely 'pragmatical'; but it grew up out of the physical and political elements which enter into that world which is 'das Substrat und der Schauplatz auf dem das Spiel unserer Geschichlichkeit vor sich geht.'¹ It is only in its architectonic form that it is 'physical-political-moral,' *i. e.*, pragmatic. What this new science was to Kant, that was to contain 'die Kenntniss des Menschen,'² is best expressed by Erdmann:³ "Dieselbe ist ein Kind von Kant's geseeligen Anlagen und seines früh entwickelten psychologischen Beobachtungstalentes, gross gezogen unter der Vorsorge der physischen Geographie, später hin vor allem ausgestattet mit den Materialien der empirischen Psychologie für die Kant sonst wie bekannt keinen rechten officiellen Platz hat."

Such an opinion, as just expressed, in regard to the fate of empirical psychology, is no doubt true in one sense, and justly finds support in what Kant wrote to Herz in 1778.⁴ On the other hand, Meyer's conclusion,⁵ that Kant threw empirical psychology overboard into the great sea of anthropology, is properly based on numerous expressions.⁶ Erdmann⁷ also attempts to reduce them to an equivalency; so far as their methods are concerned, 'wird anthropologisch gelegentlich gleich bedeutend mit empirisch.'⁸

Notwithstanding these reductions, it must be maintained that there is a wide distinction made between anthropology and

¹ *Werke*, VIII., 153.

² *Werke*, VII., 431, VIII., 151.

³ *Op. cit.*, 52.

⁴ "Empirische Psychologie fasse ich jetzt kürzer nachdem ich Anthropologie lese." VIII., 706 f.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 213 f., 267.

⁶ *E. g.*: "Psychologie sei blos Anthropologie des inneren Sinnes," etc., V., 175; "Alles Uebrige [*i. e.*, everything excepting *rational* psychology] aber empirische Psychologie, oder vielmehr nur Anthropologie ist," etc., VIII., 547, *cf.* 570.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 51, note 4.

⁸ And wishes several distinctions in the *Critique* to be so interpreted. *Critique*, II., 722, 729, etc.

empirical psychology, on the one hand, and rational psychology on the other. In the former instance, Erdmann is quite right in identifying them; but he can be justified only to the extent of *method*, when Kant makes the sweeping distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori*. This one point of agreement, however, is not sufficient to sink one into the other. From the standpoint of essentials, those which make them even empirical sciences, they stand far apart. They differ as to the limits within which they must circumscribe themselves, and as to the ends for which their respective knowledges are systematized. Psychology treats of the individual solely. Anthropology considers the totality of the race. Psychology has reference to the course of ideas as consciousness reveals their three-fold variety. Anthropology's "Absicht ist durch dieselbe die Quellen aller Wissenschaften, die der Sitten, der Geschichlichkeit, des Umgangs, der Methode Menschen zu binden und zu regieren, mithin alles Praktischen zu eröffnen."¹ Psychology is satisfied when observation as to what takes place in the 'innere Sinne' has been duly recorded. The difference between them could not be more manifest. That empirical psychology crept into anthropology is easily seen in the fact that its results are data which the latter must properly gather up, and are helpful in historic explanations, as *e. g.*, Kant attempts in his own description of psychologic evolution of human history from animal instinct.²

In the second instance, anthropology stands far from rational psychology, both as to method, content and avowed aims. The former is empiric, world-wide, pragmatic. The latter is a small, *a priori* science, beating back 'soulless materialism' from the one standpoint of the logical *ego*.

Gathering up results, which will aid in sorting the material,

¹*Werke*, VIII., 696, letter to Herz, 1774; cf., II., 447, VII., 474, VIII., 151, 570, 706 f.

²*Werke*, IV., 313 f. With all this difference it is still a fact that 'Anthropologie' is one of the chief sources of his empirical psychology. But such an unkindness to psychology, as such, induces a hesitation in taking a detailed review of Kant's conception and treatment of psychological material. The significance of Kant's treatise on anthropology, which was very popular, but temporarily, in the historic foundations of that science, is much less than its academic influence in German universities. Cf. Bastian's *monograph*, pp. 7 ff., Topinhard, *Anthropology*, trans., pp. 1 f., 15 f.

we can say, rational psychology is a (pretended) science that endeavors to know the nature of the soul through reason alone. Empirical psychology is the (impossible) science of the phenomenal mind as it is given in the stream of consciousness. Anthropology is the empirical knowledge of man set in a physical and social universe.

"Psychologisch beobachten mithin Stoff zu künftigen systematisch zu verbindenden Erfahrungsregeln sammeln, ohne sie doch begreifen zu wollen, ist wohl die einzige wahre Obliegenheit der empirischen Psychologie."¹ The intrinsic scope of psychology is fairly well recognized by Kant. It endeavors to unify 'der Lauf unseren Vorstellungen' by a systematic reduction to laws, 'unseren Vorstellungen' taken in the meaning pregnated by the developments of the Leibnitzian monadology, later to break forth in the Herbartian psychology. But Kant stands in historic disagreement and mistakes the function of psychology when he pronounces upon its relation to the physical sciences and characterizes the methods to which it is limited.

The relation of psychology to the other sciences finds its basis laid in the 'nature' of psychologic things. Those phenomena by whose peculiarity "the psychologist" is forced to be something of a nerve physiologist,"² exhibit the fact that man is set in a mass of relations not of a psychic sort. This gorgeous variety that surges upon consciousness is recognized 'not to be of itself.' The demand that a science shall be, so far as possible, explanatory, not merely descriptive, means that causation has been the fertile factor in the modern developments, and shows that psychology can go but a little way ere it invokes the biologic results of the physical sciences. In one sense, that is physical science, the manipulation of causation among phenomena. And psychology has been persistent in its efforts to realize in its own equipment its mutuality with the physical sciences. The extent

¹*Werke*, VI., 396. It scarcely needs be pointed out, that Kant did not and could not mean 'observation' in the methodized sense in which it prevails today. Cf., "aus der Psych. d. i. aus der Beobachtungen über unseren Verstand," (VIII., 14), or (V., 388), "welche methodisch angestellt wird und Beobachtung heisst."

²James, *Psychology*, New York, 1890, I., p. 5.

to which this impulse goes is generally to call upon physiology and neurology. The supposition of some sort of relation between bodily conditions and 'mind states,' either *a parte ante* or *a parte post*, yields a warrant. And we shall find Kant, the empiricist, or 'the cool, psychological realist,' as Dieterich calls him, maintaining a 'thorough-going, blank unmeditated correspondence' between brain states and bodily conditions, and the course of ideas and feelings; but not in any such manner as the since-developed biological sciences permit. This, however, is not to his detriment, nor should it be a prejudice to his age.

Kant, however, in making the essence of science to be mathematics, denies such a development to psychology. With him it is separated from the sciences in a far different manner than is done nowadays. The subject-matter of psychology, in a general way, is quite as easily distinguished from that of the material sciences as are the boundaries of any of those among the latter.

But to point out the specific differentiations between psychology and the natural sciences is not quite the easy task so generally supposed, as appears from Ward's discussion of 'the standpoint of psychology.'¹ The distinction involves not only the integrity of the science, but, also, and to a very determinative extent, limits the methods applicable in psychological research. Physics, in the general sense, confessedly deals with objects of the external sense. They have space relations, as *e. g.*, the weight is *in* the balance. The psychological objects are sometimes spoken of as 'in' or 'out,' as the idea of a tree is in my mind, but never in the sense of spatiality. They are objects of the inner sense, *i. e.*, are subject to time only, are merely before or after. This is a wide-reaching and 'negative' distinction, which, as we shall see, was the psychological stumbling block to Kant.

Besides the distinction of external and internal, which Ward criticizes as inadequate for its purpose, there is a positive feature belonging to its phenomena which serves to mark out the field of psychology. It is by the way of this characteristic that the former is made possible. When we speak of an internal object,

¹*Art. Psych.*, Encyc. Brit., 9th ed., Vol. XX., pp. 37 ff.

we refer to some one in a series which goes by the name of conscious experience. A feeling never occurs alone. Nor is a thought separated and handled, tossed to the way-side to lie until the remanent psychologist examines it. On the contrary, they are set in a series, a series that is not arranged from without, as books on a shelf. But a series with all its infinite variety that is grouped in some hap-hazard way by a consciousness to which they belong. Not only is his range of objects limited by the need that they must 'be regarded as having place in or as being part of some one's consciousness,'¹ but also "the first fact for a psychologist is that thinking of some sort goes on," with every 'thought' tending to become a part of a personal consciousness.² Into this stream of consciousness the psychologist must plunge and from it return with whatever sort of a science he may, he can define it only as the science 'of the states of human consciousness, as such.'³

To Kant, with whom "die Psychologie ist eine Physiologie des innern Sinnes oder der denkenden Wesen,"⁴ these facts appeared in a negative sense entirely. Whether it should relate itself to the physiological sciences, as foreseen by Alcmaëon,⁵ or actually carried out by Fritsch and Hitzig and others,⁶ or to physics, as the changes conditioned by the introduction of its data and reduced to numerical measurement; or, even whether it could stand alone by that method which is its peculiar birth-right, *viz.*, 'introspection' in either its subjective or objective forms, it was all the same. There could be no science of psychology. And, since the relation it might bear to other departments of knowledge depends upon the reduction of the data to a common form; and also, since Kant has always stood the great champion of the valuelessness of introspection⁷ and nullity of exact method in their application to the inner sense, we shall briefly consider the data and method which are at the psychologist's hand.

¹Ward, *loc. cit.*, p. 38, col. 2.

²James, *op. cit.*, I., 224 f.

³Ladd, *Outlines of Phys. Psych.*, p. 3.

⁴*Vorlesungen*, 6.

⁵Cf. Siebeck, *Gesch. d. Psych.*, Gotha, 1880, I., i., pp. 89 f., 103 f.

⁶Cf., Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, pp. 253 f.

As a finished product, psychology presents us with a typical mind, something that is never realized in experience; otherwise it would descend into mere biography. Nevertheless, psychology in the first instance is 'individualistic,' and the chief method of collecting its data must come by the way of that 'standpoint from which these experiences are viewed, viz.: some one's consciousness' (Ward). This material is ever at first hand; we know our feelings and our efforts immediately. So far as the psychologist is concerned, "the phenomena inwardly apprehended," as Brentano¹ says, "are true in themselves. As they appear, so they are in reality." The mere having of these 'inward phenomena' is not introspection. Their 'immediacy' is not enough. Still it is their 'immediacy' which makes adaptable that method on which "we have to rely first and foremost and always."² It is the inflexion at a late stage of that consciousness which from the very beginning had the tendency to become 'a personal consciousness.'

Kant denies adequacy to this method. In the above quoted preface³ he maintains that "the manifold of internal observations is only separated in thought, but cannot be kept separate and be connected at pleasure again. Even the observation itself alters and distorts the state of the object observed." These are objections that did not perish. They have been urged since, e. g., by Auguste Comte and Dr. Maudsley, growing into debates as to psychological methods. Such objections are true, but paradoxical, demanding of every one that he be fit for a psychologist's leap. The mere fact of a reflective consciousness, however, is no more the accoutrement of a psychologist than mere star-gazing constitutes an astronomer. They are objections that would reduce psychology to mere autobiography which would, in any attempted analysis, belie its very title. But in this individualism of its data lies the superiority of the method over that of the physical sciences. Its data can be only

¹ *Psych.*, bk. II., chap. III., sec. 2, cited by James, *op. cit.*, I., 187. This view should not be taken in the same sense as is to be understood by Beneke's guiding thought 'that through self-consciousness we know ourselves psychically just as we really are.' Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.*, II., 281.

² James, *op. cit.*, I., 185.

³ *Supra*, p. 40.

in a consciousness. On the other hand, it is true that introspection is not absolute. It, too, is subject to disturbances, as Sully points out in his work on 'Illusions' (Chap. VIII.); though its "errors are numerous, yet are all too slight to render the process of introspection as a whole unsound and untrustworthy." James' unearthing of 'the psychologist's fallacies' meets Kant's second objection, while the first finds its counterpart in that 'stream of thought,' the treatment of which is always difficult and fallible.

"Still less," adds Kant, "is another thinking subject amenable to investigations of this kind." Pure introspection could never take us outside our own thoughts and feelings. Moreover, while psychology is of an individualistic origin, and must necessarily be of the same type for a longer or shorter way, it cannot remain there. Just as psychology cannot stop when it has concluded a graphic consideration of neural tremors, so it must enlarge its field beyond that of mere introspective manipulation. It must transcend its certain morbidity, crack its shell, and become 'objective' in a generous meaning of the term. Consciousness is to be regarded as 'an object,' and not merely as belonging to a me, over which I must brood. Even here, Kant consistently denies the possibility of a psychology. For the comparative method of collecting psychological data can never pass beyond the validity and reach of introspection. It is a varied and later form of the latter. It comes in auxiliary, and essentially is the anthropomorphism of the introspective method (as Baer¹ demands it must be in anthropology). "We watch the manifestation of mind in others, and interpret these by the aid of our own conscious experiences."² But the treatment psychology gives is not of consciousness as of the individual, but 'as such.' It must roam amongst its manifestations not only in the infant's mind, in the exceptional or abnormal minds, but also into that 'collective mind,' where our historic foundations are entombed, even into that of the animal consciousness. No doubt Kant is right in complaining that none of this is quantitative. Yet we estimate by instituting

¹ Cf., Bastian, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

² Sully, *op. cit.*, I., p. 18.

comparisons between experiences of the like kind, never passing from one group to another.

Kant spurned psychology not so much, it seems, from the fact that the use of the only method possible produces disturbances in the data. For he himself makes use of the 'observation' which he elsewhere¹ recommends to it, not only making some additions, but also accepting them as foundations on which the whole Critical philosophy and its articulation into a system rest. In the nature of the subject and its incompatibility with quantity is to be found the real source of his condemnation. From the general tone that prevails, it seems that this condemnation would best be understood as a desideratum, while he may secretly wish, with Herbart,² that psychology might yet find her Newton.

On the other hand, Kant laid emphasis and insists throughout on the 'negative' features of the data of psychology. That is, the distinction between external and internal sense, the latter being consciousness, plays a great rôle, often to the production of havoc. He would have science conform itself to his metaphysics of apperception. "Still farther even than chemistry," he might be heard to say, as the last and chief objection, "must empirical psychology be removed from the rank of what may be termed a natural science proper; because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and its laws, unless, indeed, we consider merely the law of permanence in the flow of its internal changes; . . . for the pure internal intuition in which psychical phenomena are constructed in time has only one dimension." This was after the *Critique* had been thought out. "It can never therefore be anything more than an historical, and as such, as far as possible, systematic natural doctrine of the internal sense, *i. e.*, a natural description of the soul, but not a science of the soul, nor even a psychological experimental doctrine."

In so far as the content of a science can be consequentially effected by its method, this opinion as to the possibilities of psychology relates itself in a two-fold way to the Critical philoso-

¹ *Werke*, VIII., 14.

² *Werke*, Vol. VI., p. 463.

phy. Anticipating possible results of our study, it must be said that the drift of Kant's speculations goes against that very materialism, which was then so rampant, and which Kant undoubtedly thought would be the outcome of any psychology that would be quantitative, *i. e.*, as a 'science' that would have its 'pure part,' which meant, "Metaphysik der Natur, d. i., Principien der Notwendigkeit dessen, was zum Dasein eines Dinges gehört, beschäftigen sich mit einem Begriffe, der sich nicht construiren lässt, weil das Dasein in keiner Anschauung *a priori* dargestellt werden kann."¹ As Kant himself worked this out, there resulted matter as characterized by force and motion. He even purposed to treat 'Seelenlehre' in the same manner; so he wrote Schütz in September, 1785. The fate of his intention is clearly seen in the above quotations from the preface of the work as it appeared the following year.

It also has its bearings in a positive way with the Transcendental Æsthetic, which provided the only possible form of all qualification, *viz.*, that in which motion becomes a mark of the permanent. Duration, simply, cannot suffice. In a negative aspect, this is inconsistent with one of the principles in the 'Analytic,' *viz.*: "The anticipation of perception, whose principle is: 'In all phenomena sensation, and the Real, which corresponds to it in the object (*realitas phænomenon*), has an intensive quantity, that is, a degree.'" A "sensation by itself² is no objective representation; and, as in it the intuition of neither space nor time can be found, it follows that though not an extensive, yet some kind of quantity must belong to it. . . . That quantity must be intensive and corresponding to it, an intensive quantity must be attributed to all objects of perception so far as it contains sensation." It is not true, however, as Weber's law indicates,³ that sensations rise gradually with the 'quantity' of the stimuli, nor that sensations, subjectively considered, have this gradually changing quality which Kant calls 'degree.' The phenomena of the rhythm of consciousness, as *e. g.*, in the ebb and flow of the perception of the barely audible ticking

¹ *Werke*, IV., 359.

² As the 2d ed. explains, I., 465-466.

³ Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, pp. 365 f.

of a watch, shows that there is a periodicity in sensations whose rise and fall are best indicated by the steps of a stair.

It also is curious that the nature of psychology as it was seen in 1786 did *not* have a *corresponding* influence on the second edition of the *Critique*. As Itelson¹ calls attention to it, there remains this inconsistency between the possibilities of psychology and the principle on which the judgment is permitted to construct the rules of all perception.

In cutting off this last resource, as it were, of the science of psychology Kant does not critically anticipate the modern developments which have come about mainly by the adoption of experimental methods of gathering its data. Speculations were then rife concerning the possibility of a psychometry. Wolff already² said, "theoremata haec ad *Psychometriam* pertinent quæ mentis humanæ cognitionem mathematicam tradit et ad huc in desideratis est. . . . Dari etiam mentis humanæ cognitionem mathematicam, atque hinc *Psychometriam* esse possibilem." Bernoulli (1738) had discovered the dependence of the *fortune morale* on the *fortune physique* (which was in some sense an anticipation, as Fechner says, of Weber's law), and was further developed by Laplace and Poisson. Euler (1739) had treated of the relation of the sensation of tone-intervals to the rate of vibrations.³ Against this brewing of experimental psychology in the middle of last century, as foreseen in Wolff's expression,⁴ "monuimus, Psychologiam empiricam Physicæ experimentalis respondere," Kant remained steadfast, not however in the sense that experimentation results, as he says,⁵ in an 'Unding,' which might be transformed by an arrangement about metaphysical principles; but from a transcendental standpoint he negated the possibility of the science. The objections raised

¹Cf., *Archiv für Gesch. d. Phil.*, 1890, p. 286., cf., *Werke*, IV., p. 55, Sec. 24.

²In his *Psychologia Empirica* (1732), Sec. 552. Wolff's opinion is also echoed in Baumgarten's *Metaphysik* (Sec. 552), with which Kant was familiar, since he used it as the basis of his lectures. Cf., *Werke*, II., 316, 43.

³Cf., Fechner, *Elemente d. Psych. Physik*, II., 548 ff; Külpe, 'Anfänge und Aussichten der Exp. Psych.', in *Arch. f., Gesch. d. Phil.*, 1892, Bd. VI. II. 2 p. 170 ff.; Itelson, *loc. cit.*; Sommer, *Grundzüge einer Gesch. d. deutsch Psych. etc.*, Würzburg, 1892, p. 3 f.

⁴*Op. cit.*, Sec. 4.

⁵*Werke*, VI., 377.

by Kant undoubtedly interfered, as Külpe surmises, with the growth of those investigations carried on by the surging Wolfian and eclectic schools of those decades.

However far this objection against the unsatisfactory condition of psychology at that time is of an architectonic origin, it is now a fact that psychology rightfully undertakes the measurement of psychical phenomena as to time, intensity and extensity or their voluminousness. As to the validity of psychophysical methods, it must be said that the psychologist profits by them only in so far as they extend his horizon and present him carefully selected data. Beyond this, or when he becomes lost in his experimentation, he forfeits his scientific birthright. Methods of gathering data do not solve psychological problems. In all its departments the science is, as Prof. Ladd maintains for the physiological portion, 'first experimental and then speculative.'¹ The variations in methods come with the variations in the character of the activities, data concerning which are to be ascertained. Experimental psychology is not psychology by virtue of its methods. They are an elastic garb that only covers up those real processes which ferret out explanations. Thus, then, Kant is right in maintaining that psychology is not and cannot be demonstrative. But far be it from us—the admission that psychology remains an 'Unding.'

It has already been seen how Kant's philosophy limited itself to the foundations of science as they appeared in logic and physic. From the view as to what is possible to psychology from the standpoint of method, we can now affirm with Hegler,² that "Kant's ganze Erkenntnisstheorie ist auf die Wissenschaft der Natur zugeschnitten, die Psychologie ist von Anfang an nicht gleichberechtigt." An explanation for this is ventured here, which may appear clearer farther on, that Kant, while really contributing much to noëtics—and we would not undervalue nor diminish the fame of his services in this regard—only attempts, or at most, only makes out a theory of perception so far as external objects are concerned. His difficulties can be understood from this point of view, and the metaphysical foun-

¹*Phys. Psych.*, p. 12.

²*Die Psych. in Kant's Ethik*, Freiburg, 1891, p. 33.

dation of science finds its extension to objects in the objective sense of that term. The struggle with 'objectivity' and a disregard for psychology send out reciprocal influences.

Inquiries relating to the physical basis of mind life admit of two kinds of considerations; one, of what sort and of what extent is the phenomenal relation that may obtain between the body and its concatenating nervous systems, and the flow of consciousness? the other, what shall be the answer to the ultimate question: what is this relation, and how shall it be resolved? The one problem disappears before the scalpel and a pricking pin, by strenuous determination and a rage of anger. The other goes beyond the length of observation, and begins with the consistent adjustment of conceptual facts. The one confronts us in empirical psychology; the other conducts us into philosophy itself when the nature of the real, so far as it concerns mind, is to be wrought out.

This distinction is made by Kant. Of all psychological points that are confessedly two-sided, this is probably the one where Kant appears properly as the empirical realist and a metaphysical idealist when required. He recognizes the length to which empiricism can go, and demands that at that point the problem be taken up by metaphysics.¹ Beyond this statement we can hardly go, except for the sake of historical curiosity. It is not to be expected that he speak of the correlation of mind and brain with any such explicitness as the theory of localization of cerebral functions now permit us. He must needs confine himself to the crude state in which were the chemical and anatomical sciences. Our inquiry is satisfied when it is discovered that he, as a psychologist, has consulted the physiological knowledge of his day, and an investigation into the question, as to how far *he* consistently adopted this knowledge, is useless here.

There are, however, a few points which should be mentioned. At times he speaks as a medical psychologist,² writing a tract on the diseases of the head; again as a physiognomist,

¹*E. g.*, cf., his letter to Herz, *Werke*, VIII., 696.

²It might be mentioned that, when still a youth, the medical profession was inviting to him.

giving more or less credence to the phrenological theory then formulating by the German physician, Gall. Many of these opinions are full of that humor in which Kant delighted, or contain biographical material.¹ It is as a psychologist that he details these relations in a manner and to an extent interesting to note in comparison with present tendencies. It is not merely the intelligence, but the whole mental life of man, that stands in connection with the body. "Die Gemeinschaft ist die Verbindung wo die Seele mit dem Körper eine Einheit ausmacht; wo die Veränderungen des Körpers zugleich die Veränderungen der Seele, und die Veränderungen der Seele zugleich die Veränderungen des Körpers sind. Es geschehen im Gemüt keine Veränderungen, die nicht mit der Veränderungen des Körpers korrespondirten. Ferner so korrespondiert nicht allein die Veränderungen, sondern auch die Beschaffenheit des Gemüts mit der Beschaffenheit des Körpers. Was die Korrespondenz der Veränderungen betrifft, so kann in der Seele nichts stattfinden, wo der Körper nicht ins Spiel kommen sollte."

This is detailed in the various ways of thinking, volition, emotions and passions, and the modifications of external origin through the senses. "Die Seele affiziert gar sehr das Gehirn durch das Denken." "Also ist das Gehirn die Bedingung des Denkens." "Das Wollen affiziert unsern Körper noch mehr, als das Denken." "So wird der Körpers auch sehr affiziert wenn der Menschen in Affekten und Leidenschaften gerät." "Auch die äusseren Gegenstände affizieren meine Sinne . . . durch diese Affektion der Nerven geschieht das Spiel der Empfindung in der Seele, etc."² Over against this *naïveté* in the sort of correspondences, appears the plodding course of physiological psychology which carefully passes from the physiology of the senses to the more doubtful localization of the 'higher' mental activities.

Or, again, Kant admits a reciprocal action between the soul and body. The former is as much temporally responsible as to what occurs to a certain extent in the latter,³ as *vice versa*.

¹As, e. g., "Der Streit der philosophischen Facultät mit der medicinischen," VII., 409-428.

²*Vorlesungen*, p. 47 ff.

³Cf., also *Werke*, VI., 457, VII., 409 f.

Nowadays it is at times maintained that the brain is responsible for all, and a mechanical conception is made to do the service of both science and a metaphysic.¹ Kant, however, constantly expresses a doubt as to the complete carrying on of this reciprocal action, which we shall notice when we come to the imagination. As a scientific doctrine, it would be unjust to pit Kant with more modern formulæ, as was said above. And so far as it is given a metaphysical interpretation, it must be reserved until we take up rational psychology, where will appear an estimation of what seems to be the relation between the philosophical and physiological aspects of psychology, and also as this relation appears in Kant.

So far there has been a general elimination, or a comparison of psychology with other departments. The circumscription gained from a general preliminary view is the safeguard when approaching details. The separation of psychology as a science, and the pointing out of some causal, or, at least, temporal relation between the mind and the neural substrate, does not complete the possibilities. The psychologist deals with the facts of consciousness, in which every fact seems to be linked to a body. But it soon appears that this consciousness in the individual is not continuous, but either is periodically intermittent, or can be interrupted extraneously. So, for psychology there appears the third general consideration of consciousness, its varieties and possible negations.

This distinction appeals not only to the physiologist objectively, as a general and variable concomitancy of mental manifestation, but he gives it a subjective turn when he invokes the aid of assimilative tendencies, or unconscious natural synthesis, to the perceiving of an object. The whole doctrine of sensibility, as it stands in the forefront of the science, is affected by the recognition of the possibility of some sensations being 'unattended to.'

The distinction is of no less importance in a theory of knowledge, or at least has been made so. Constructiveness (as pre-eminently Kant) in the knowledge of things, or in the being of things as known (Lotze), is flatly vitiated by mere con-

¹As, e. g., partially appears in James's *Psychology*.

consciousness when it says, "I merely perceive this or that." A constructiveness it must then be which is of some mystic sort, unknown except by rational positing, and incurring the objection from James,¹ that the notion of such an internal, hurly-burly machine-shop is shocking. And not only in a theory of knowledge is the distinction helpful or treacherous; but the difference is one turned to the account of metaphysics, where it repays by calling the Schopenhauerian world a blind, unknowing, unconscious will; or, as in his disciple, the essence of the universe or absolute finds its remarkable expression in the unconscious. On the other hand, its opposite is made to be the real, as the monads of Leibnitz, or the conscious souls of Lotze.

Indeed, the great problem in all philosophy is how consciousness can or does come from the unconscious. And the facts which appear early in psychology, as the distinguishing marks of its data, have their bearing throughout the course of philosophical discipline, and grow in importance when the nature of consciousness is sought in order to carry over the scattered tenets of its analyses into the ultimate synthesis which it is the constant effort and special right of philosophy to attempt. Schools of philosophy begin to part way when they enter upon their respective treatment of consciousness. For inquiries into the nature of consciousness take us back to beginnings. But beginnings are always profound. When a thing is 'realized,' we appreciate its reality and think we understand it when we are finally compelled to defer one question, *viz*: how did it become? Still, Lotze's frequent musing that we do not completely understand what a thing is by describing how it came to be, may have its full truth. Yet, when we wish to pronounce upon the ultimate nature of the world-ground we can defensibly do so in no other terms than are warranted by our psychological analysis of consciousness. We must be at least so anthropomorphical as to affirm of reality no less than what we find in ourselves, but affirm by the special right of a rational defense.

This variety of uses to which the distinctions between the conscious and unconscious is put, indicates the elemental psy-

¹ *Op. cit.*, I., 363.

chologic variation which must be differentiated, at least for preliminary treatment. Not only is it a factor in the conceptions of the psychologist, but he must at once proceed to establish, in some tenable manner, the mind's relation to other things by answer to a question so variously prominent since Locke: "Are we ever wholly unconscious?" It emerges when he sets out on his way by equipping his science with those general characteristics of mind among which attention, as conscious selection, appears. How far consciousness figures in those sensations which are attended by perceptions, whether there is necessary the distinction of the form of being conscious of something, or conscious of it through remembering; how far ethical tenets may require imputability of my actions, if habits are 'unconscious' modes of my being, etc., etc., are only preliminary empirical questions which culminate in the highest form of the consciousness of life. When the empirical laws of the mind's synthetic activity are being discovered, the same distinction presents itself in the form of what is ordinarily called mere representation or feeling, against which reasoning must force a positing of submerged activities, or technicalize it and think it sufficient to pass under the name of apperception. Here it passes into one's theory of knowledge and the query becomes, what function has it in that synthesis which must make for cognition and reality? In affirming a perduring unity, the philosophy of mind appeals to it in some way as ramifying all the infinite variation we actually find in sensuous elements, and expects of it a potency that makes for an *ego*, yesterday, to-day and forever. Finally, when philosophy ceases with 'the facts of life' and passes to its 'unitary conception of the world,' it must *a fortiori* weave into its last words the great facts of 'the psychic half over which it dare not draw the pall' in its empirical advance, and adequately account in reality for all that pervades *our* life and without which there could not have been one jot of that experience which urges us on to the riddles of existence. Consciousness is the great fact, and only grows in importance and acquires an ontological momentum as we pass from the survey of the silent fact of awakening from deep sleep, to the conclusion, that, that surveying consciousness is itself set in a unified Reality of which he can be scarce more than a sympathetic sensation.

But we must hasten to say that the nature of consciousness is not to be dwelt upon here, nor can there be tested the implications of a psychological doctrine in a philosophical discipline. On the contrary, here is properly indicated the place of those psychological considerations which assume varied forms in the mental life, and to mark out where Kant appears in the scheme, limiting the discussion to those sections where he properly belongs. Kant does not go to the length of this matter, especially in the first stages of its empirical side, as the results of recent psychical and natural research now require. Nor does he appear to treat it in its proper psychologic forms, except in a very general way in perception and in the consciousness of the empirical self. The philosophic implications are profoundly drawn out, as is well known, in his deduction of the categories; and the possibilities of consciousness, *i. e.*, tenets in regard to personality, etc., are negated in the rational psychology. Of course his sceptical outcome gave him no right to attempt a weaving-in of the factor of consciousness in reality. In a general way it will become us to test the legitimacy of his claims as to the impossibility of extending positive inquiries as to the nature of the individual mind and of what may be beyond.

It must suffice here to point out that Kant recognizes not only the antithesis of the conscious and the unconscious, but also makes much of the latency of, or degrees in consciousness. This was only a historic reflection from Leibnitz's doctrine of monads and their representations.¹ After Locke's discussion and Leibnitz's theory, consciousness and its characteristics became of special interest. Accordingly, we find Kant speaking² of representations of which we may be unconscious, though "darin scheint ein Widerspruch zu liegen;" or again, recognizing 'degrees' both in consciousness³ and in the knowledges which it throws off.³ We find him even going to the length of giving the distinction a positive significance in his theory of the categories, saying, "that synthesis, the faculty of imagination, is a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which

¹Cf., Duncan's trans. of Leibnitz's *Philosophical Works*, p. 218 ff.

²*Werke*, II., 298, 346 note, VII., 445 f.

³Cf., *Critique*, I., 497 f., *Werke*, IV., 55, 438; VIII., 65.

we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of the existence of which we are scarcely conscious."¹ Indeed one feels, at times, disposed to take the very conception of the *a priori* and the whole system of transcendentalism as a most acute parody on the unconscious.

The first thing needful in scientific inquiry is the analysis of material. Methods merely supply data, which, being submitted to that process, begin to assume scientific function. Since psychology first began its career under the hands of Aristotle, this duty of classification was recognized and became crystallized in his classification of the various souls and their forces (*δύναμειν*).

The necessity of such analytical procedure has not yet disappeared. Indeed, one might say that the analysis of mental functions constitutes the very definition of psychology and truly comprehends the whole task of such inquiry. It is of these that psychology treats, and such a division can have meaning only when the work of the psychologist has been accomplished. Moreover, one dare not present a scheme and then endeavor to fill in with observations. If psychology is to be empirical, it must by all means distinguish itself from that scholastic procedure which began, as Drobisch says,² with such expressions as "Ich verstehe unter Vernunft, unter Verstand, etc., das und das." One may overlook such attempts when men confine themselves to speculation as yielding the truths of nature. We may find traces of this very spirit in Kant himself.

The division of the faculties has had its great rôle in the history of philosophy. Cartesianism recognized reason and will as the chief characteristics of mind and sought to weave from them such philosophical doctrines as should somehow allow for the explanation of other elements of human nature; *e. g.*, the passions. English thinking, as clearly expressed in

¹*Critique*, II., 69; *Cf.*, *Crit.*, II., 92. "This consciousness may often be very faint, etc." But he also denies total unconsciousness, saying, "to sleep and to die were one and the same, if dreaming were not added." "Man kann aber wohl für sicher annehmen, dass kein Schlaf ohne Traum sein könne, und wer nicht geträumt zu haben wähnt, seinen Traum nur vergessen habe." *Werke*, VII., 505, 506.

²*Emp. Psych.*, p. 302.

Reid, swung about the 'intellectual' and the 'active powers.' A still more famous instance of how psychology in this way *has* been the starting point in philosophy—at times so unconsciously—we will find in our own author. Whether this is *the* service that psychology can and dare render to reason in her attempts to understand the world may constantly appear throughout the study.

The remark must here be made that more or less confusion has entered into the analysis of mental functions, especially the meaning which it can have. Now it is undertaken in a purely psychological spirit. Then, again it has savored of ontology, where the reconstruction of hard and fixed faculties into a doctrine of the simplicity of the soul to which they belong has found its great historic culmination in that rational psychology which Kant attempted to pierce through. It must be borne in mind that 'mental faculties' serve a psychological purpose, but assume another aspect, which should be clearly distinguished, when the attempt is to make a philosophical use of them. It is not comparatively easy to keep this distinction in view, and we shall find Kant groping in the same darkness.

A study of Kant's psychology and philosophy has, as R. Quäbicker says,¹ 'to satisfy itself before all else with the rational psychology and the doctrine of the faculties of the soul.' In this sense, and truly, his empirical psychology comprehends the detailed examination of the faculties and their relation to Criticism *ab ante*, and, rational psychology in its relation *ad post*, as being an application of the principles of Criticism. We shall first trace the development of the division of the faculties within Kant's own mind; then gather the special divisions whose ramifications lead us into the particular consideration of empirical psychology; with a remaining inquiry as to the fact and an estimation of the formal relation of Kant's psychology and the Critical philosophy.

According to Meyer,² the first mention made by Kant of the elemental powers of the soul is found in 1764 (?; 1763); but, in the treatise on "Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund, &c.,

¹*Phil. Monatsheft*, Bd. IV., p. 116.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 41.

für das Daseins Gottes," appearing in the year preceding that in which was issued the work mentioned by Meyer, Kant says: "die Eigenschaften eines Geistes sind Verstand und Willen,"¹ and turns the statement to his immediate ontological purpose. In 1764 he did his psychologizing on 'das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen,' but later in the same year considers the relation of the faculties, first as explanatory necessities, and secondly as to the ultimate nature of our reduction when we have 'run down' a faculty, as it were.² In the same writing³ he approves of the psychological progress, saying: "Man hät es nämlich in unseren Tagen allererst einzusehen angefangen, dass das Vermögen, das Wahre vorzustellen, die Erkenntniss, dasjenige aber, das Gute zu empfinden, das Gefühl sei, und dass beide ja nicht mit einander müssen verwechselt werden." Not only a partial expression of the inner relation of the faculties, but also of their relation as to philosophical distinctions, is implied in his musing "ob lediglich das Erkenntnisvermögen oder das Gefühl (der erste innere Grund des Begehrungsvermögens) die ersten Grundsätze [der Sittlichkeit] entscheide."

This was Kant's own first conquest over the variety of internal states. The distinction between knowledge and feeling already lay deep when the effect of scepticism began to seethe within him. Then he writes to Herz⁴ of his psychological discovery and his philosophical intention.

Here it appears that Kant made a distinction within the realm of what had heretofore, in modern psychology, been considered as the 'Begehrungsvermögen' or 'active powers.' In so far as the feelings are recognized, he has introduced a new element in psychological explanations, but not without precedent. But what it meant to him both psychologically and for Criticism, appears in the foot-note in the 'Canon of Pure Reason.'⁵ "All practical concepts relate to objects of pleasure or displeasure, that is, of joy or pain, and therefore, at least indirectly, to ob-

¹ *Werke*, II., 131.

² *Werke*, II., 288.

³ *Werke*, II., 307-8.

⁴ Feb. 21, 1772. *Werke*, VIII., 688.

⁵ *Critique*, II., 687.

jects of our feelings.¹ But as feeling is not a faculty of representing things (*Vorstellungskraft der Dinge*), but lies outside the whole field of our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, do not belong to transcendental philosophy which is concerned exclusively with pure cognitions *a priori*."

Here also appears for the first time, and with considerable integrity, what we shall find more fully developed and completely recognized in later years, namely, that 'metaphysik' could proceed only with regard to the faculties of the soul.² That Kant was working with faculties which he presupposed, as Drobisch hints, as already adequately determined, is also seen in the remarkable statement a decade later,³ to make which he had not yet given himself the teleologic right. "Everything that is founded in the nature of our faculties must have some purpose and be in harmony with the right use of them."

As we approach the close of the critical maturing, we find the expressions more decided and the conviction grown firm, that the mind appears under these sorts of activities, for it had cost twenty years' painful reflection to adjust the psychological matter-of-fact into a philosophical interpretation. In the preface of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790)⁴ he writes more explicitly than he had expressed himself to Reinhold three years previous.⁵ "Denn alle Seelenvermögen oder Fähigkeiten können auf die drei zurückgeführt werden, welche sich nicht

¹That the separation of the feelings from will, or pleasure-pain from desire, required time on the part of Kant, appears in a comparison of these earlier expressions with one in 1788 (V., *Practical Reason* preface, p. 9, note): "Man konnte mir noch den Einwurf machen; warum ich nicht auch den Begriff des Begehrungsvermögen, oder des Gefühls der Lust vorher erklärt habe." But so far as Criticism is concerned these are 'in der Psychologie gegeben;' for the critical method applies itself to "Begriffen die aus der Psychologie entlehnt werden." Strange that Kant should now affirm psychology to be the peculiar basis of philosophy, when we saw in the previous chapter how thoroughly it was denied any such relation, and know that he yet goes in the face of it!

²How much this is due to the bent of his philosophical genius, that it preyed continually on that one fact of *knowledge*, and how he tried to bring all philosophy within the precincts of noëtics, may be estimated later on.

³*Critique*, II., 551.

⁴*Werke*, V., 183.

⁵*Cf.*, letter to Reinhold, Dec., 1787, *Werke*, VIII., 739.

ferner aus einem gemeinschaftlichen Grunde ableiten lassen: das Erkenntnissvermögen, das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, und das Begehrungsvermögen." Or, again, in the treatise 'Über Philosophie überhaupt, etc.' (1794), the trichotomy of mental powers, with an admixture of what each faculty represents, is defended with Kantian jealousy.¹ Finally, in 1798, the psychological 'Anthropologie' appears, whose first part treats "von Erkenntnissvermögen, von Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, und von Begehrungsvermögen" in three books respectively.²

Kant, then, recognizes three ways of viewing the mental life. But he does not overlook attempts to reduce them to one. In the posthumous 'Vorlesungen über Psychologie,'³ he turns an interestingly critical eye towards a Leibnitzian development. It has been questioned "ob alle Kräfte der Seele vereinigt, und aus einer Grundkraft können hergeleitet werden, oder ob verschiedene Grundkräfte anzunehmen sind um alle Handlungen der Seele daraus zu erklären? *e. g.*, Wolff nimmt eine Grundkraft an und sagt, die Seele selbst ist eine Grundkraft, die sich das Universum vorstellt." But, to call the soul a fundamental power is false ontology. Power (die Kraft) is not a particular principle, but only 'ein respectus der substanz zum Accidenz.' Furthermore, to reduce the powers to one, because the soul is a unit, raises a far different query. This unity of the soul amidst the diversity of activities must take care of itself. In empirical psychology we must account for the classified varieties of phenomena, and find accordingly, "das wir verschiedene Grundkräfte annehmen müssen, und nicht aus einer alle Phänomena der Seele erklären können; demnach sind das Erkenntnissvermögen, das Vermögen der Lust und Unlust und das Begehrungsvermögen Grundkräften." They have a peculiar but limited service "um die empirische Psychologie desto systematischer abzuhandeln."⁴

Before inquiring what Kant intends to comprehend under each 'faculty' respectively, it is well to note what the recogni-

¹ *Werke*, VI., 379.

² *Werke*, VII., pp. 437, 548, 571.

³ Pp. 50 ff.

⁴ This has special interest in a historical comparison with the Herbartian developments in psychology.

tion of faculties can really mean. Reason in its *a priori* function possesses three principles which are regulative of the understanding in its observation of nature, *viz.*: manifoldness, variety and unity, which have their application to the facts of the inner sense as seen in this psychological doctrine of the faculties.¹ But what could be meant by those principles of homogeneity and specification, as they apply to the various groups of conscious states, is happily told us in a magazine article appearing in January, 1788. Not only does he here enunciate a consequence which may condemn his own conception of the faculties later on; but his interpretation of all this facultization is a weak, lone pulse of that new life coming out of scholasticism. Elemental powers mean no more than this: upon the observation of activities which can be grouped, there is to be a (metaphysical) positing of some substratal power that may assume the name given to that class of phenomena. When we have reached these fundamental powers human insight is at an end. We are forced to accept them, for their possibility cannot be understood by any means.² But only in the very popular essay on 'Philosophie überhaupt' does Kant become the true metaphysician, and express the real function of the so-called faculties that may not only be reduced to one, but even increased to four. After all "muss man doch gestehen dass es mit psychologischen Erklärungen, in Vergleichung mit den physischen, sehr kümmerlich bestellt sei das sie ohne Ende hypothetisch sind, und man zu drei verschiedenen Erklärungsgründen gar leicht einer vierten, ebenso scheinbaren erdenken kann;"³ and this in the self-same treatise that gives almost his ultimatum on the question of mental powers and their relation to Critical philosophy.

There now issues the more difficult task of answering the inquiry, What does Kant mean by the cognitive, affective and conative faculties, and how do they relate themselves to each other? It is difficult, since, in the first instance, Kant though extremely systematic, was not fond of hard and fixed defini-

¹*Critique*, II., 567; *cf.*, Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²*Werke*, IV., p. 492 and note.

³*Werke*, VI., 395 f.

tions. He always defines himself as may be suitable for his immediate purpose. Secondly, because it is no whit less true in psychology than in philosophy, that 'the definition,' as Kant himself says,¹ 'in its complete clearness ought to conclude rather than begin our work.' But it is desirable, though extremely difficult, to construct a proper definition.

In general, Kant means by the respective faculties something like what follows: "Erkenntnisvermögen (*facultas cognoscendi*) ist das Vermögen des Gemüths das Daseyn und das Veränderungen der Gegenstände zu bestimmen."² It is a unique faculty whose activity consists in carrying on the mechanism of 'Vorstellungen,' a mechanism into which enter both a receptivity and a spontaneity, and representations that have objective reference. Feeling is something *toto cælo* different. "Man nennt die Fähigkeit Lust oder Unlust bei einer Vorstellung zu haben, darum Gefühl weil beides das bloß Subjective im Verhältnisse unserer Vorstellung, und gar keine Beziehung auf ein Object zum möglichen Erkenntnis desselben (nicht einmal dem Erkenntnis unseres Zustandes) enthält."³ Conation is variously represented; yet all expressions may agree in these: now it is will in its highest critical meaning; "Man kann den Willen durch das Vermögen der Zwecke definiren indem sie jederseits Bestimmungsgründe des Begehrungsvermögens nach Principien sind;"⁴ then it is the empirical activity of desire, as "das Vermögen durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache der Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zusein."⁵ What sort of passivities and activities is included under each is most briefly and graphically seen in diagrams which gather up about all there is to be found on his special divisions of the faculties.⁶

Next to the division and the conception of the faculties, the most important point in Kant's psychology that has influence on the form, and even on the content of Critical philosophy, is his

¹ *Critique*, II., 626 and note.

² Mellin's *Encyc. Wörterbuch d. Krit. Philosophie*, 1797, II., i., p. 384.

³ *Werke*, VII., pp. 8 f.; *cf.*, V., 62; *Vorlesungen*, etc., pp. 31 f.

⁴ *Werke*, V., 62; *cf.*, VII., 10.

⁵ *Werke*, VII., 8; *cf.*, V., 9, note.

⁶ *Cf.*, *infra*, at end of study.

notion of what are the relations between the various fields of mental activities. Indeed this feature of his opinion, as to the empirical nature of mind, may be said to stand second to none in its influence on transcendental philosophy. All others become appreciable only when Criticism had exhausted itself in the three *Critiques*. But this is the great fact which fashioned the articulation of the three parts, and gave coloring to the treatment each 'higher cognitive' faculty received. Eliminate this psychological influence, and Criticism could never have ripened a speculative scepticism, the moral law with its intellectual austerity would have vanished before the affective conditions of ethical needs, and in the æsthetical judgment there would have been introduced an objectivity as categorical in its demands, that the ideal of beauty shall be realized in an 'intelligible' world, as is the ethical imperative, that I shall find my complete manhood in the perfection of myself in terms of the ultimate good.

Kant's utterances on the point in question are not exceedingly numerous, yet they come with no uncertain sound whose sonority is intensified as we introduce the implications easily to be read in that huge commentary which the whole of Criticism is. The general view taken may be summed up thus: "Die Verknüpfung zwischen dem Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes und dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust an der Existenz desselben, oder die Bestimmung des Begehrungsvermögens, ihn hervorzubringen, ist zwar empirisch erkennbar genug."¹ When expressed in detail it must include such views as these. Reason (cognitive) is the special and great activity which throws off knowledge, as it were. It can never be replaced by faith, or belief, which is some sort of feeling, and this is directly opposed to knowledge.² Though there be feeling in all sensuous elements,

¹ *Werke*, VI., 379.

² "Aller Glaube ist nun ein subjectiv zureichendes, objectiv aber mit Bewusstsein unzureichendes Fürwahrhalten; also wird er dem Wissen entgegengesetzt." "Die Vernunft fühlt; sie sieht ihren Mangel an, und wirkt durch den Erkenntnisstrieb das Gefühl des Bedürfnisses;" i. e., orientation in reflection starts from a subjective means which is nothing more than a strange 'Gefühl des der Vernunft eigenen Bedürfnisses' (which Kant thinks peculiar to intellect alone, but is really an affective accompaniment of all acts of discrimination,

and pleasure-pain may be an accompaniment of perceptions,¹ yet it is subordinate to all ideational determinations and cannot reflect backwards over the intellective processes, except as strong emotions interfere with the activity of attention or mutilate the formation of concepts.² An object being once determined through the senses, its possible psychological history is not completed until it has stirred the desires and motivated the will through those feelings with which it is particularly connected. Desire always has at its basis that class of feelings which appreciate the continued presence of an object.³ Yet all feeling does not rest on the will. This converse does not hold. Even if this be the natural history of the will, the metaphysic of morals can find no principle based on feelings; for with whatever sort we may begin, 'vom pathologischen oder dem rein ästhetischen, oder auch dem moralischen Gefühl,' we can never get beyond the 'physical' character which belongs to feeling, because of its initiation.⁴ The will, however, as it actualizes itself in the ethical life, is the source of any amount of feeling.⁵ Reason still stands alone, howsoever feeling and desire may be mixed up. Much less than the affective faculty does the will have any legitimate or constructive influence on the intellect. To the question, 'ob das Wollen einen Einfluss auf unsere Urtheile habe?' an affirmative answer cannot be given; 'dies wäre auch sehr ungereimt.'⁶ Thus knowing, feeling and willing are distinct activities not influencing one another so as to promote rational life, and the Critical method proposed to itself to see what could be known by each faculty alone.

so much so that one might say the whole cognitive life is based on the one motive of interest). IV., pp. 342, ff.; cf. the famous antithesis between 'knowledge' and 'faith' as clearly brought out in the second edition preface. *Critique*, I., 380. Cf., *Werke*, VIII., 72 f., belief vs. knowledge, etc.

¹ *Werke*, V., 210 f. 297, 388.

² *Werke*, VIII., 37 f., VI., 379.

³ *Werke*, VII., 8 f.

⁴ *Werke*, VII., 178 f.; cf., V. 26.

⁵ *Werke*, V., 76 f.; cf., VI., p. 380.

⁶ *Werke*, VIII., 74: "Hätte der Wille einen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf unsere Ueberzeugung von dem, was wir wünschen [mere whim or desire is thus confused with will as an executive determination], so würden wir uns beständig Chimären von einem glücklichen Zustande machen und sie sodann auch immer für wahr halten. Der Wille kann aber nicht *wider* überzeugende Beweise von Wahrheiten streiten, die seinen Wünschen und Neigungen zuwider sind."

This leads at once to the inquiry, how Kant turned these psychological tenets to the account of Critical philosophy. Even here we are not left to a mere inference of what may be implicated. He himself becomes explicit when it was finally discerned that reason had been carrying on, not merely an investigation of the formal, but also of matters that have specific relations to the mind analyzed, and is then ready to say: 'hiemit endige ich also mein ganzes kritisches Geschäft.' The articulation of the system ('aggregate') has already been indicated; here it must be seen what basis he found for it in human nature.²

From the very start Kant announces his position as anti-theistic to scholasticism. It is 'human reason,' 'our reason,' not angelic or divine rationality, that is to be submitted to the tests of the proposed methods. The humanness of his inquiry he has even further explained. The earliest expression of this, with which I am familiar, is near the close of the year 1787. He writes to Prof. Reinhold that he is struggling to unearth the elements of knowledge and to trace them back to their elemental powers.³ Three years intervened, when the last *Critique* appeared, filling in a lacuna 'in der Familie der oberen Erkenntnissvermögen.'⁴ That this triplicity, however, was not taken with psychological intent, is seen in the footnote⁵ replying to the surprise and dubitancy that philosophy always appears threefold. "Das liegt aber in der Natur der Sache So muss, nach demjenigen, was zu der synthetischen Einheit

¹ *Werke*, V., 176.

² This relation has a manifold interest as Kant carried it out: 1st, In his attempt to break away from 'dogmatism,' which meant the scholastic procedure of saying, 'by this, I understand such and such, etc.,' and then proceed to develop concepts expressive of reality; 2d, That it has been the most potent expression of the anthropological modernism in philosophy. Inquiries as to reality are to be settled first by an appeal to man and his capabilities. This was the call of Criticism; 3d, How, while this very Criticism first founded itself on formal logic, it required only a decade and within the maturity of its patient founder, to run its own development into psychology—that anthropological branch of knowledge most helpful to him who would think out the truth of experience.

³ *Werke*, VIII., 739 f.

⁴ *Werke*, V., 183.

⁵ *Werke*, V., 203.

überhaupt erforderlich ist, nämlich (1) Bedingung, (2) ein Bedingtes, (3) der Begriff der aus der Vereinigung des Bedingten mit seiner Bedingung entspringt, die Eintheilung nothwendig Trichotomie sein." What view of the various faculties is to be taken, and what portion of their activities are to be regarded in Criticism are told us when that was wrought out.¹ In these explanations it appears that philosophy, in general, treats only of the 'higher' faculties, the 'lower' being subject to such treatment as they might receive in psychological anthropology. That is, a threefold division of each faculty is made: first, the lower or empirical, are those which are thrown into the medley mechanism of experience; second, the higher or rational aspects, where activity is the chief mark. It is on these that Criticism builds itself. When it demands an analysis of man's power to know, and an inquiry as to the respective constituents of his moral and aesthetical natures, there abides this constant elimination of what is empirical; thirdly, there occasionally appear allusions to transcendental faculties, those discovered by Criticism, as *e. g.*, the pure apperception of the *ego*, a 'transcendental faculty' in rational psychology.

The more general or extensive psychological substrate of Kantian philosophy is detailed in the specially written essay.² The system of all the faculties of the human mind gives the triplicity of powers and shows their empirical relation. Kant had treated 'understanding' (knowledge) and 'reason' (ethical relations) 'objectively,' but they stand so far apart. There is no transition from mechanism and nature to man and freedom. All experience, being given as a series in time, falls in the clutches of casuality. Practical reason revealed a rational spontaneity as law-giving and eliminated all empiricism. A great gulf abides between these two precipices erected by metaphysic. Somehow the chasm must be spanned. But the material for such a possibility can be sought only in the system of the faculties.³ Feeling, in its entirety, is not represented in the Critical system. The large mass lies below metaphysical par.

¹ *Werke*, V., 183-185.

² *Ueber Phil. überhaupt, zur Einleitung in d. K. d. Urtheil.*, 1794, *Werke*, VI., 373-404.

³ *Werke*, VI., 380.

It is always 'physisch,'¹ and its very essence as 'sensible'² brings it within the limits of subjective sensitivity. It remains ever individualistic, and, *a fortiori*, can never enter the holy grounds of Criticism. This deals only with what falls within "das System der reinen Erkenntnisvermögen durch Begriffe."³ The possibility of the admission of aught within this circle, lies in the claim, that it carries on transactions with 'objectivity' in one way or another. It is the pleasure of 'taste' or the enjoyment of the beautiful, which requires some representation within the mechanical side of human nature, and yet links itself with that ideal spontaneity which freedom is, thus co-ordinating the three *Critiques* with the cluster of mental faculties.⁴

The three external divisions of philosophy not only grow out of the psychological triplicity, but the very treatment within each is also traced back to the same source. "Dass es drei Arten der Antinomie gibt, hat seinen Grund darin dass es drei Erkenntnisvermögen: Verstand, Urtheilskraft und Vernunft gibt, deren jedes seine principien *a priori* haben muss, etc."⁵ As Kant thus tries to work out an intimate relation between much of the Critical philosophy and the content of the human mind (and this was his special and necessary right in view of his great problems), there constantly appears the attempted *schmelzung* of formal, abstract logic, and concrete, living psychology. The former was the starting point, the latter the conquest of the critical development.⁶

¹ *Werke*, VII., 179.

² *Werke*, V., pp. 80, 95, 123.

³ *Werke*, VI., 400.

⁴ *Werke*, VI., 388 f., 401 f.

⁵ *Werke*, V., 356.

⁶ This, as well as the immediate points of contact between the results of psychological analysis, the faculties which fall within Criticism, the transcendental principles it discovers, and the facts of experience to which they are metaphysically related, clearly appears in the following table abridged from V., 203 f.; VI., 402 f:

Erkenntnisvermögen,

Gefühl der Lust und Unlust,

Begehrungsvermögen

are the three elemental faculties. But their "Ausübung liegt doch immer das Erkenntnisvermögen [rational treatment?] obzwar nicht immer Erkenntnis

That Kant thought himself to have covered all the facts of experience and given them a complete philosophical interpretation, we must take him to mean, and he seems also thus to clinch the system of transcendentalism to 'the facts of life,' when he says:¹ "So entdeckt sich ein System der Gemüthskräfte, in ihren Verhältnisse der Natur und Freiheit; deren jede ihre eigenthümlichen bestimmenden Principien *a priori* haben, und um deswillen die zwei Theile der Philosophie (die theoretische und praktische) als eines doctrinalen Systems ausmachen, und zugleich ein Uebergang vermittelt der Urtheilskraft, die durch ein eigenthümliches Princip beide Theile verknüpft, nämlich von dem sinnlichen Substrat der erstern zum intelligibilen der zweiten Philosophie, durch die kritik eines Vermögens (der Urtheilskraft), welches nur zum Verknüpfen dient und daher zwar für sich kein Erkenntniss verschaffen." We see then that Kant did go to considerable length in empirical psychology, in recognizing empirical faculties, in ascribing a large content to them, and in so doing, pronounced upon the influence he supposed to obtain between them. We see, also, that he developed a consciousness of the substratal relation of this empirical psychology to the

zum Grunde." The 'higher cognitive' faculty, therefore, as shown by the course of Criticism, that stands alongside of

Erkenntnisssvermögen	is	Verstand;
Gefühl der Lust und Unlust	"	Urtheilskraft;
Begehrungsvermögen	"	Vernunft.

The metaphysical principles which correspond with the faculties and lie in the higher forms of cognition respectively, are:

Gesetzmässigkeit,	Zweckmässigkeit,	Zweckmässigkeit, die zugleich Gesetz ist—
		Verbindlichkeit.

Finally, a table that associates the products of the various mental factors, how Criticism works among them, products whose fusion, we might fancy Kant saying, makes up the totality of experience:

Gemüthsvermögen:	Obere Erkenntnisssvermögen:
Erkenntnisssvermögen,	Verstand,
Gefühl der Lust und Unlust,	Urtheilskraft,
Begehrungsvermögen.	Vernunft.
Principien Apriori:	Products:
Gesetzmässigkeit,	Natur,
Zweckmässigkeit,	Kunst,
Verbindlichkeit.	Sitten.

¹ *Werke*, VI., pp. 401-404.

Critical philosophy, on all of which it now remains to gather up an estimation.

When we consider the variety of aspects from which the stream of our mental life can be regarded, we find that they all cluster about three groups. It is a general agreement, with some notable historic exceptions, that we can view consciousness from three view-points; or as Ward says,¹ we find we can make three statements in reference to ourselves: "I feel somehow, I know something, I do" somewhat. As long as our psychology is to be, as it were, a natural history of the soul, that is about all we can say. Taking some object, or any stepping-stone in the flow of consciousness, substantives of mental life, I somehow cognize, or properly, I recognize it. With this apprehension of it there is some shade of concomitant feeling; it is not merely the proper cause of some pleasure or pain, but there is a tonic ingredient. Some form of feeling attends me. I am also said to make some effort, either a purpose striving or 'an involuntary act of will' somehow appears, or there are inhibitions, negative efforts as well as positive strivings. The complexity of adult mental life is merely the developed fusion of the infinite terms which come in the growth of such a consciousness.

But when psychology becomes some form of psychical dynamics it passes beyond to something which we cannot truly admit as psychology. Nor is it the psychology that has been struggling under biologic influences to assume the rank of a natural science. It includes these in a more or less absorbent way, but its roots lie confessedly elsewhere. Not only on 'Erfahrung' and 'Mathematik,' but also 'auf Metaphysik,' is this science 'neu gegründet.'² Empirical psychology is to be reconstructed from a metaphysical standpoint. The historic precedent in English and French thought since Locke is set aside. Metaphysic does not have psychology as its foundations. The rather psychological analyses are to start from the metaphys-

¹*Loc. cit.*, p. 39; or as perhaps better put by Drobisch (*Emph. Psych.*, p. 36), some of the states of consciousness appear only 'in uns zu geschehen'—Vorstellen; others 'mit uns vorzugehen,' so that we suffer—Fühlen; and finally others 'aus uns hervorzugehen'—Streben.

²Herbart's *Psychologic*, 1824-25.

ical postulate, that the soul, like all other realities, is of a simple nature and quality and of spaceless essence. Its real nature is that of 'self-preservation,' and when affected neurally it acts in opposition. "Every such act of self-preservation on the part of the soul is an idea." Feeling is the consciousness of the process of 'Vorstellen;' *e. g.*, if the relation of 'Vorstellungen' is such that the process of 'Vorstellen' is characterized by conflict, then there is a painful feeling. To will there is denied any independent nature. Such was an epoch-making psychology—a metaphysical 'Mechanik and Statik' of ideas,¹ from which the course of mental life was to be deduced. It was a 'realism' that rose in opposition to idealism, and was the most signal reaction for the science of psychology.

Kant's position in the history of the division of mental functions is a most prominent one. As we have already seen, modern tendencies before Kant were to regard merely two functions of mind, or to posit some realistic simplicity, as in Wolff, etc.,—influences coming from the doctrine of monads. It is only in recent times that the tripartite classification has been taken up. We find its beginning among the German psychologists, *e. g.*, Mendelssohn and Tetens.² It was Kant's acceptance and authoritative defense of the trichotomy of powers that has made it modern psychologic orthodoxy. Herbart, as Harms says, merely developed a tendency in Wolff's psychology which first represents all spiritual activities as merely modifications of ideating powers. The triplicity of mental function was completed when feeling had been declared to be a primal element. The late recognition given to it in psychology is probably due to the fact that feelings are rather obscure, inaccessible and marvel-

¹Harms, *Phil. seit Kant*, Berlin, 1876, p. 548 f.

²*Cf.* Mendelssohn's *Schriften*, II., 294 f. '*Morgenstunden*,' ch. VII.: "Man pfleget gemeinlich das Vermögen der Seele in Erkenntnisvermögen und Begehrungsvermögen einzutheilen, und die Empfindung der Lust und Unlust schon mit zum Begehrungsvermögen zurechnen. Allein mich dünkt, zwischen dem Erkennen und Begehren liege das Billigen, der Beifall, das Wohlgefallen der Seele, welches noch eigentlich von Begierde weit entfernt ist," etc. *Cf.* Tetens's *Phil. Versuche*, etc., I. p. 625.: "Ich zähle drey Grundvermögen der Seele: das Gefühl, den Verstand und ihre Thätigkeitskraft." *Cf.* Ziegler's *Erkenntnistheorie Tetens in Beziehung auf Kant*, pp. 58 f.; Sommer's *Grundzüge einer Gesch.*, etc. pp. 291 ff.

ously fantastic, and, as Kant indicates in his 'Anthropologic,' were generally considered physiological functions having no place in psychology proper. On the other hand, that the feelings should have been recognized in Germany first is, no doubt, in some way to be associated with the rise of modern æsthetics in the labors of Baumgarten and Schiller.¹

Closely associated with this are recent psychological attempts to reduce the aspects of consciousness to one element and develop the others from it—not to mention metaphysical attempts, such as Schopenhauer's, who would reduce all to will. Lotze², who champions the trichotomy of faculties in his vigorous criticism of Herbart, seems in the end to make feeling the primordial element in consciousness, and by its presence sees, in the consciousness of any grade whatever, the power to differentiate itself from its environment. It is Horwicz³, however, who not only recognizes feeling as an independent mental function, but stands the chief representative of the attempt to reduce feeling to the primordial type of mental manifestation.

Will has also been the point of psychological reduction of the faculties. Wundt⁴ seems to find in 'Trieb' that which constitutes the fundamental aspect of consciousness. Höffding⁵ finds it in will, "if any one of the three species is to be regarded as the original form." James⁶ secures in 'purposive action' the trait which is to characterize the phenomena that may come within the scope of psychology, thus virtually agreeing with Wundt and Höffding.⁷ But attempts to find the essence of self-consciousness in other terms than that itself, leads us beyond distinctive psychological considerations; and, indeed, we need not be surprised to find in Kant a metaphysical

¹Cf., Sommer's *Grundzüge*, etc., pp. 2, 277, 297.

²*Phil. of Rel.*, tr., p. 61; *Microcosmus*, Eng. trans., I., 247, 250.

³Cf., Bobtschew, *Die Gefühlslehre von Kant bis auf unsere Zeit*, Lpzg., 1888, p. 83 ff.

⁴*Phys. Psych.*, II., ch. XXIV., Sec. 2.

⁵*Outlines of Psychology*, tr., pp. 99-100, 308 f.

⁶*Psych.*, I. pp. 5-11.

⁷Fortlage also shares the opinion with Schopenhauer, that 'Wille oder Trieb,' in general, is the fundamental aspect of the empirical ego; even, that impulse is the foundation of that phenomenon ordinarily called 'consciousness.' Cf., *System der Psych.*, 1st. Th., Vorrede XIX.

reduction of the soul to rational will. In one sense he has anticipated many of the developments since his time, whereas, as Harms says¹, he had predecessors only in Augustine and Dun Scotus.

It is of importance, however, to note that Kant's greatest service here to psychology is his constant clamor for the feelings as a distinct type of mental life, as well as recognizing the disparity between the other two forms. Bobtschew² points out another merit in Kant's conception of the feelings in that they were particularly regarded as of purely subjective nature. But it can hardly be conceded that Kant considered the feelings as a tone quality of representations in the same way as they are now regarded as one of the qualities of the sense element which enters into the ideational processes.

While Kant's service to modern psychology is great in this respect, he fell into the scholastic error of abstract entities being indicated by faculties. It is a difficult task even for professed psychologists to free themselves from the same error, notwithstanding their constant efforts to do so. They warn themselves against partitioning off mentality into faculties, but straightway their discussions require us to believe them viewing presentation, memory, thought, feeling, etc., as so many separate entities which come up with consciousness. It is no metaphysical leap which permits one to point out that faculties, as such, are no original mental possession. The natal consciousness has no faculties and knows none. Faculties, if anything, only come with the development of adult consciousness. And then there can be meant nothing more than the attainment of certain aspects of that development. The fundamental fact is that 'some sort of thinking goes on,' that consciousness is on the march, and cannot be impeded or split up in any other way than by its own activities, which we find clustering about its substantives. It is Herbart's brushing away all the abstract talk about faculties, to which this tendency in psychology must be attributed. But on the other hand, he subverts the truth, that "every psychic act requires for the expression of its full con-

¹*Gesch. d. Psych.*, p. 346.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 19.

tent three acts: discriminative, affective, conative; though any one of these aspects may be emphasized, possibly at the expense of the others, but all depending on the given amount of psychic energy at disposal."¹ That Kant laid the basis for leaving to musty shelves all scholasticism about 'faculties' as mental apartments into which one might put anything and then proceed to demonstrate by the articulation of such conceptual pack-horses, but on the other hand appears to fall into the same fault, will appear more clearly in considering the psychological basis for his divisions of philosophy.

For psychology then, in its formal aspect, Kant is of great historical value. And one could almost agree with Harms² in saying that with Kant psychology entered a new era in setting off the phenomenal realm of consciousness, had he not called men away from scientific psychology in denying its mathematical possibilities, and showing the uselessness of building up any 'rational' system concerning the soul.

In his analysis of consciousness, Kant must receive psychology's approval. But when he characterizes the inter-relations of the so-called faculties, the same science must take him severely to task. He not only announced a false psychology, but makes it the empiric basis for his conception of *a priori* cognition, and took from it the coloring matter that suffuses, not only his sceptical tenets, but gives the entire tone to his ethics and æsthetics. So important is this point with Kant that one can conceive of nothing else, except his wilful and persistent disregard for the influence of one form of consciousness on the others, that made possible the very conception of the transcendental itself. Unlike the scholastic adage that something might be true in philosophy and false in theology, *we cannot concede for a moment Kant's implication that something may be true for psychology but useless for philosophy.*

The relation of the faculties to each other is, in Kant's view, about as hard fixed and far apart as they appear in a diagram. Curiously enough, there are two aspects to this relation, one empirical, the other transcendental. In the former

¹Prof. Ladd.

²Harms, *Gesch. d. Psych.*, p. 339.

Kant allows (and, as it seems, it is an echo from the *Recherche de la Verité* and its unique method) only a relation of hinderance between the faculties. The ideating powers are distorted in their primary functions when the appetitive feelings enter.¹ Emotions, requiring a pulsating heart, detract from cold-blooded reflection. The will is helpless in its true desires when it falls within the clutches of the all-prevading passions. Rational beings are irrationalized in the contemplative, subjective moods where the beautiful and the sublime yield forth no object. An answer to 'What is truth?' based on the empirical nature of man, only shows us 'of what crooked material he is made,' and from which nothing perfect can come.

But the faculties must be viewed from a critical point. What is, either in knowledge or in reality, we may fancy ourselves to hear Kant say, can be got at only as we transcend trammeling experience, and find what each faculty can do for itself. The cognitive powers must be examined in themselves. The will must submit to a treatment when all the vagaries of motivation have been swept away. Feeling of the 'pathological' sort has such a vast amount of what constitutes the nature of 'der Pöbel' that it can never be granted an introduction into the enthroned sanctum of pure reason. Each faculty in its 'oberen aspects, only, belongs to philosophy.

Kant's attempt to smudge psychological facts for the sake of speculation is classic, and stands as an example of a host of philosophers,² who proceed on the assumption that 'pure thought' is a possibility unattended by the 'baser' elements of human nature. Psychology was not cultivated among them for its own sake. It could proceed only with an admixture of ethics. And with our author naught else but pietistic convictions give permission for moral judgments only when activity and its affective conditions were in question. Thus, and as we have seen, the influence of the 'faculties' was of a negative, moral aspect. Psychological observation was carried only far enough to assure the religious sentiment that the hindering and inhibitory

¹Cf., *Werke*, VII., 451 f., 575 f.; Erdmann, *Reflexionen*, 70 ff.

²E. g., Hegel and Hamilton. "Consciousness is knowledge." "Pure apperception is fundamental."

results of feeling exhausted them; or, where noëtic activity was in dispute, there frequently appeared citations of the supposed fact that 'reason' and the 'passions' were in conflict, and struggled for a supremacy; consequently, philosophy must view 'pure reason' alone. Will, movement, strivings were properly conceived of as flowing from affective impulses, but these again contaminated ethical purity.

Such ethical psychologizing appears erroneous from the fact that not only are the feelings inhibitory on the presentative activity of the conceptual sort, and thus lodging in the feelings the mass of conservatism that pervades human nature; but also the feelings are helpfully influential in the processes of cognition, while ideas can no less be severed from the development of the feelings. It must here suffice to point out one or two instances of such inter-dependence, in order to show how the failure to provide for such psychological facts influenced Kant's formal divisions of philosophical discipline, and wherein the *principium divisionis* resides in knowledge in its widest sense, and lastly, to estimate the formal aspects of his philosophy from a psychologic point of view.

It is one of the conquests of recent psychology in heeding Lotze's¹ imploration that "we must above all wean ourselves from the habit of looking on the feelings as subsidiary events that sometimes occur in the succession of our internal states, while the latter for the most part consist of an indifferent series." Since this reaction against the tick-tack play on dry, abstract thought in order to call the attention of the absolute to the way of dialectic, as we find it in this philosopher's 'musings from his æsthetical perch in Göttingen,' whither Aristophanic facetiousness has placed him, psychologists have been wont to inquire into the nature of feelings, not to say, philosophers build on them. Not only do associations form themselves between ideas, as such; but, "every idea connects itself also with the momentary tone which characterizes our universal vital feeling, or the general feeling of our whole state at the instant when the idea appears."² Nay, more, cognitions do not only fall along

¹*Micr.*, I., 242-3.

²Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Eng. trans., II., 229.

side of the feelings, but the growth of the latter is inextricably bound up with the ideational attachments which give characteristics to the core of feeling. In a certain sense there is an evolution in the life of feeling which comes from their fusion of elements. Even in Spinoza there appears a recognition of the fact that "feeling naturally enters into an association with the idea of that which played as the apparent or real cause" of the joy or sadness. He, too, is guilty of the attempt of abstracting pure feeling and pure cognition, overlooking the fact most patent to any one observing his own mental life, that ideas are *structural* in the life of feelings, in that, through their sense and perceptive elements, they contribute to the very possibility of feeling coming into reality. For, "the most important crisis in the development of a feeling is when its object is removed out of the sphere of sensation and perception into that of ideation and memory."¹ Psychology finds the possibility of an adult feeling laid in the fact that the germs of the affective life differentiate only as they become "directed through ideas which fuse with it, to definite objects." Again, the association of feeling does not belong to affective retentiveness and control, but undoubtedly is subject to the connection of the ideational elements fused in each emotive state.² This affinity of the representative factors is a biologic necessity, nor dare its importance be lessened when the unitary life of mind is sought in contradistinction to the variety so apparent on all its sides.

The relation of cognition to feeling is still farther seen in the dependence of the latter on the former. Feelings are often found to be regarded as effects whose causes appear in a previous idea. The changes in the flow of feelings no doubt contribute to this as exhausting, or being the chief point in the nature of feeling. Cognitions could go singly, but feelings take their rise in ideas. "We never find," as Ward says,³ "that feeling directly alters, *i. e.*, without the intervention of the action to which it prompts—either our sensations or situations, but that regularly these latter with remarkable promptness and certainly

¹Höfding, *Outlines of Psychology*, London, 1892, p. 254.

²As Höfding quite clearly shows, *op. cit.*, p. 239 ff.; cf. also Lotze, *Metaphysic*, II., 314.

³*Encyc. Brit.*, XX., 40.

alter it. We have not first a change of feeling, and then a change in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas; but, these changing, change of feeling follows." This relation was taken by the psychology underlying Criticism, as the sum of the whole matter.¹ Accordingly we find Kant consistent in making his divisions follow the order of facts as they appeared to him. We shall see in a moment, that the opposite is just as true, that change of feeling changes the course of ideation.

Had this been all of the matter, Kant could be justified in his formal aspect of philosophy. But, profounder than the relation of cognition to feeling, is the influence of feeling on ideation. Not only in the mechanism of mental life so far as psychology is interested in depicting it, but the very nature of reality itself, as we look to metaphysic for its analysis, cannot be faithfully regarded with an utter neglect of this deep influence of feeling on cognition. Neither can philosophy in its formal and material aspects disregard this fusion of primitive elements, and, in so far as the initiative separation and final articulation of the three *Critiques* hang upon the oversight of these facts, so far is the Critical philosophy blame-worthy. The development within the Critical philosophy, as seen in the order of the appearance of its parts, and as Kant explains their concatenation,² indicates that an ethical judgment was pronounced on the play of the faculties, whereas we now demand a psychological judgment. Not only is it true as Kant chiefly recognizes, that the feelings may have a hindering effect upon the combination of ideas, but the phenomena of what is called 'the expansion of feeling'³—wherein the principle is, that "all strong feeling struggles for the sole control in the mind, and give a coloring to all its mental activities;" but it is just as true that "the simplest and apparently driest notions are never quite destitute of an attendant feeling."⁴ Nor is there a chance rela-

¹Cf., *Werke*, VI., 380, V., 123.

²That there is a development within the Critical philosophy is one of the rather recent attainments of Kantian criticism; cf. Caird, *The Crit. Phil. of I. Kant*, II., pp. 406, 643; Bernard's *trans. of K. of Judgment*, pp. XIV., ff.; Kant's letter to Reinhold, VIII., 738.

³Höfding, *op. cit.*, 298 ff, 303 f.

⁴Lotze, *Micro.*, I., 243.

tion between the strength of an idea and its feeling. Just as it may be contended philosophically that knowledge is not without conviction,¹ so it must be maintained that the phenomena of strained expectation, as in spiritualism, or in the common-place experience of desiring aught, demand that we find in the feelings an anticipation and realization of ideas; whereas, one does not only find that for which he seeks; but, also, the very reality of any finding, even ordinary percept-having, goes along with some anticipating interest. This is as much as to say, with Ward,² that "feeling leads the attention to concentrate on its object."³ Even profounder yet is the relation of feeling to what was formerly thought to be a purely discriminative act, *viz.*, apperception, or self-consciousness.

The mutual influence of will among the other sides of consciousness was inadequately conceived by Kant. All favorable influence proceeds forwardly from ideas through feelings to movement and choice. A retrograde working, other than promotive, was denied. That would be 'absurd.' It is true that ideas and feelings are the motives of the will. But it is no less a fact that volition enters into the structure and course of ideas at first involuntarily, when nature steps in to help us in our helplessness, and later in the conscious activity of attention. This reaction of will upon cognition is quite as important as the feelings; for, by it we *work* our way through states of dubitancy and matters of delusion up to certainty and reality.

In the mechanism of ideas and feelings, the will acts not only indirectly, but immediately in the sometimes-thought closed circle of the nature of mind. It is an 'augur, boring' sluices

¹ *Of.*, Ladd, *Introd. to Phil.*, pp. 186, 198 f.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 43.

³ Kant himself is an excellent illustration of this very psychological principle. Popularly thought to be a sordid philosopher writing only dry books, he is, on the contrary, subject to the most intense feelings, so little known to those who thus judge him. As a psychologist one might say the whole Critical philosophy has its reality and actualization in that 'pedagogic primness' which is its constant passion. The desire to make a *formaliter* exhibition of rationality is undoubtedly the sunken pier on which rests the conviction that the *a priori* and its ramifications are its *materialiter* expression. It is without question that this interest was the psychologic affinity which caused the transcendental philosopher to precipitate a whole series of *a priori* scientific principle from the menstrum of cosmological knowledge he had gathered in early years.

for the flow of ideas and feelings.¹ The will itself is no less subject to its own reactionary influences. Volition is not a voluntary affair, but becomes a habit which expresses the highest form of mental fusion that comes with development. One does not even have the priceless self-consciousness without a persistency in attention that is not born of the moment, a fact showing that subjective idealism needs to resubmit itself to what transpires in the developing mind, which is not always made up of 'logical' *a priori*.

It also appeared that Kant did not clearly distinguish between the conative and affective elements in the mental life. And, no doubt, he thought the work of speculation was completed when it had gone through the practical aspects of life. This vacillation had its disturbing effect upon the apportionment of the formal and material aspects of his philosophy. For the *Critique of Judgment*, in its formal articulation, had its basis laid in a mental content, while its matter is subjected to an attempted formal reduction of speculative logic.

We were at last compelled to touch upon psychology so far as it affects the content of philosophy in order to hint at some *principium divisionis*. The brief venture also illustrates the difficulties which attend the division of philosophy, and that the ground must be gone over again. There is a reciprocal relation of this sort both in psychology and philosophy. One cannot partition off their problems and be done once for all with their treatment. Kant's *principium divisionis* is to be found in whatever may have led him to distinguish between fact and reason, sensibility and intelligibility. This conception remained. It appears, and seemingly in a manner to justify the procedure Criticism has taken, in his classification of mental faculties. In the first *Critique*, logic, as dealing with knowledge of that which is, gave him the guiding lines. When the field of conduct, as known, is to be inquired into, some principle is wanting, and he at once attacks the rational voluntary faculty. When the circle has been completed we still find the treatment restricted, to what may be known; but it is now with reference to the faculties whose activities throw off the respective pro-

¹ Goldschmidt's figure quoted by Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

ducts. Finally, it is vigorously maintained (by Kant himself) that the (knowing) faculties have supplied the *principium* all the way. Now, from the way in which Kant worked out his conception of philosophy and the manner in which he relates it to the human mind, we must say, with some provision to be noted in a moment, that *the basis of his division of philosophy lay in the psychological division of the mind*. The formal aspects of the former grew out of the formal aspects of the latter.

It is to be gathered from the preceding mention of the relation of the faculties, that psychology is concerned with the tracing out the mechanism of what may be called knowledge in its most liberal meaning. It dare not estimate the value of the various elements, for then it becomes ethical; nor can it pronounce upon the ultimate facts and their inherent worth, for then it becomes philosophical. Processes only are the goal of psychological inquiry. The impulsive queries which go beyond these must find satisfaction in the answers rendered by philosophy. So close do they lie, they are difficult to separate. One begins where the other ends. Thus knowledge and its manifold implications are to be submitted to the eye of reason; and the breaking up into problems depends, not on the 'faculties' which have contributed to that knowledge, but on the way in which that knowledge may be broken up. There first emerges that broad distinction which Kant recognized and is fundamental, *viz.*, between that which is, and that which ought to be. The former falls within knowledge in its more limited sphere, and breaks up into the dirempted products of consciousness, affording the subject knowing and the object known. The latter provokes inquiry into the nature of the objective object and subjective object the me and not-me. The second broad distinction finds unique implications in manifold ways, which philosophical analysis must bring to light. Such are the ideals we feel reality somehow ought to realize.

In raising his profound inquiry, what is knowledge? Kant truly apprehends both the data and formal basis of philosophy. And in this psychologic age there is a sparkle of wisdom in the 'return to Kant' which seeks to enter the domain of philosophy by the only possible gate. Here Kant was concrete, liv-

ing. But as he worked it out, it appears that his appreciation was entirely of the abstract, and he at times becomes truly speculative in a scholastic sense. This is the attempt to fuse the initiative, formal logic with the ultimate, living psychology. But the confusion sprinkling it throughout indicates that Criticism found no other pedagogic demand than to satisfy the formal faculties of the mind. Its problems corresponded to these. Moreover, it was a Criticism of transcendental faculties—faculties unknown to psychology. The formal aspect only multiplies the abstractness as we see it carried back. The success of it withal, lay in an inconsistent, but defensible departure from these formal demands. Kant's harking back to scholasticism is seen in this, while his vigorous break with 'angelic' speculation appears in his invitation to men to examine human reason as it is.

CHAPTER IV.

EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONTENT OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

It is a very treacherous procedure to attempt to split up the Critical philosophy and view it from the two aspects of form and content. It has its precedent in Kant himself.¹ The 'Transcendental Æsthetic' and the 'Transcendental Analytic' rest on a violent separation of the form and matter of knowledge. Indeed, the very *raison d'être* of the Critical philosophy itself is found in the possibility of that asseverated distinction. And when a study of it would force it to the same treatment, it must *a fortiori* find itself doubly abstract and still farther removed from a foothold in experiential or rational realities.

It is a precedent only, not a model. It constantly appeared in the preceding chapter that any attempt to carry out the disreption is futile. We cannot pass beyond its mere expression. The two 'aspects' have naught else than a conceptual reality. It is the peculiarity of all species of philosophical inquiries, that how they shall express themselves is inextricably wrapped up in the nature of that which shall constitute the expression. *Sie sind wechselseitig*. And, if we admit that there obtains a qualitative series of such inquiries, this mutuality advances *pari passu* with the relative importance of the respective inquiries. Kant's system does not half complete itself before it begins to struggle with the difficulties arising from its illegitimate sublimation of the bare whirling machinery that is to turn out the fine grist of reality. The necessity of pitting speculative and practical reasons in order to champion reality, however near it may approach hyperbolization in transcendental phraseology, and, the ultimate insight that it all needed a rounding out by a Critical appeal to the most subjective subjectivity, are supreme

¹*Critique*, II., p. 18 f.

parodies on the conviction that fostered the first nursling of pure reason, and warnings to him who in his search for truth must run the gauntlet of the facts of life.

The distinction of form and content, however, is only a convenience for this study. Psychology underlies Criticism in more ways than one; nor in an entirely negative manner. The conception of psychology and its preliminaries very properly enters into its relation with the formal nature of Criticism. The more serious and difficult task remains—an estimation of the tenets arrived at by Criticism, from a psychological point of view. So much presupposition and implication from this empirical science is wrapped up in Criticism, it was the original purpose of this study to inquire into the extent of the influence it feels from all psychological principles and reach conclusions from a detailed systematic study. But the limitations of time require that an exhaustive treatment be replaced with a condensed consideration of three or four of the most important psychological problems so far as they enter into philosophical doctrines.

In the introductory chapter it was affirmed that psychology and philosophy are two distinct, yet closely, uniquely related, and, consequently often confused endeavors. The truth of this appears even in all forms of sceptical thinking. For in general, their scepticism is due, either to an imperfect psychology; or, their philosophy is only a psychology under a different name, and makes of it an unwarrantable application to problems which do not concern it. Psychology always leaves us with an X and processes. It has also been hinted all along that Kant's was an intensified psychological age that expressed itself in 'Orientations' and 'Aufklärungen,' under whose rational countenance of free-thinking there was a fermenting psychologic spirit only to break forth in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and its supplementary treatises. It must be said the Critical philosophy is the best and natural expression of its age, basing itself on the concatenating unity that man furnishes and thus being an answer to all forms of modern speculation—at one stroke rebuking empiricism and materialism, and checking every variety of dogmatic spiritualism. The preceding chapter

saw how far psychology was Kant's guide, notwithstanding his utter repudiation of such an impure, empiric matter-of-fact science as he conceived psychology to be. From the general content which he allowed to that psychology, it was seen how closely he links Criticism to a knowledge of mind life. There has also been indicated the substance of Kant's answer to his great question—his sceptical solution—and how he proceeds at once to build an ethical metaphysic on the ruins of a speculative structure once erected by the same reason, and to fuse the positive, empirical limitations of the one with the transcendental possibilities of the other by a critical examination of subjective, *i. e.* æsthetical, judgments. This provides at least three chief problems—the nature of knowledge and certainty, and man's ethical and æsthetical being. These, in terms of brevity constitute philosophy. Even Kant says as much with some apparent incongruity with the contents of the first *Critique*.¹ It is not proposed to investigate the integrity of Kant's philosophy—though this has been one of the most obvious points of attack in the history of Kantian criticism, and may appear so far as desirable in a study of this kind. Nor is it proposed to inquire entirely into the legitimate employment Kant made of his own psychology in his theory of knowledge and rational ethics. This would partially approach the above problem, and would also encounter that serious and irremovable difficulty, that, up to the time of Critical philosophy, we have its psychology only in implications. And a doubtful attempt it would be to gather the involved psychological facts as they appear to any student. And furthermore, Kant's psychology, while not in dissonance with his time, was given to us mainly after his philosophical reflections and with their speculative coloring. On the basis of man's self-knowledge, with which the Critical philosophy first spent itself, did it afterwards attempt to build up a doctrine of philosophical knowledge—both scientific and moral.

Now philosophy, as a whole, is a progressive doctrine. It renews its attacks on 'the riddles of life' from the sometimes

¹ "Ich habe gelernt, dass Philosophie eine Wissenschaft des Menschen, seines Vorstellens, Denkens und Handelns sei; sie soll den Menschen nach allen seinen Bestandtheilen darstellen, wie er ist und sein soll, etc." *Werke*, VII., 386 f.

clearer vantage ground afforded it by a deeper scientific insight into the entirety of nature. Yet some of its tasks are perennially concerned 'with the same old problems.' Philosophy as a discipline must somehow render an account to reason of its ingress into its 'inquiry after ultimate reality,' either by halting first at this universal fact of knowledge and endeavor its solution, whether man can know reality, as Kant has done; or with Hegel 'learn to swim by at once proceeding into the water.' Notwithstanding Lotze's objection that the orchestra never comes to music by a constant tuning of the instruments, the music, if it is to be defensible, must come only after the fitness of the instruments has been ascertained. And it is this very problem of philosophy—an analysis of knowledge, that receives least help from the advancement of the empirical sciences. However much knowledge may be increased, the problem of knowledge remains the same. Reflective analysis must here go over the same ground from thinker to thinker, and with the aid of processes and elements acquired by empirical induction, the conviction of an ultimate solution may be increasingly confirmed.¹ It is this fact, coupled with Kant's claim that he had said the last word on the nature of knowledge, that makes inviting a consideration of Kant's results with the results of empirical psychology, as it may have advanced.

Kant is an idealist, as the phrase has philosophical vogue; but of what sort, has been the great question from the very first among his critics. He himself labelled his position in the first edition of the *Critique*, and later expressions are mere vindications of his original doctrine. By 'idealist,' Kant understands one who teaches the doctrine of the doubtful existence of external objects, of which there "are two kinds: *dogmatic*, who denies the existence of matter, and the *sceptical* who doubts it, because he thinks it impossible to prove it."² In the popular '*Prolegomena*'³ is found the expression of what *he means* by 'idealism,' which "besteht in der Behauptung, dass es keine andern als denkende wesen gebe." His idealism "betraf nicht

¹ Cf., Ladd, *Introd. to Phil.*, pp. 181 ff.

² *Critique*, II., 318, 327.

³ *Werke*, IV., 37, Anmerkung II; 42 Anmerk. III.

die existenz der Sachen denn die zu bezweifeln, ist mir niemals in den Sinn gekommen, sondern bloß die sinnliche Vorstellung der Sachen, dazu Raum und Zeit zuoberst gehören."

Again, his idealism is the critical kind which subverts the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley and the sceptical, problematical idealism of Descartes.¹ This 'transcendental idealism' was still the bone of contention among his critics when the second edition (1787) appeared, whose only alteration or addition was 'the new refutation of psychological idealism.'² Such emendations were more unsatisfactory than any previous, inviting such perverse and unethetical criticism as is notably that of Schopenhauer, that these latter refutations were the cowering utterances of the 'verältende' Kant. Instead, 'the new refutation' is plainly sarcastic; and while the second edition is less confident in its tone, there is undoubtedly a thorough-going adherence to the same doctrine of transcendental ideality, which, when taken in connection with the doctrine of noumenon,³ is utter scepticism in the critical sense of that term. 'Objects' are such only for the active understanding whose principle of causality has no validity beyond the mere series of temporal events as they are dirempted in the two forms of consciousness. This noëtic conclusion was reached by the transcendental process which neither finds an auxiliary in psychological data, nor is it a psychological procedure.

But Kant has left an excellent loop hole in which the psychologist can thrust his inquiries with a disposition to question the validity of his psychological implications. While there is not a little psychology thrown up as a bulwark behind which Criticism takes its refuge, we must concede to Kant that his fixed armament is philosophical. "We have declared ourselves from the very beginning in favor of transcendental idealism." "The transcendental idealist is an empirical realist and allows to matter, as a phenomenon, a reality which need not be inferred, but may be immediately perceived." "If then we are asked whether dualism only must be admitted in psychology, we

¹ *Werke*, IV., 122 f.

² *Critique*, I., 386 f., note, 475-479.

³ *Critique*, II., 205 ff.

answer certainly, but only in its empirical acceptance."¹ Such passages, though removed in the second edition, are most excellent psychological texts for the Kantian student.

An objection must first be raised against Kant's persistent utterance, that he was dealing only with the 'oberen Erkenntnisvermögen.' Not only does he obviously pass beyond these, but he is compelled to make heavy drafts upon the powers he placed among the lower or sensible—*c. g.* imagination, so important in the transcendental deduction and in the doctrine of schematism. But he swept away the ground on which the Wolffian distinction of higher and lower faculties rests, and which was made with reference to the cognitive activity of mind. "The distinction between confused and well-ordered representation," says Kant, criticizing the psychology of Leibnitz and Wolff,² "is logical only and does not touch the content of our knowledge." He replaces this logical by a transcendental distinction, and at once goes farther away from any allowance granted by psychology. The impossibility of his working out his problem on the line of psychological 'purity' is seen in the necessity of his constant invocation on something other than 'pure reason.' It alone could not spin out the knowledge into whose nature he made inquiry. While his conclusions justly entitled him to say,³ "einem jeden Vermögen des Gemüths kann man ein Interesse beilegen, d. i. ein Princip, welches die Bedingung enthält, unter welcher allein die Ausübung desselben befördert wird," he also found himself compelled to abide with the principle, announced in 1770,⁴ that sensations excite mental activity.

As an idealist, Kant is in perfect consistency and truth when he affirms the 'reality' of the facts of experience.⁵ Dualism

¹ *Critique*, II., 321, 322, 328.

² *Critique*, II., 38. It was largely this distinction which aided Kant in coming to the insight of sensibility *vs.* intelligibility. *Cf.* 1770 *Dissert. Werke* II., 402 ff; *cf.*, *Vorles. üb. Psych.*, p. 26, where Wolff's position is more clearly repudiated; *cf.* also on the distinction between 'ästhetischen' and 'logische Deutlichkeit.' *Werke* VI., 391 note.

³ *Werke*, V., 126.

⁴ *Werke*, II., 413.

⁵ Although the very core of criticism is to see what reason can do without all experience, whence that very shallow criticism that the *a priori* of the

in psychology is a healthy sign of the right sort of an idealism. It leaves unquestioned the reality of things given by the immediacy of consciousness, and comes to us as an answer to those inquiries which press beyond the bare is-ness of things and confronts the mystery of their nature.¹ Here is where realism and idealism as ontological doctrines begin to part ways, the former affirming the independent reality of a world of related things which we know, while to idealism is given the defensible right of maintaining a mentality in, or behind this reality.

Here, also, appears clearly the relation of psychology to either form of metaphysics. They pronounce upon the ultimate nature of the known things as real, while to psychology is incumbent a delineation of the processes whereby a knowledge of those things, *as real*, arises. Both presuppose psychological investigation and plant themselves upon it. They cannot cut loose from it. For the sake of consistency, realism must be realistic and idealism must be idealistic, because each has adopted certain empirical laws as summing up psychological truth. Moreover, in so far as each harks back to the way this knowledge of things as real comes about, they lose their philosophical birthright and drop down to the level of psychological empiricism. But this is satisfied when the manner of acquiring a knowledge of things and the attainment of other forms of developed consciousness has been recited.

The first great and fundamental problem in psychology is the process and nature of sense-perception. These are states of consciousness having the mark of objectivity, and make the first and enduring appeal to the conscious activity. It expresses itself in such terms as, "I see this, here or there; or that, then or now, etc." It affirms itself to be knowing things in space

elements of understanding is of a very doubtful kind, since Kant himself must have been *in* experience in order to have the problem suggested to him. Cf., Lange, *Hist. of Mat.*, II., 190 n., represents them as fruits of an 'inductive process.' Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 129 ff., represents it a 'steadfast, constant reflection.' Fischer, *Gesch. d. n. Phil.*, V., reduces the method of Criticism as 'psychological empiricism.' Cohen, *Kant's Theorie d. Erfahr.*, pp. 105-107, finds the mode of discovery in "der Reflexion, der psychologischen Besinnung über der Erfahrung."

¹ Cf., Watson, *Journ. Spec. Phil.*, 1881, p. 337 ff., "The Critical Philosophy in its relations to Realism and Sensationalism."

and time, things that are distinguished from that consciousness which knows; (and more significant yet) things (which are not fantastic creatures) that are given to it, oblivious of what theoretic importance the past may have for the being of that which is given. Here psychology steps in with its atomic sensations. It invokes all the scientific resources to which its position, as at the head of the biological sciences, entitles it, to aid it in its explanations, or rather in constructing a satisfactory theory of perception. Here, too, is where the choicest work in psychology has been done, and from this quarter comes the imputation that Kant, in his denial of the possibility of a scientific form being attained by psychology, does nothing more than work crude observations into a speculative form. Only so far, however, as the mechanical manipulation of sensations is concerned can this charge be allowed. For when this much has been accomplished, orthodox psychology links itself to the authoritative classification of Kant.

Sensations are taken as the simplest and original of the facts of consciousness, but as data which the developed consciousness is unable to separate from that fused complex which it must regard as 'presentation.' These simple elements modern psychology¹ regards in three chief aspects: the quality, or what-sort-ness, the quantity, or how-much-ness, the tone or the felt-ness. Its investigations, especially of the first two marks of sensations, have been its chief success and rightly entitles it to its claim of scientific character. Kant also recognized three such qualities of the sense elements. The quality of sensations are classified not according to the kinds of sensations that may appear in consciousness, but rather on the basis of the variety of the organs of sensation.² There was that broad and common distinction between 'the vital' or bodily sensations and the special or 'organic' sensations. The former are connected with the emotions and passions; and, furthermore, are to be distinguished from the feelings, *c. g.*, 'of delight and disgust,' and from 'the internal sense,' which is considered as the mind's mode of affecting itself and an observation

¹*Cf.*, Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, pp. 306 f., 356 f., 509 f.

²*Cf.*, *Werke*, VII., 451 f., 465 f.

of these affections. The special or 'organic' senses are the five: sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. The sensations of 'heat and cold, smoothness and roughness' belong to the 'vital' sense. The sense of touch 'gives *form* only and immediately.' Vision is a mediated perception and gives the 'image' of an object. Indeed, it is 'the highest form of pure intuition of the immediate representations.'¹ Hearing, which is 'merely mediated perception,' does not give the '*form*' nor '*image*' of an object. For the most part it is a 'vital sense;' it is the 'musical sense,' and gives rise to feelings. Taste and smell are closely related to each other as, *e. g.*, one who has no smell has a coarse taste, etc.

The first three senses are of mechanical origin, the others are of chemical.² The first three are the perceptive senses. Their sensations are more objective than subjective, thus contributing chiefly to the cognition of external objects. The second set are the purely hygienic, organic senses of enjoyment, their sensations being more subjective and contributing less to the knowledge of objects. Seeing and hearing seem to be held to be 'acquired,'³ while perception or 'cognitions' come only with a fusion of touch (form) with sight (image) and hearing (which is partially concerned with the location of noises in space). Vision is most closely associated with touch, and has 'least sensation' but 'most perception.' With this is closely associated the law of relativity which exists between sensation and perception; for Kant made the distinction, and psychologists generally attributed the first statement of it to him.⁴ In the first three senses, an increase of sensation diminishes the perception and (internal) pain ensues. Even the fact is general that 'the more strongly affected the senses feel themselves to be, the less they teach.'

Very closely associated with this relativity of the effective

¹A remark that may be of significance to him who finds all idealists 'eye minded' thinkers, *Werke*, II., 468; *cf.*, V. 13.

²A statement not borne out by the facts of later discoveries in the case of sight, whose physiological origin resides, probably in the photo-chemical changes that occur in the retinal visual purple, etc., *cf.*, Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, pp. 179, 184.

³*Werke*, VII., 487.

⁴*Werke*, VII., 470; *cf.* Höffding, *op. cit.* 129.

and perceptive elements in sense cognition, is the psychological principle which Kant raises to the rank of *apriority* in his 'Analytic of Principles.'¹ "In all phenomena sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the object, has an intensive quantity, *i. e.*, a degree." Strangely enough, this very principle stands in contradiction with the possibilities of psychology allowed by Kant in the preface passage already dwelt upon in the previous chapter. Nor was it removed or essentially modified in the second edition. In truth, it is some such a presupposition which lies at the basis of modern psychophysics. It assumes some quantitative relation between a sensation and its stimulus, and attempts to measure it, as, *e. g.*, Weber's law² summarizes the relation (whether it be physiological or psychological in its character is scarcely pertinent here); while the determinations of the kinds of sensation is chiefly of the physiological psychological sort, more strictly speaking.

Kant enumerates³ several conditions on which the quantity of sensation depends, though they contain admixtures of higher psychological principles and can doubtless be reduced to items which concern the interest accompaniments of attention. They are: 1, *contrast*, where sense intuitions are placed side by side, under one and the same conception (chiefly the principle of the comic, as he expands it); 2, *novelty* increases the degree of our sense perception because of the newly involved acquisition; 3, *change* refreshes our senses, while monotony results in atony; 4, *intensification*, where the maximum is the turning point, towards which the influence is reviving, beyond which it is exhausting. But such are semi-popular classifications of everyday observation, that there is not a like intensity attending our sense experiences, and has had no real consequence in the history of psychology.

There is also a sharp distinction of what is now known as the sensation and its tone of feeling.⁴ It is a wide-reaching psychological principle, and was especially fundamental in that

¹ *Critique*, II., 147 ff.

² *Cf.*, Sully, I., 88 f.

³ *Werke*, VII., 475 f.

⁴ *Cf.*, *Werke*, V., 195 f, 210 f, 296, 311; VI., 388; VII., 8 f.

it was the psychological fact on which the last and unifying *Critique* planted itself. Sensation is an affection of the mind, and as known in consciousness, includes at least two elements, *viz*: 1, the cognitive or objective; 2, the æsthetical or subjective. A pleasure or pain is 'combined' with sensation and perception. The fusion of a rational element (judgment) with the form of sensibility gave Kant his warrant for finding in the *Critique of Judgment* the investigation which should close the circle and unite sensibility (knowable experience) with reason (a law-giving morality) in the totality of a system. Whether psychology may permit him this conclusion cannot be inquired into here.

Modern psychology also undertakes the measurement of the 'extensity' or 'voluminousness' of sensations.¹ This sensational 'quale of spatiality' was not an unknown psychological tenet in Kant's time. It had been developed by Condillac, and even yet finds acceptance in some psychological quarters. Kant, speaking with his speculative intent,² has denied the extensive or spatial quality of sensations. "Sensation being that in the phenomenon the apprehension of which does not form a successive synthesis progressing from parts to a complete representation, is without any extensive quantity." "As sensation by itself is no objective representation, and as in it the intuition of neither space nor time can be found it follows that an extensive quantity does not belong to it, etc."

Now Kant did not go into the perception of space as a psychological problem, and only occasionally do there occur allusions to this process. In 1766 a passing reference³ is made to the fact that the localization of an object in space conforms with the direction whence comes the rays of light which enter the eye, within which is the *focus imaginarius*. Again, and with more physiological reference, he finds⁴ the principle to be

¹ Ward, *loc. cit.*, 46, 53 f.

² *Critique*, II., 148, I., 465-6. A passage (*Crit.*, II., 145) says, "every phenomenon, as an intuition, must be an extensive quantity." Here, however, the 'intuited phenomenon' is plainly the product of perceptive synthesis.

³ *Werke*, II., 352 f.

⁴ In the essay 'Von dem ersten Grunde d. Untersch. d. Gegenden im Raume' [1768]. *Werke*, II., 387 f.

of a physiological-psychological character. The relation of objects is expressed in judgments which at first have distinct reference to the characteristic feeling of being in the body and distinguishing one side of it from the other.¹ Absolute space, however, is already discerned to be not an object of external sensation, but a primal concept (*Grundbegriff*), which makes all else possible (*i. e.*, as objects). This same physiological basis of the judgments is again referred to almost twenty years later.² Beyond this Kant did not go. There was discerned no problem of space perception, and much less was there felt the need of positing 'local signs,' towards which his fragmentary expressions can hardly be likened.

What distinction Kant makes between sensation, perception and knowledge it is difficult to conclude, and especially so in regard to the first two. For in them is wrapped up that great element in Criticism, *viz*: 'that which is given.' Between this and 'knowledge' the distinction is apparently broad. Now, representations are perceptions which become sensations or knowledge, according to the direction into which we turn our reference to them either subject-wards or objectively.³ Again, sensation is represented as the groundwork of perception, and a psychological reality in the latter is conditioned upon the presence of the former.⁴ Or, sensation is no 'intuition' (perception),⁵ and can become 'representation' only with the attachment of 'consciousness,' *i. e.*, perception is the consciousness of an empirical intuition.⁶

As to the nature of this perception there is quite as much vacillating vagueness. A tone time⁷ 'perception is the given element' after which there comes that cognifying, transcendental

¹ "Die beiden Seiten des menschlichen Körpers, ungeachtet ihrer grossen äusseren Aehnlichkeit, durch eine klare Empfindung genugsam unterscheiden." *Ibid.*, 389.

² *Werke*, IV., 340 f.

³ *Crit.*, II., 278.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II., 196.

⁵ *Werke*, IV., 55.

⁶ *Werke*, VI., 33, 22; *Critique*, II., 327. On sensation vs. perception, *cf.*, also *Crit.*, II., 105 note, 102.

⁷ *Crit.*, II., 105, 44.

synthesis; at another,¹ perception is immediate consciousness of a representation in which there is no inference, for a perceptual reality is immediately given. But in his empirical expressions we saw a vague mediacy and immediacy given to the various senses in their activity. Again,² neither 'sensations' nor 'ideas' are knowledge. It presupposes both while they are yet in need of 'the synthetic unity of apperception' in order to become cognitions. Indeed, these 'representations' are represented as being the material which understanding synthesizes.³ With this confusion, we may safely conclude that, with Kant, sensation is the affection of a passive mind (Gemüths),⁴ which somehow is yet dormant in the 'ideas,' 'representations' (Vorstellungen), concerning which are given those 'judgments of perception' from which knowledge and experience flow pursuant to a later intellectual activity.⁵

Thus we can have scarce any ground on which to rest an answer to the inquiry whether perception with Kant is 'mediate,' or 'immediate.' He certainly makes a broad, generous distinction between perception and knowledge, the latter being in chief the core of judgment around which the fantastic variety of sensibility clings, and does not represent knowledge as a datum given to us—a diametrical criticism of strong currents of sensationalism that eddied about him. It was 'knowledge,' not mere perception, which was his absorbing theme. Yet perception was a phase of his problem, if we make the unsubstantiable supposition that by 'object' and objectivity he means the constructive, perceptive activity of mind. Here appears how closely the content of Criticism borders upon psychology and yet has in it a savoring that differentiates it from the empirical science. It could not have been perception, as such, that Kant is explaining. *He presupposed the work of psychology as completely done and accepted in certain forms the doctrine of 'Vorstellungen' then regnant in psychological circles, but combats the empiricism which attempted to bring knowledge out of these*

¹ *Ibid.*, 327, f, 322.

² *Werke*, VIII., 34, 527, 529; VIII., 537.

³ *Crit.*, II., 44; V., 222.

⁴ *Crit.*, II., 17; *Werke*, VIII., 689.

⁵ *Werke*, IV., 47 f., 499; V., 296 f., 300, 222.

ideational images.¹ For ideation is not a knowing judgment.² Yet perception, as such, with Kant is an immediate act of consciousness, and he does not hesitate in subverting the 'representative' theory that had obtained such Cartesian vogue. But if we grant an extensive meaning to perception, then this 'immediacy' is confronted by that famous and frequently employed phrase of Criticism,³ the 'correlative' or that which 'corresponds' to an object. Even yet, perception remains an immediate spontaneity; for such expressions treasure up what Reid might have been struggling with, but in Kant are connected with the doctrine of noumenon, which concerns the *knowledge* of the (causal) reality of that which lies in our (phenomenal) representations. Still, allowing the generous meaning to be given to knowledge and perception, the immediacy of perception remains, even if Kant's analysis of the

¹Schopenhauer (*Fourfold root, etc., tr.*, 94) with a characteristic feeling, criticises Kant's views of perception. 'He simply identifies perception with sensation,' and 'is therefore obliged to leave the genesis of empirical perception unexplained.' As to the first point, S. is wrong. Wherever else K. may have failed, he does not fail to make the distinction between sensation and perception (*cf.*, *Crit.*, II., 278, 196, 327; *Werke*, IV., 55, 47, 499; V., 195, 300; VI., 33; VII., 46 f. ('Sensation' is here identified with perception only, and so far agrees with S.) 470; VIII., 529, 527, 537; Erdmann, *Reflexionen*, I., i., p. 79, No. 66, etc). *Cf.*, Meyer, *op. cit.*, 268. As to the second point there are serious difficulties as to K.'s real purpose. But we think the text indicates these and at the same time discriminates his accepted doctrine of perceived 'representations,'—'accepted,' because K., presumably, was not concerned with the problems of 'empirical perception,' as such, but struggled with the obscurities of 'judgmental' knowledge, if it might be so expressed. If, on the other hand, he was attempting an explanation of the 'objective' ideational states of consciousness, then S. may be in the right. We admit the confusion possible, but can hardly conceive of K. attempting to parody psychological analysis with his sublime philosophical reflexions. It does seem that the 'problem of perception' did not confront him. K. even intimates that ideation is something mysterious; *cf.*, VII., 34: 'Ideas cannot be explained; for this always requires another idea.'

Again K. does not question the validity of perception, such as is frequently done by idealists. 'For perception is the representation of a reality' (*Crit.* II., 324), and the two sorts of realities given in perception, external and internal things, so-called, and feelings, thoughts, etc., come by way of the diremptive process of consciousness, for everything is at first given in that consciousness, internally as it were. *Cf.*, *ibid.* 322, 324, 88, 128, 428, 326, 156, 167-8, 196.

²*Cf.*, VIII., *Werke*, 34, 526, 584; *Crit.* I., 492, II., 45, etc.

³*Cf.*, *Critique*, II., 26, 92, 219, 333, 429; I., 386-387, note, 487; *Werke*, IV., 84; VIII., 526, 580, 585 f., etc.

nature of knowledge was intended to be an account of perception. In either case there must be a synthesis *somewhere*, which Kant places in mental spontaneity rather than in the 'corresponding' relatedness of objects which stamps itself upon us.

From what has been said above (p. 95 f.), which is about all that Kant has given us for the explanation of perception, it is seen, not how disrespectful he might have been of empirical efforts, but how ultra-psychological were his investigations. One must mourn this want of psychological material, or find stupendous implications in the most psychological portions of the *Critique*. We, of course, allude to the problems of perception as they find themselves united in that supreme problem of the 'perception of space.' How comes about the knowledge of what, in the reflective period, leads one to give to *that* an independent reality? And that portion of the Critical philosophy, which has special bearing on the nature of spatial perception, stands at its threshold and really gives to transcendentalism its great wedge for driving asunder the knotty, antinomistic problems which arise in the course of the natural, metaphysical procedure of reason. It is the Transcendental *Æsthetic*—its first part. It gives the whole drift to speculative reason, and virtually forces Kant to push his inquiries into the moral, intelligible world for the nature of reality.¹ It also is one of the first of the critical tenets with which psychology, as since developed, finds itself closely related. It is likewise the psychological problem on whose solution realistic and idealistic metaphysics partially base themselves. The wise ontologist will consult the myriad facts entering into our ideas of space. Thus an intense significance is attached to the respective answers given by the associational school (Spencer), the sensational, empiristic school (Ward, James), and the nativistic school of 'psychical stimulists' (Lotze, Ladd), to the psychological problem of space-perception.² These are instances where respective philosophical

¹His doctrine of space is the ground of his idealism, while his scepticism is undoubtedly due to the ideality of time which swept away all reality to what may be given in mind-life. Cf. *Werke*, V., 105: 'Our capital supposition of the ideality of time.' Cf., in following chapter on time-consciousness and the *ego*.

²Wundt divides the theories of space perception into 'Nativistic' and 'Gene-

views of mind *do* condition the acceptance of certain scientific views. Natural logic, in the name of consistency, invites this close affiliation of psychology and metaphysics, though their respective tasks are by far unlike.

Now Kant's doctrine of space is that of its ideality; it is an empty *a priori* form of the mind which must be filled with the material of intuition, or rather sensation. From the manner in which Kant leaves it, his students are justified in thinking of it as an abstract form. And some psychologists have attempted to weave that interpretation into a scientific theory, giving such views as that of Müller's, the physiologist, 'nativism.'¹ The view of Prof. James as to the 'voluminousness of sensations' would class him among those who agree with Müller's speculations; but he repudiates any affiliation with that 'machine shop' that appears thoroughly 'mythological' to him. For 'the essence of the Kantian contention is that there are not *spaces*, but *space*—one infinite continuous *unit*.' He concludes with the general agreement that 'it is a notion,' an abstract form and could possibly be 'no intuition.'² James is with the throng, and we too must admit that the Kantian space is apparently the space of abstraction—something unknown in the perceptive consciousness. As a speculator, this may be vouchsafed to Kant; but where he speaks with reference to psychological realities³ we must not forget such passages as, *c. g.*, 'space consists of spaces only,' etc., which James has apparently done. Moreover, Kant does fight 'abstract space.' When on the threshold of the critical period he contends that 'absolute space' is no object of the senses, but much rather a 'Grundbegriff' which makes possible the *totality* of experience.

In a curiously obscure foot-note⁴ occurs a passage which tic,' and affirms himself as adhering to the latter. Now his classification is really unfortunate. All psychologists are 'genetic' nowadays. Their points of difference lie in what is implied in the terms employed above, *viz*: 'Nativistic,' 'Empiristic,' 'Associational.' Cf., Ladd: *Phys. Psych.*, p. 389, James, *op. cit.*, II., 277, Helmholtz, *Phys. Optik.*, 435, Wundt, *Phys. Psych.*, II., 23.

¹*Critique*, II., 371; cf. *Crit.*, I., 437, note.

²Sully, *op. cit.*, II., 332.

³*Op. cit.*, II., 273 f.

⁴*Crit.*, II., 149. Though in the same paragraph time and space are spoken of as 'quanta continua.'

seemingly makes against that very abstractness of space on which rest the antinomies (among which it occurs). "Empirical intuition is not a compound of phenomena and of space (perception and empty intuition). The one is not a correlate of the other in a synthesis, but the two are only connected as matter and form in one and the same empirical intuition.¹ If we try to separate one from the other, and to place space outside all phenomena, we arrive at a number of empty determinations of external intuition, which, however, can never be possible perceptions, etc." Nothing could be more plainly a refutation of that interpretation of Kantian space which has been significant in the development of some 'nativistic' theories regarding the perception of space. Of course, Kant was satisfied with the vague expression 'pure *a priori* form of external intuition;' in fact, he seemed to stick in it. Nor does he give more than rare psychological reference to it anywhere. Gathering together the analyzed bits, we may affirm psychologically that Kant denies any spatiality, or 'extensiveness' to sensations, but space still remains a mental form.² How then might these be fused, or, speaking more in accordance with the facts of consciousness, how does it happen that 'objects are external or outside ourselves?'³ We can reply only by taking an implication of his theory of knowledge, *viz.*: the synthetic activity of mind (*Gemüth*), which is so fundamental with Kant.⁴ The 'manifold' must be submitted to mental constructions before they become affirmable realities 'to ourselves.'

In this connection there should be noted a psychological principle which Kant adopted. It lends its coloring to all that portion of the *Critique* which relates to the genesis of knowledge, the subsumption of the manifold, and the construction of the schema, and doubtless enters into his negative conception of

¹Note that 'intuition' is not exactly equivalent to sensation, but rather to the 'representations' of sense.

²These two are in opposition in Prof. James's theory, but not because of the 'unconscious machine shop' *he* has not.

³*Crit.*, II., 20.

⁴*Cf. Crit.*, II., 144. "Every phenomena as an intuition must be an extensive quantity, because it can be known in apprehension by a successive synthesis only (of part with part)"—a statement of psychological import.

self consciousness and his ideality of time. The acceptance of the principle is certainly to be associated with his one-sided conception of memory, at whose expense he exalted imagination (as we saw in the preceding chapter). He believed in the fact so firmly that it is sublimated into an *a priori* principle, in fact, *the* 'axiom of intuition,'¹ viz: "All phenomena are, with reference to their intuition, extensive quantities." Its foundation resides in his view that consciousness has no span, but is necessarily limited to one point, or moment only; for the (synthetic) imagination 'must first necessarily apprehend one of these manifold representations after another.'² Even this sort of 'going through,' which belongs to the nature of consciousness, is subtly connected with the idea of 'synthetic' judgments. This is a view not common with Kant alone, but it was a favorite in all forms of rational psychology where the soul was considered as a unit and in its attentive powers was unable to 'attend to more than a single object at once,' as Hamilton³ expresses it.

Though Kant gives this a significance wherever possible, it is a question not admitting of speculation. Only experiments can properly arrive at a conclusion. Bonnet, *e. g.*, before Kant, and Hamilton since, have concluded that the 'circuit of consciousness' could embrace six or seven impressions.⁴ This possibility also enters into a theory of perception, and, indeed, provides the conscious basis of that fusion which all psychologists somehow recognize as entering into spatial perception. Its possibility lies in the simultaneity of impressions coming upon moving organs, etc.⁵

Beyond this the lack of any attempt on the part of Kant to solve the special problem will not permit one to go. However he might turn the conception, he still holds fast to the opinion that 'space itself exists within me only, . . . and is nothing outside our sensibility.'⁶ There only remains to point out what

¹ *Crit.*, II., 143 f.

² *Ibid.*, 88, 91, 114.

³ *Lectures on Metaphysic*, 165 f.

⁴ In recent times Dietze has undertaken to ascertain the facts and found the variations in the 'span of prehension' to be between 15 and 40. Ladd, *op. cit.*, p. 494 f.; cf. James, I., 405 ff.

⁵ Cf., Sully, *Human Mind*, I., 223, 238.

⁶ *Crit.*, II., 325.

validity modern psychology may allow to such a conception of space.

Whatever judgment metaphysic may pronounce on the nature of space, psychology can regard it only as a mental form of some sort, and not an independent object, a knowledge of which is built up in the usual manner. This appears in the inky discussions of the various modern views on the nature of this form of perception. Whether 'nativistic,' in the sense that space is a mental form peculiarly such and not to be had or given in the jumble and associative assortment of sensations, or 'empiristic' in the contrary meaning, that space is an original form, not of the mind, as it is said,¹ but of the sensations themselves, and is a necessary quality of them, is the chief point of difference. In some way the spatial element is a given factor in consciousness. Their divergence of views widens as they both become 'genetic.' Neither view can now dispense with that development which enters as a potent, transforming process. They all are geneticists and must look to experience for that native constructiveness which rounds out the deficiencies in any theory. In the one view the serious task encounters growing difficulties as it attempts to satisfy the explanation of the process whereby the mental form develops into the spatial series. Its analysis of the qualities of those sensations which enter into such a synthesis must needs be searching, and then only partially accomplishes its task by calling in some sort of 'local signs' which differentiate in consciousness those elements which successively enter the fields of simultaneous perception. The other view has an apparent triumph in the slight necessity of merely throwing the original sensational *quale* into arithmetical computations in order to satisfy theoretically that which is given in adult consciousness, but drags in the scientific absurdity that in the primal datum there is the mysterious fact of space. In one sense, nativism and empiricism do not lie far apart, and are each closely related to and suffused with that philosophy of mind with which they furnish their psychology. In another sense, as psychological theories, they are antipodal; the difficulties of one are matters of scientific fact and their consistent ad-

¹ Cf., Bain's 'massiveness,' Ward's 'extensity,' James 'voluminousness.'

justment, while the other is compelled to defend itself from the possible absurdity that mingles in its assumption of a 'big extendedness' (James). The one is disburdened at the very point at which the other becomes encumbered.

There has been briefly and intentionally expressed the comparative value of the two rival theories, hinting the validity which it is believed either view can rightly claim. As a psychological theory the empiristic or sensational view bears the *onus probandi*. It mistakes scientific function. The mere statement of facts is not explanation. No brilliancy, however versatile, can be left unmolested in the assertion that the limit of the possibility of conceiving, reachable by 'matter-moulded forms of expression,' is to be posited as the elemental affair.¹ The atomic sensation posited by the psychologist is a subjective affair, and only in adult consciousness do things appear 'out and spread out' in space. The gap is as wide as the extremities of a maturing experience, and it becomes psychology to adjust a theory to its presuppositions and the inductive facts which have accrued from that patient analysis of sensations and perceptions which are now its possession.

It is thus indicated that Kant's conception of space agrees with that of psychology, in that he maintained it as a mental form; but disagrees with the one view that it belongs to sensation as such, and throws its suggestive influence with the opposite view that the manifold of sense receive spatial character only by a synthesis of apprehension.² He omitted the numerous details of fact, and reached on theoretic grounds the conclusion

¹James, *op. cit.*, II., 31 f. Höfding, *op. cit.*, 190 f. Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, 385 ff. and art. 'Psych. as so-called Natural Science,' in the *Phil. Rev.* Jan., 1892, p. 24 ff.

²This fact must never be lost sight of: that, in the first instance, Kantian space is mathematical space (showing how his analysis of 'knowledge' emerges out of mathematical conceptions); and that the space of psychology is utterly unmathematical. It is, as Sully somewhere says, that sort of room that seems to be felt as out a little way in front of us ready to vanish as we orientate ourselves. The mathematical space is much rather the space of non-sensuous imagination—that which flits beyond the horizon of our accustomed perceptions. The confusion of interpretation and source of general objection when K. speaks of space as a ready-made form or mould into which sensations must get themselves synthetically arranged, may thus be obviated. The *real* space that we *know* is built up, but not in that way.

which it has taken the patient search of half a century to verify in its discovery of details involved in the psychological processes.

This compatibility is that possible consonance which is of an hereditary origin, for it is true, doubtless, that Kant's speculations have shaped empiric investigations, and the psychology of space perception can be pointed out as showing one of the streams of influence issuing forth from the *Critique*.¹ But it should not lead one to overlook the fact that it does not indicate any accordance between his views of perception and those which are now defended by psychology. 'The mere having of ideas' was the vogue psychology of the two preceding centuries. Kant's doctrine of the representation of the object (*Vorstellung*) is, in some confused sense, 'the given element,' with which Schopenhauer charges Kant as smudging over the problem of perception. 'Representations' are given, and then the understanding broods over them in its categorical forms.² The phenomena become cognitions, realities, only when brought under other than sense forms. These are conceptual realities, whose becoming and the grounds of whose perdurance Kant is describing. Perceptual realities are the facts of experience which come with the immediacy of consciousness. The problem of ideation and percept-making could not have occurred to him.³

The facts of experience were never submitted to doubt.⁴ "It cannot be denied that phenomena may be given in intuition without the functions of the understanding."⁵ Schopenhauer⁶ is right in objecting to Kant in taking causation and understanding out of perception; right, since it left room for his own 'dis-

¹ Cf., Classen, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

² Cf., *Crit.*, II., 80, 105, 137.

³ It may be an interesting speculation to inquire how many questions Kant had to wade through before he could have put himself in a position to answer the problem of the *Critique*; but such attempts are fanciful, such, *e. g.*, as that of Münz (*Die Grundlagen der Kant'schen Erkenntnistheorie*, Breslau, 1882), who puts K. through the process of answering such questions "How is perception possible?" "How is representation possible?" As his solution stands, such queries did not arise, for his real task was the supervision of an affirmative answer to the question, "May not our knowledge be an illusion?" See *Mind*, VIII., 142.

⁴ *Werke*, IV., 41 f.

⁵ *Crit.*, II., 80.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

covery' of the rational character of perception; right, since it does not hit the mark, for Kant is not dealing with perception.

The relation in question must be insisted on. Psychology is utterly unconcerned with the validity of knowledge. Logic has need of psychology, but forfeits its right as a philosophical propædæutic, or even as a part in a system of philosophy, by the fact that its supreme interest is bound up in *truth* and its human expression. A theory of knowledge, mingling with primal elements in those two sciences,¹ has its essence laid in inquiries into the *validity of knowledge* and *its reference to reality*, thus dirempting itself peculiarly from them as well as from a metaphysic which analyzes the *nature* of reality, or, 'works over those conceptions' which make their appearance in psychology, when it treats of the thinking consciousness, and in a theory of knowledge, when it depicts the inweavings of the forms of thought. Philosophy has had painful struggles before it has come to the clear recognition of the close relations in which its own departments stand with reference to each other and to the sciences of mind life. Nor has she been long in receiving this lesson; but severe has been the punishment as she has been stubbornly harking back to the abstract form in which 'thought' is to be her content, or wantonly selling her rational primacy for the vapory pottage of empiricism. A brief century has been the lesson's hour, but how packed have been the instructions of her master! With Kant began the tutoring that philosophy is an exercise not to be swallowed with one pedagogic gulp. What success attended that supreme effort of reason to clean the metaphysical board at one sweep, we may yet see. Hegel shrivelled this throbbing world into the frigidity of dialectic. 'Logic' was to be the 'first, last, and altogether' of truth and reality. 'Blind will' that has no hope and reality, struggles for reason's diadem and sceptre, but comes clad in the dust and tatters of the mob. Lotze, to whom psychology and philosophy are so greatly indebted, apparently banishes psychology and embosoms logic. But the nature of the Real comes with the

¹*Cf.*, Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 355-6; "Psychology is a special discipline, which presupposes the general principles of our knowledge, but cannot explain their validity."

mental unit of consciousness, and a healthy agnosticism ultimately emerges from that 'system of philosophy' modestly coming up out of logic. And the Insular mind? Ah! Reason, confined to the lever and balances of force, or thrust out among the cold facts of 'bodies,' shook the sands of British shores and flew to a balmier clime and warmer hearts. Philosophy must note these evolving pulse-beats and find in them nature's admonition that rational provender for continued life must be sought elsewhere than in an unanalyzed mixture of ideal abstractness and vanishing phenomena.

But we must return to the inquiry which comes up out of the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, as it expresses itself in the nature of the presentations of sense, and gradually emerges into the problem which finds its supreme answer in the first book of the Transcendental Analytic. How is knowledge possible? and what is the nature of experience? To all appearances, Kant unwarrantably separates the matter and form of knowledge, sense and understanding. The former is disposed of in the *Æsthetic*, but we hear strangely reverberating echoes of the nature of sense knowledge (from the psychological point of view) away over in the Fourth Paralogism of Rational Psychology. How these 'phenomena,' in the getting of which the mind is passive,¹ become 'cognitions,' 'objects' and 'objective,' Kant proceeds to show by an analysis of understanding, but links it backward to sense in the doctrine of 'the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition,'² so that he justly entitles his exposition to the worthiness of a comment issued late in life.³

It is true, that while his idealism admits only 'denkenden Wesen' as realities, he yet fails to bring about any unification of sense and understanding. It indicates, on the one hand, that the unity of knowledge was lost in his view, and he

¹ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 17 f.; *Werke*, V., 300; VII., 451 f.; VIII., 689.

² *Crit.*, II., 88 f.

³ "Verstand und Sinnlichkeit verschwistern sich, bei ihrer Ungleichartigkeit, doch so von selbst zu Bewirkung unserer Erkenntniß als wenn eine von der anderen, oder beide von einem gemeinschaftlichen Staune ihren Ursprung hätten; welches doch nicht sein kann, wenigstens für uns unbegreiflich ist, wie das Ungleichartige aus einer und derselben Wurzel entsprossen sein kann." *Werke*, VII., 492.

was unable to free himself from the real thought of his task, and what was the real nature of its solution, *viz.*: an abstractness which comes with the criticism of mere faculties. On the other hand, the longing for such a unity, as a philosophical tenet, appears in the development of absolute idealism where sense becomes sublimated into understanding. In a very true sense, Kant had the principle which serves to unify the disparate elements from which he could not charm his thinking, *viz.*: in that knowledge itself.¹ And the opinion that sense and understanding have no common ground is the fruit of his sceptical outcome, but in opposition to "the central idea of the *Critique*, that knowable objects exist only in relation to intelligence."² This disparateness, that is affirmed to the last, shows both Kant's disregard for psychology as having any value for philosophical reflection, and the need any constructive philosophy has of the results of psychology. As a philosopher, Kant takes the world as already here. It is the 'given datum.' Whatever that may be, this world of *ours* is an intelligible world permeated by the 'rule-giving understanding.' He saw the need of a foundation for a philosophical system, found it in that 'given datum,' and proceeded at once to examine the structure among its upper stories, as it were. Indeed, sensations go for everything in experience (excepting only the idea 'des Zusammengesetzten';³) and he is thus led to agree, in an initiatory sense, with Lotze,⁴ that all knowledge begins with sensibility and must come back to that.

Kant's theoretic emphasis of 'sensibility' has been taken up by inductive psychology until its greatest progress has been in that very department of mental life. Of course, every philoso-

¹ Lange (*Hist. of Mat.*, II., 196 ff.,) is quite right in saying that 'the physiology of the sense organs' has brought out the fact that many 'thought-processes' are correspondingly involved in perception; Cf., Sully, *Human Mind*, I., chs., VI. and VII. Processes of mental elaboration of the sense data, etc., initial forms of intellection are apparent in the early stages of perception. These are empirical facts that render assistance to the epistemologist who is working out his problem on the Kantian line.

² Watson, *Kant and his English Critics*, p. 332.

³ *Werke*, VIII., 536-7.

⁴ *Werke*, IV., 339, Cf., *Microcosmus*, I., 563. Kant, of course, with sceptical intent, while Lotze gives it a positive significance.

phy that comes within human experience must and will recognize a 'given datum.' The material aspects of this world lie heavily on its hand. Even scepticism itself owes its stumble to the fact of 'the given object.' The sense element does come in. But here is where a philosophy links itself to the facts of the world vision and finds in psychology's account of the nature of this so-called sense element the starting point for the subversion of those two antagonistic functions of mind (as supposed by Kant). For in perception is assured the mentality of all elements; "only mental factors can be built into mental products,"¹ and in its unity is typified the unifying activity that comes with the presence of the subject.² Moreover, as psychology progresses in tracing the acts of mental complexity, it finds not only the submergence of sense data in a flood of mentality, but also, that sense, intellection, yea, all the activities and forms of the subject bound up in that perception which feels its reference to realities and is fit to assume the profounder name of knowledge. Sensations become not only percepts or ideas which relate themselves to a mere outwardness; but, in the transforming power of concepts and judgment they generalize and objectify themselves [*cf.* the German word '*Gegen-stand*'] as cognitions. It is this product whose genesis psychology traces in a progressive manner, irrespective of its validity and possible implications of either formal or material reality, and which epistemology takes up, going through it both forward and backward with the explicit philosophic intent to hunt down any implications of a reality given, or of its nature as known. Whatever certification of reality noëtics may find in the facts of knowledge, either positively or negatively, philosophy as a system will accordingly drift and shape itself. In accordance with its views on the nature of knowledge, a philosophy either proceeds to construct a metaphysic or to end in scepticism. Kant is famous for his inconsistent jumble of both. That valuable sentence,³ without which Criticism would not be

¹ Ladd, *op. cit.*, 383.

² Even in the Kantian theory no fact receives more emphasis, nor is of greater importance. *Cf.*, *Crit.*, II., 103 note, I., 435 note.

³ *Critique*, I., 380.

half so precious to the world, expresses it in its entirety: "I had, therefore, to remove *knowledge* in order to make room for *belief*." This knowledge in the Kantian sense has its positive, limited, and its negative, unlimited aspects.

One terse paragraph¹ sums up the entire constructive results of the analysis of pure reason: "The whole of our perception rests on pure intuition (if regarded as representation, then on time, as the form of our internal intuition), their association on the pure synthesis of imagination and our empirical consciousness of them on pure apperception, that is, on the permanent identity of oneself in the midst of all possible representations."

Herein Kant concluded that he had attained *a priori* certainty, a synthetic necessity which gave to philosophical knowledge the apodicticity of mathematical constructiveness. It was an answer to the problem as more analytically stated in the second edition,² a statement more truly in accord with the nature of the solution itself, as it limits metaphysical apodicticity to the bounds hemming in sensibility. Nor less attributable to the model which is constantly before pure reason is the elimination of non-rational factors as participant in that synthetic activity, and the pruning of sporadic attempts which have no immediate reference to the starting point of all knowledge. Kant was too faithful an imitator of mathematics to have served philosophy in the ultimate service of attending reason's last call as to the nature of knowledge. The whole lesson of the historical reaction is that reason cares not for geometrical formulæ. Mathematical certainty and the path that leads to it as its goal are now placed in philosophy's trinket bag. Noëtics must seek *rational* necessity, such as comes to the demands of man's thinking. Other realities, either epistemological or metaphysical, are illusory of the genuine sort, and the need of the philosophic age, as it has come up out of Kantian scepticism, is an ontology which shall accord with reason and life. 'Back to Kant' can be a heeded cry only as it indicates an attempt to raise, on the foundation of a reconstructed theory of knowledge, a metaphysic which shall quicken this finite reflex of reality into a yet more

¹ *Critique*, II., 102.

² Cf., *Critique*, I., 398-412.

serious realization of that goal which lies enshrouded in the ground of the world.

Granting the validity of a distinction between the presentations of sense—as chiefly expressive of the synthesis that ‘runs through the manifold’—and preception as inclusive of the intellectual processes, and chiefly in its most highly developed form as given in self-consciousness, *i. e.*, perception as correlative with psychology’s account of ‘knowledge,’¹ we then have a dividing principle which yields a constant service in separating the content of speculative Criticism so far as it has psychological bearings on the elemental and developed forms of perception; and, of course, a principle that arranges the faculties engaged in the various sorts of mental products (Kantian): sense, intuition, and cognized ‘object,’ for ‘it is a criticism of the faculties that is undertaken.

The first ‘faculty’ which comes to view by this partition is the imagination (‘*Einbildungskraft*.’) It is an empirical and a transcendental faculty, which, from a *psychological* point of view, is the most important fundamental power of the mind. On its presence depends the constructive character of positive Criticism, while on a confusion of its limitations hangs the sceptical outcome of the *Critique*. It is the ‘go-between’ of sense and understanding. Kant’s reflective genius might have ferreted out the truth that “thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,” but could never have shown its legitimacy in the Transcendental Deduction had “this faculty of empirical imagination remained buried in our mind as a dead faculty.”² That Kant found a unity of sense and understanding ‘*unbegreiflich*’ is due to the fact that he viewed knowledge backwards, faculty-wise, and failed to appreciate the supreme function of this ‘blind, but indispensable’ imagination which presses forward and brings unity in the product knowledge. In it lies the *a priori* possibility of

¹ A caution must be borne in mind *pari passu*: any ‘rigid demarcation of the spheres of sense and thought’—such as is common among speculative masters who build on logical forms—subverts the psychic truth that the mental life has a continuity in its movement that finds its best figure in the flow of a stream. Cf., Sully, *op. cit.*, I., 212; James, *op. cit.*, I., 224 ff.

² *Critique*, II., 89.

knowledge, whose *nature* and *content* arise from the ingredients of understanding and sense. For it is the one faculty which is found in both the divisions of higher and lower.

At this point Criticism works up a warm feeling for psychology in spite of the careful sifting which thought itself to conclude in its selection of a logical basis. Nor does the function of the faculty appear in the Transcendental Deduction alone. It, in reality, promotes that synthesis in the *Æsthetic*, which secures the manifold as given in 'intuition' or 'representation'. For 'phenomena,' as such, 'bedarf der functionendes Denkens in keiner Weise.'

Not only is it the 'faculty of synthesis' in the *Æsthetic*, and not only does it assume transcendental proportions in the Deduction, but it is the activity, under guidance of the understanding, whose product is the Schema.² It is also an element in the Transcendental Unity of Apperception which figures in the legitimacy of the categories, and likewise is the 'transcendental faculty' in the Rational Psychology which it attempts to subvert; it is the synthesis which produces the Antinomies and manufactures the Ideal which is naught else than the anthropomorphic absolute. Imagination is thus a mighty current in Criticism, pushing reason to the extremity of metaphysical confusion. It is just as true that 'the *a priori* necessity' and 'natural illusion' might be replaced by a corresponding *need* or *act* of *imagination* and much of the '*a priority*' in 'pure reason' would find rather the matter-of-fact statement of what constitutes the syllogistic need and procedure of mind.

No less is the significance of the imagination in the *Practical Reason*. Indeed, the whole moral law is the appeal of an ethical ideal to the rational imagination. True, Kant does not introduce the faculty, and seems to deny its activity when he ostracises all empirical deductions of the supreme categories of freedom and the imperative. These are given *a* deduction, but what a demand is made on the ethical imagination! They are never given in any experience. They transcend the world of sense. Their reality lies in a postulated faith—a vigorous de-

¹ *Critique*, p. 123, second ed. Cf. II., 80.

² *Critique*, II., 124 f.

mand of Criticism that the rational imagination shall be turned loose in the fields of the supersensible where the ideal of humanity is a kingdom of free selves.¹ The possibility of the *Critique of Judgment* lies in the freedom which must characterize the æsthetical taste as, in its judgment, it roams over the free purposiveness of organic nature. It is a draft upon the imagination when the judgment subsumes a 'particular' under a concept.² We would not for a moment attempt to depreciate the 'rational' character of the Critical philosophy, but here is a truly psychological object—the imagination—which increases in relative importance as the system advances towards its close. It is seen at a glance that psychology stands not only round about Criticism, giving to it the defense that comes in its virtue of having reflected the rational unity of man, but also passes through it all, sporadic almost, in the infinite ramifications which everywhere carry with them the stamp of the humanness of Criticism.

The detailed characteristics of this faculty need scarce detain us here. Its general feature is the 'intuition of an object without its presence,'³ and is either productive—as phantasy, or the imagination which precedes all experience; and reproductive—plainly empirical in that it merely brings back to the mind ('ins Gemüth zurück bringt') some intuition we have already experienced. It is a wanton, active power, and knows no limits, both in its effect on the mind and on the body. It, but not understanding, may be forgiven if it dreams. With all its varieties it is not so 'creative' as one is ready to suppose. It cannot go beyond what is given it in sensations; these it cannot create, nor can it conceive of a rational being with any other than a human form; whence the anthropomorphism in the knowledge of God. Thus its activity has its fantastic field hemmed in by the influx of sensations and by the ultra limits of sensibility.

¹ Cf., Frohschammer, *Ueber die Bedeutung der Einbildungskraft in der Kantschen Philosophie*, München, 1879, p. 84-91.

² Cf., further Frohschammer, pp. 91-114, Mellin's *Wörterbuch, etc.*, II., 222 f; cf., also *Werke*, V., 246, 257, 277; Dieterich's *Kant und Rousseau*, p. 150.

³ *Critique*, I., 449; *Werke*, VII., 481; Kant is not steadfast in the *Critique* in what he means by imagination. Now it is itself; and now it is understanding, spontaneity. Cf., I., 457 n., 449.

The imagination is thus given a very comprehensive scope. And Kant is doubtless right in holding to its generic sense, for representation in all its forms deals with 'images'; and in classifying reproduction as voluntary and calling it memory, and production as imagination proper. This alone contributes to (Kantian) knowledge and is limited to dealings with space and time associations. To his views on the former (memory) exception must be taken. Remembrance comprises merely retention and recall, with retention of three sorts, *viz.*: mechanical, ingenious, judicious, a classification of the kinds of memories whose pointedness has scarce been excelled.¹ On yet another point Kant is to be commended, not for his truthfulness, but for his refusal. The law of association is that of repeated contiguity.² His refusal is to accept no physiological explanation of this phenomenon; even to demand such 'is idle.' It is now maintained that the basis of retention *is* laid in the cerebral nervous system, and psychologists differ not in their analyses of memory, but chiefly as they accept or modify the physical basis of memory.³ But the chief point in the phenomenon of memory lies not in retention and recall. These are, as it were, the mere initiation of the 'object.' Over and above these is recognition—the essential thing in an act of memory. This is a complex feature and must be drawn out, as including (a) reference to the *past*, wherein memory differs from expectation or prevision, as Kant readily allows; (b) explicit reference to *my* past, with more or less definite localization with reference to that past; (c) lastly and supremely characteristic, 'the feeling of belief in this peculiar complex object.'⁴ This last element Kant overlooks not only here, but seems purposely to exclude it in a still wider field of cognitions—whose consequence may appear in subsequent consideration of self-consciousness.

¹Cf., Lindner, *Empirical Psychology*, p. 163.

²"Empirische Vorstellungen die nach einander oft folgten, bewirken eine Gewohnheit im Gemüth, wenn die eine erzeugt wird, die andere auch entstehen zu lassen." VII., 490; cf., Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 282.

³Cf., Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, p. 545 ff; James, *op. cit.*, I., 653 ff.

⁴James's own words, which appear to antagonize his physiological explanation. Cf., Rabier, *Leçons de Psych.*, pp. 176 f; importance of definite localization in the past.

Kant recognizes¹ memory as yielding a body of knowledge, but objective, *viz.*: such historical knowledge as is *ex datis* and gives it a subjective turn so far as it carries a memoriter impress. But his general oversight of memory, as a distinct form of mental activity, is doubtless the cause of one's not finding its forthputtings mentioned as some form of knowledge subjectively considered, or as a stage in the development of knowledge. It has also an influence on his theory of knowledge. Its abstractness is accounted for in that he misses that definiteness to reality within a particular subject, which memory as a noëtic function compels one to admit; and, by throwing all the stadia or developments of knowledge into the transcendental imagination, he analyzes the knowledge of no one that psychology can be aware of.

To this it might be objected, that the individualistic reference which is implicated in knowledge, Kant fully recognizes in the necessary activity of the apperceptive consciousness which gathers all in the unity of experience. To which it must be replied, that Kant's self-consciousness is, again, 'something which never comes by way of psychic experience. The self as an object of knowledge does not come through the vague indefinite representation which imagination is. On the contrary, it is the moment of memory which makes for the development of one-self consciousness.'² The states of one time must be permeated with the 'my' which is referable, *either with certainty or with doubt*, to the 'my' which was found implicate in preceding, remembered states.³ In some such way does this defect of Kant's doctrine of memory creep into his negative conclusions regarding the met-empirical identity of the *ego* and the nature of personality. He would seem to have in rational psychology a fixed faculty of self-consciousness, springing in the full armor of a diremptive and concatenating power, from

¹ *Crit.*, II., 717.

² *Cf.*, *Crit.*, II., 103 n; the relation of the empirical self-consciousness in the becoming of knowledge.

³ Even a so-called false memory is just as significant for a theory of knowledge, as a so-called accurate memory, though it may not be useful in perception. Here the order of experience is unloosed and the individual is the victim of a pathological consciousness.

the mysterious depths of our being. But memory essentially and imagination non-essentially enters into that form of life in which the *ego* unifies itself in its own discriminative diremption.

Since Kant it has been customary to distinguish between productive and reproductive imagination. But we cannot agree with him¹ in consigning the latter to the limbo of psychology and assigning the synthetic function of understanding to the former, for psychologic falsity is noëtic error. But, granting him his meaning of imagination, it is not only a worthy merit of the Transcendental Deduction that it finds in conscious thinking the nature of knowledge (logically a higher activity of mind than sensation,² and "logically a subjective point of view is deeper than the objective"), and in a fusing representation, the mechanism of that knowledge; but also it must be specially mentioned that Kant calls the attention of psychologists to the fact that imagination is a factor in preception.³ Kant is right in finding in imagination something underneath the ordinary estimation that it is only a phantastic power that promotes romantic pleasures. Imagination is an indispensable faculty and has its uses in gathering up vague images and fusing them with discriminated sensations into the percept so often thought of only as a presentation by the senses.⁴ But, in overlooking the virtues of empiric memory and ascribing the mediatory function to the imagination, he takes all reality out of knowledge, and psychology must continue to clamor for a revision of his theory at those points where particularity accompanies knowledge. There is no knowledge in general. His treatment of imagination leads one to think his theoretic knowledge is such.

Moreover, imagination appears important not only in the

¹ *Critique*, I., 449 f.

² *Cf.*, Ladd, *Introd.*, p. 193, Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

³ "Dass die Einbildungskraft ein nothwendiges Ingrediens der Wahrnehmung selbst sei, daran hat wol noch kein Psychologe gedacht. Das kommt daher, weil man dieses Vermögen theils nur auf Reproduktionen eingeschränkte, theils, weil man glaubte, die Sinne lieferten uns nicht allein Eindrücke, sondern setzten solche auch sogar zusammen und brächten Bilder der Gegenstände zuwege, wozu ohne Zweifel ausser der Empfänglichkeit der Eindrücke noch etwas mehr, nämlich eine Function der Synthesis derselben erfordert wird." *Critique*, 1st ed., Erdmann's *Ausgabe*, p. 607.

⁴ *Cf.*, Sully, *Human Mind*, I., p. 212.

positive, constructive aspects of Criticism; it is essentially concerned with the negative limits set by that same Criticism. In the doctrine of hypotheses,¹ it is the imagination that is chiefly at work, and where it 'dreams with the concepts of things' there knowledge ceases and reason becomes subverted in mere opinion, which, in reference to realities, is always an absurdity. We can 'think' many things also, but this, too, is nothing other than imagination active in the field of judgment. The negative possibilities of both 'thinking' and 'opining' rule out all that rich field of scientific knowledge to which inductive logic does give validity. The theory of hypotheses is entirely wrong, for it attempts to draw a fixed line between reason as a categorical activity in experience and imagination as a sensuous faculty usurping the prerogative of rationality. Psychology finds in judgment itself a large amount of representation, and particularly so in its most recent advances, where the old-time 'concept' is being more accurately displaced by the 'Gesamtbilder,' which form the stepping stones over which the relating and universalizing activity of judgment passes, as intellect carries on processes whose material is already laid in the representative sensuousness of knowledge.

This, however, approaches a higher psychological activity. Understanding is the second, and, according to Criticism, the last cognitive faculty which appears upon adoption of the principle pointed out above. It is one of the triad,—sense, imagination and apperception, each one being an irreducible faculty of the soul and conditioning the possibility of experience. It is the cognitive power in the soul's triplicity of faculties, the others being feeling and desire. In the hierarchy of 'oberen Erkenntnisvermögen,' it stands chieftain at the gateway of Criticism; but for the sake of reality it is the weakest of man's possessions. In the history of Kant's influence, understanding, its positive and negative functions, has been given the precedent, but, in the architectonic of the *Critiques*, its *a priori* pales before the solar light of the law-giving reason.

Sense and mere synthesis do not constitute knowledge. They provide only raw material under blind handling. Ex-

¹ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 659 f., *Werke*, VIII., 81 f.

perience *is* an orderly affair. Whatever this world may be in itself, its seeming is to us something of reality and sequence. These are the features of the knowledge that comes to us. Whence those touches of noëtic beauty? and what the constitutive function that makes the little we have that which it is? Says one, ideas are innate, and the whole world is a sort of Platonic reminiscence of monadic souls; another, sensualism finds entire passivity in knowledge, for things come to us; and scepticism (Hume) reaches a higher psychological stage and sees the nature of experience lie in the habitual association of ideas, but sees certainty falling to the zero point of constant doubt. Logically more profound, and psychologically higher, Criticism unites what is found in all other systems, and, re-casting it in the psychologic mould, finds knowledge in sense, imagination, *and* understanding. These three, and these three only, make for cognitions objective. They are a forthputting of intelligence, a discernment of relations; and the nature of knowledge, or its form, partakes of the essence of that principle which lies at its core—judgment. Knowledge? Its content comes from sense; its possibility lies in imagination; its nature is of judgment—these three and no less; it lies in the nature of the thing.¹

What Kant proposes to do with 'understanding' as a cognitive faculty, and also as a treatment mediating between scepticism and dogmatism, is more manifest in his elaboration of its functions than in his definitions of this faculty. To take him as he speaks means confusion for us. To say that knowledge involves mind, *is* mind, leaves a vagueness inadequate to distinguish it from that dreamy pageantry which must answer to the description of sensationalism. To take him as he presumably means, we may find clearness. For, in that meaning he banished the inadequate vagueness which comes with the affirmation that knowledge is the minding of things, and is explicit in the analysis of that understanding whose functions it is to give that nature to knowledge which it has.

¹As a psychologist, Ràbier well expresses Kant's historic advance: "C'est le grande mérite de l'école criticiste d'avoir mis en relief l'originalité et l'importance de cette fonction intellectuelle; c'est le grand défaut de Hume et de toute l'école empiriste, de l'avoir confondue avec des fonction sensibles de la simple appréhension ou de l'association des idées." *Leçons de Psychologie*, p. 277.

We have Kant's own word for the looseness of his definitions: "We have before given various definitions of the understanding, by calling it the spontaneity of knowledge (as opposed to the receptivity of the sense), or the faculty of thinking, or the faculty of concepts, or of judgments." But he also fixes on a comprehensive and explicit formula that is more in accordance with the totality of the Transcendental Analytic in its notions of *a priori*. "All of those explanations, if more clearly examined, come to the same; it is the faculty of rules. This characteristic is more significant and approaches nearer to the essence of the understanding."¹ Yet it is a faculty that applies its rules in various ways. Now it is a synthetic activity endeavoring to unite and fuse the particular, or manifold, in the objective legitimacy of the universal or categories, giving us an 'object' or a judgment of experience; then it is the subsumption of things according to a rule, but not concepts,² whereby we come to æsthetical objects, (for this is a judgment of taste); finally, the vigorous struggle to get an enlarged concept over the totality of any class of experiences results in the unconditioned totalities—the desired predicates of metaphysical judgments. (Ethical judgments do not properly fall within the Critical philosophy. They appear in 'Tugendlehre'; but in 'Sittenlehre' something vastly more *a priori* and less susceptible of a diversity of forms can occur).

Here is the proper place to mention the famous tripartition of the 'oberen Erkenntnisvermögen,' an analysis of which it was Criticism's special aim to complete, as was seen in the preceding chapter. The separation of 'lower' from 'higher' was not a new division of human faculties; but one thoroughly in vogue, and with which Kant agreed.³ It was a century when faith in 'reason' was almost a religious tenet. But the faith had become so rational that Kant frequently calls it 'the age of criticism.' Criticism itself was a child of reason, and the greatest work of the age was the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

¹ *Critique*, II., p. 110.

² *Werke*, V., 200.

³ Cf., Baumgarten, *Meta.*, Sec. 383, 462, 510; Hegler, *op. cit.*, p. 106 f.; Kant, *Werke*, IV., 145-6, 243, 490; VII., 388; V., 214, 478 n.; *Reflex.*, 108, 113; Dieterich, *Kant u. Rousseau*, 30, 125 f.

The influence of such external data is to beget a doubt as to the psychologic intent of the title which Kant adopted. What he apparently meant by 'reason' as a 'higher faculty' is also partially explained by the general conception then attached to the term. Man is always the metaphysical egoist, ever ready to set himself off in terms of reality from all forms of animal life below him. No less was he thus rationally selfish last century, when attributing 'reason' to himself, whereby he supposed the merely 'apprehensive,' apperceptionless animals to be peculiarly separated from himself. Animals have only instinct. The understanding is man's peculiar possession which gives human reality to the passions.¹ It is the opposite of instinct, and constitutes the humanity of man.

Another suggestion² not only clears the way to an appreciation of his treatment of reason, but lends coloring to the conception of the faculties in the preceding chapter and to the existence of the mind as undertaken by rational psychology. It is this. To all appearances Kant endeavors to avoid all metaphysical implications. In psychological passages, 'Gemüth' is the term of his choice, while 'Vernunft' is the great encyclopedic cart of philosophical entities. In empirical psychology we cannot speak of a 'Seele' or 'Geist.' The admonition is, psychologize without a soul.³ 'Gemüth' has a vague, indefinite meaning, limited only to the states of consciousness. After these have been adequately considered by the corresponding science, one may be positivistic or spiritualistic, just as he chooses. 'Vernunft' is also a favorite term with Criticism, whose inherent difficulties are made more difficult by the obvious effort to leave out all psychological presuppositions, either as to the nature or the existence of the soul. These two points have validity only when the psychological attainments of Criticism can be existentialized by a trustworthy metaphysic of mind. Is it not a worthy supposition to fancy Criticism saying, we can and do reason or philosophize, no matter whether we be matter

¹ *Werke*, VII., 590.

² Lange, *op. cit.*, II., 191, note 23.

³ Cf., the very recent effort to make psychology 'non-metaphysical.' James, *op. cit.*, I., 182, 350.

or spirit? This, in turn, is a point upon which there must be reasoning. From such a view-point it appears that the investigations of Criticism are quite largely psychological, *viz.*: in so far as it engages in describing the functions discovered in that reason; but, more metaphysical, as it posits their reality as *a priori* necessities of all experience, whether cognitive, ethical or æsthetical.

No more convenient term than 'reason' is at philosophy's command. It is ever large enough to pour forth the creative categories of absolute being, or so contractile as to be reduced to a minimum capacity, holding only an ever dubitable principle of habitual association as the binding link of all experience. The use of the term is a psychological necessity with philosophy; nor can it be wisdom to clamor for a discontinuance of its employment. But when philosophy persists in giving a highly specialized content to that reason, so as to have validity in the life of a self, then psychology is invited forthwith to inspect the 'rational' importations. This is what Criticism has done. It has ascribed a manifold individualistic content to reason, even introducing diametrical variations in the meanings assigned to it, so that no point in the Critical philosophy is more factually vexing than the diversified attributes of reason. Now it is the supreme quality of intelligence and constitutes the special domain of philosophy; here it is inclusive of all the 'higher cognitive faculties.' Again, it is 'speculative' reason that exhibits a spontaneity towards representations and makes for the 'objective' reality known things have; but is to be separated somehow from 'practical' reason that is a spontaneity in the function of self-determination—a separation that renders possible the antithetical foundations of Criticism and desiderates the appendant unification in subjective Æsthetics. No less is it reason standing in opposition to sense whose intellectual realization comes about through the former. It is likewise the aspiring logical reason, making spuriously syllogistic advances on totalities that really are but function-wise distinguishable from the ethical, yet modest metaphysical reason intuiting its own implied reality in the consciousness of a relentless duty. Or, it is the genuinely psychological, but critically

delusive reason laboring to know realities that are syllogistically implied in the things and selves which are the 'critical' creatures of a self-apprehensive understanding that appears to be the faculty of positing cognitive particularities. Now it is an understanding whose judgment is the fusion of sensible and intelligible forms into *a priori* rules, determinative of the categories to phenomena; or it is a judgment, natural and uneducable, synthetic and subjectively universal, fusing an ideal of beauty with a construction of apperception by which we experience a 'pleasurable purposiveness' as we contemplate nature and find our æsthetical 'Wohlgefallen' in pronouncing this judgment of taste.

This great variety in conceptions is allowable to philosophy. Its interpretation of the world always predicates a chosen content to 'reason.' But when reference is made to pure speculation, which equals psychological intellection, then psychology modestly presents its request that the ratiocinative processes be properly indicated. The psychology of thought comprehends the treatment of generic terms, their adjustment in affirmations or negations, and the manipulation of their consequent judgments so as to arrive at some new truth. The concept, judgment and syllogism are psychical processes and products, an analysis of which completes a description of that ideational development from primitive discrimination and comparison that results in cognitions or perceptual realities. There is no 'thing' for any consciousness without an explanation of the possible relations inherent in its antecedent image. The copulizing of a related predicate need not necessarily be a complete and well-rounded-out grammatical expression. A thought psychosis may be realized without the propositional formality. The only point is, that 'ideas' are products, not impressions, constructions, not presentations. And modern psychology very properly refuses to call that consciousness cognitive which has not predicated somehow. A mere sensational reaction or a returning image must ever be denied the positedness which 'things' have. An ideational state does not become what we adults all recognize it to be, without a judgment-wise execution of a perceived discrimination. Things are not known, unless,

in some manner, we make them to be known. This is the Anglo-Saxon of Leibnizian 'apperception' and of the 'transcendental synthetic unity' of Criticism. It merely expresses the fact that in every knowing consciousness there is a relatedness mingled with the content. But psychology fails to find a necessity of limiting this relatedness to a physiological consciousness. That would omit what is patent to all observation, that there is a psychical fusion of specific with conceptual images (as in a proposition), and, *also* of concepts of perception and experience with chosen concepts, as in the syllogism. The one mode of synthesis is not unlike the other, of which it is only a developed form. Judging and syllogizing are psychologically not the widely separated processes nor differentiated products as Criticism's treatment of them would have one believe.¹ Syllogism, in fact, is the judging process turned at a later period upon the judgment product. The process of relating propositions does not enter into the judgments of experience. (*E. g.*, the knocker announces some one's presence without. I rely upon my friend's promise to confer with me at an appointed time; and, upon suggestion by contiguity, I recognize this as the appointed hour. There ensues a fusion of chosen elements, as a result of which mental activity I refer, by numerous abbreviated syllogisms, the presence of my friend without.) What are the modes of the fusion which beget affirmations is seen in an analysis of the various products.² Propositions may be the association of concepts, one of which is experientially given in the other and essentially enters into its previous formation; as, *e. g.*, flowers have petals. Such are analytical judgments which merely explicate the (logical) intensiveness of the subject concept. But when I affirm that the paper is the cause of my present sense-experience of grayish white, I am proceeding in a characteristically different manner. I am fusing an extensive and chosen concept with a given experience. I pronounce a synthetic judgment, and add to the concept of experience. What these various forms of synthesis are, cannot be answered except by special investigations. Suffice it to say

¹ *Cf.*, the 'Analytic' with the 'Dialectic' as to their psychological basis.

² *Cf.*, Sully, *op. cit.*, I., 439 ff; Baldwin, *op. cit.*, I., 292 ff.

that these modes of fusion are the categories which have been so famous in the history of philosophy. *What* they are, must be answered by metaphysic as it investigates the constituents of reality. *Why* I use them in my experience, this way or that, it is incumbent on a theory of knowledge to inquire. *How* I do proceed in their application throughout experience, psychology must testify in reporting on the psychical transactions which it is constantly observing.

The foregoing are, in general, the psychological processes called reasoning, and the faculty is intellect or reason proper. It is but a mere speck in that multitude of rational activities, so-called by Criticism. Its term for the discriminating and ratiocinating consciousness is 'understanding' over against which is set 'speculative reason.' Now, so far as the psychology of speculation is concerned, it can find no other processes in the intellectual consciousness. These must be employed by every philosopher in his contribution to man's attempt to come to a more perfect *rationalc* of experience. Thus the distinction between understanding and reason, as cognitive, is unwarrantable and Critical scepticism is not an *a priori* necessity as seen by an examination of pure reason alone. This separation of the higher cognitive faculty is also the source of the epistemological defects and ethical excellencies of Criticism. Knowledge, so delusively limited, is the three by four (the grouping of the categories) of the *a priori* forms of judging, and has a *quid juris* only so far as this present sensuous consciousness is concerned. Nor does Criticism win psychological approval in attempting to identify pure and practical reasons, if process and contents are to be the truth of names.¹

Thus the great constructive portion of the *Critique* is, as it were, a prophet of psychology. The latter finds it impossible to separate widely between the process of perception and the process of conception. But more pertinent in its vindication of Criticism is the general agreement that conceptualizing and re-

¹On the *antithesis* of 'Verstand' and 'Vernunft,' *cf.*, beside the *Critique*, *Werke*, VII., 449 f. 515, 390; V., 53, 413 f.; *Vorlesungen*, 51; on the *unity* of the two reasons *cf.*, V., 125 ff., in which Green attempts to vindicate Kant: *Phil. Works*, II., p. 111 f. Schopenhauer criticizes Kant's separation of Verstand and Vernunft, and with much justice; *op. cit.*, pp. 551 f.

lated activities are psychical processes that round out into a percept and a cognition, those discriminated and assimilated sensations of psychic beginnings. Thus, while it may be a serious defect in the Transcendental Logic that it endeavors to separate the above processes, it is its chief value in having contended that judgment is knowledge.¹ Whether reason and understanding are one and the same,² or whether they are separated and constantly antagonistic in the manufacture and attempted ultimate interpretation of experience, experience can be as it is for us men only as we exercise those powers we have by virtue of being rational, thinking beings, and let 'knowledge rest on Verstand.' Sensations or ideas empirical-wise, thinking or mere thought are not knowledge.³ So far Criticism remains psychological; but it pilfers the mind of a valid activity when it affirms that we can be said to 'know' when we have categorized the 'stuff' of sense by the one discriminative form of judgment. Our intellectual activity, as it develops with the continuity of sensuous life, does not merely relate concepts. Inferences in all directions coöperate with lower ideational functions to bring assimilated sensational factors to the order of objective or real things. The syllogism does not remain the distinctive instrument of the old rational sciences. It has a psychological validity in perceptual realities, that varies inversely as the amount of clearly discriminated sense and image factors.⁴ Indeed, this whole rational activity is at least given play in the large amount of 'thinking' that appears and rounds out, as it were, the perceptual consciousness into the 'scientific' mind. So far as the psychical processes are concerned in either instance they are one and the same. It is the material elaborated by each which differentiates the world of things and their varieties from the world of hypothesized atoms and unseen forces. Thus it is that Criticism permits cognitive, objective validity to only certain judgments, its scepticism cutting off all

¹ This may be partially questioned; *cf.*, the distinction between, and relation of 'Wahrnehmungsurtheil' and 'Erfahrungsurtheil' mentioned in the next chapter.

² *Werke*, II., 66.

³ *Cf.*, VIII., 34, 584, 526; VII., 512, 545 f.; *Critique*, I., 492, II., 67.

⁴ *Cf.*, Baldwin, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

this mass of 'thinking' which passes as inference and hypothesis, *etc.*; but for its famous limitations it can find no suggestive warrant in an introspective explication of the respective processes. Here it appears to a certain extent that the conclusion of the preceding chapter is true of the intellectual processes: Kant either supposed the work of psychology as already complete when he began the metaphysical reflections, or used terms into which he put chosen material, rather than such as appears empirically.

Almost inextricably wrapped up with Criticism, and appearing in connection with the great purpose which was its speculative goal, is the question as to the degree of certainty attending our knowledge of reality. Kant wished to place metaphysics on a sure foundation, to give it a sub-structure which should be as unshakable as the piers on which rested the triumphs of mechanical science in formulating the space and time of our universe. It was certainty that Kant was desirating. Philosophy had degenerated to a weakling where any dubitating breath, fragrant with literary perfume, might toss it about in the scene of experience. With a mathematical model, he plunges into the *a priori* and discovers the sources of primitive synthetic judgments. It was their possession and the (highly fictitious) schema under the guidance of pure apperception which gave certainty, reality, as they were applied to objects. When once the forms of judgment had been discovered, all was secured. The difficulty became, how these forms were applied. It is the deduction of their experiential legitimacy that is the grave concern.¹ With their application to 'Vorstellung,' sensationalism is denied, rationalism rebuked, and an assured answer given to the great problem of certainty, but a certainty limited to phenomena. Only in a use of the categories do we know objects and by an application of the *a priori* principles into which they are somehow fashioned by a static, uneducable judgment,² do we come to reality. Indeed, these principles are the *via media* of the categories.

Since these forms belong to some consciousness, and a

¹ *Critique*, II., p. XXVI.

² *Critique*, II., 117, *Vorlesungen*, p. 29.

degree of certainty is no less a feature of cognitive psychoses psychology has its descriptive word as to the application of the categories and the source of conviction that suffuses that intellection which predicates reality as its content. In the preceding chapter,¹ there were generalized some of the facts for which psychology must adequately account in expressing the interrelation of the faculties. Such are, also, facts which make against Kant's great claim that it is understanding to which all cognized experience is attributable. Pure discrimination and relateness are mental functions setting the categories adrift among sense-elements in such a manner as to make up the legality of experience. But psychology finds no empirical guarantee for the doctrine that mere comparison adjusts *a priori* forms to the idea as it has passed its way up through the lower cognitive faculties.² In the first place, and as apparent throughout the study, Criticism really overlooks the significance of the patent facts of growth and fusion which contribute to that judging consciousness. Whatever else may be said as to the nature of adult consciousness, no consideration of it which includes processes can be competent without regarding the way in which it has become. And a theory of knowledge, if it desires, as it ought in every instance, to introduce judgment as a conditioning process, cannot subvert psychologic truth. This may encroach upon the cherished purity of philosophy, which was Kant's passionate ideal, leading to the exclusion of all empirical dross.³ But the truth of experience, expressed in terms of rationality, should be the great aim of all inquiry basing itself on the self-confidence of reason. Secondly, and what is an outgrowth of the first, the categories 'get applied,' not by a non-empirical, apperceptive unity, but only in the frequent rebuffs which primitive attention and motor consciousness receive at the hands of that cruel, violent congeries which surge in upon infantile beginnings. The stubborn refusal to abide the warning disappointments, the pleasure that accrues in the successful issue of petty strivings, and the determination to be self-assertive

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 79 ff.

² *Cf.*, Lang, *op. cit.*, II., 197, note 26.

³ *Vide supra*, pp. 17 ff.

and rebut the imperiousness of things are of great moment in the obscure and often under-valued forthputtings that posit things as realities. Thus psychology's word on the categorization is brief, but comprehensive in that every psychic nerve is quivering that the mental discriminativeness may realize itself in this varied world of things and selves. One must admit that differentiation, as a cognitive process, essentially belongs to intellect. But, in his vigorous attempt to explicate the intelligibility of the world, Kant has sublimated understanding into such a spontaneity that the question becomes extremely pertinent: How much will has been clandestinely introduced into that 'faculty' whose forthputting is knowledge and experience? It is not a psychological impossibility that a 'synthesis,' a 'fusion,' an 'activity,' should be the supreme characteristic of that which pierces the obscurity of the unrelated. If Kant's 'understanding' is the faculty of *human* knowledge, then it must invoke that impulse which goes along with all intellection, and is properly called will, but not that 'free, voluntary' activity which strives to set into reality a purpose and choice; that can appear only as a product of a highly complex development. If will means anything in the life of mind, it does mean the actualization of '*a priori* forms.' As a condition of experience this striving in its worth with the power of relatedness is so important that one could say, without the conative inherency of cognition, there would not be any knowledge that is knowledge (and we must, on the whole, take Kant's answer to his specialized question as being an account of the nature of knowledge, and not merely a logical treatment of certain forms of *a priori* judgments).

In Criticism's discovery and application of the categories lay another deep-seated, genuine purpose, namely, to find a certification of knowledge in its dealings with reality.¹ Some truths come to us claiming greater validity than mere habitual association seems possible to grant. We make affirmations or negations, positing them as true for all time and absolutely necessary in the experience of every rational being. What are the grounds on which rest these features of our knowledge? or, what is the evidence that 'our' knowledge is dealing with re-

¹ Cf., *Critique*, II., pp. XXV, 1, 94; *Werke*, V., 12 f.

ality? Kant answers this question in no less an *a priori* manner than the problem of the intelligibility of experience. In fact the two problems are answered in the same solution. Kant did not distinguish them, but makes the famous discovery of the categories whose various validity solves, *mutatis mutandis*, all the difficulties of known realities encountered not only by transcendentalism, but by all philosophy. While sensuous objectivity and cognitive reality are conditioned by the *a priori* concepts and the manifold that is given, certainty, or necessity, rests upon the one 'transcendental faculty' which makes possible the fusion of the two widely various factors in knowledge, namely, pure apperception, or the synthesis of one consciousness.¹ But experimental certainty is limited to phenomena only. What we construct in intuition is the only 'object' which properly belongs to the noëtic acquisitions of pure reason. Reality, however, or noumenal determinations, are implicated in our ethical being. The moral law demands 'faith,' and brings truly 'objective' realities. But reason can 'know' only a little way. When knowledge is to stand alone it ends with experience, revealing the cognition of phenomena. Thus it is that there is a critical scepticism. We can know things only as they 'are given' and elaborated by understanding. This 'faculty,' though it is the corner stone of all nature, limits its truth-expressing activity to only that which has 'sensual content.' Realities elude our cognitive grasp. They are for us only as we pass beyond the positing of relations to a credence in ethical being. Thus in Criticism, knowledge and certainty are given in a consciousness that explicates relations, while reality and its paramount certification come with the feeling that 'the ought' is somehow valid even in the phenomenal series into which we are set. 'Knowledge' ends in scepticism and the universality of *a priori* forms concludes in the transcendental dream of sensuous phantasmagoria—a pleasing play in which we all are deluded. 'Faith' ends in the attainment of true reality, and the imperativeness of the inner self brings us real being, set in manifold ontological relations with existences not ourselves, whose natures are likewise indicated by the reciprocity of 'the ought.'

¹ *Critique*, II., 93-94.

Even more than Jacobi is Kant the 'faith' philosopher. Critical philosophy in its entirety is idealistic realism, but a 'known' realism that lies outside cognizing activities. It ventured as sceptical idealism, but when the circuit of its purposes was run, it became an ethical realism founded on the former. The later explication of the reflective, æsthetical judgment does not modify its foregoing essential conclusions.

The scepticism of Criticism does not rest merely upon this separation of belief and knowledge. It also has its roots in an unpsychological view of the ratiocinative processes whether dealing with perceptual things or with the self of consciousness, which have been considered elsewhere.¹ Yet the famous antithesis between faith and knowledge, as clearly expressed in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique*, is the great objective point towards which Kant is constantly working. If Criticism be true, then the point of orientation in all rational life is faith, belief, conviction, feeling, a purely subjective condition which has its universal validity in the ethical experiences of each one who posits self and selves and finds them binding each other down to the fulfillment of an obligation that will not cease its clamorings, though it be persistently denied that gratifying experience which comes in the satisfaction of duty done. Criticism seems to say that there is no belief, no feeling in knowledge, as such; but in certain super-sensuous relations there obtains 'critical' validity of this inner impulse that comes up as the content of a conscience.²

So far as the scepticism of Criticism rests upon the elimination of the affective factors in the cognitive consciousness, it remains without psychological warrant. All intellection is suffused with the element of belief. Judgments proceed with the conviction that they are dealing with somewhat real. In its speculative aspects, Criticism unpsychologically considers mere intellection. Though there is yet dispute among writers whether 'belief' is intellectual or affective, there is no doubt

¹ Cf., *supra*. pp. 125 f.

² At times a moral 'sense,' or conscience, is denied: cf., *Werke*, II., 307, V., 122 f., VII., 19, IV., 290, 308; at others it is partially recognized as a valid psychical faculty: *Werke*, V., 41, 80, 102 f., VII., 178 f., 204 f., 257, VIII., 609 f.

about the 'conviction of reality' being an accompaniment of rational processes. This is just the nature of belief, that thought is having reference beyond itself to a real object.¹ Even in its most speculative flights knowledge is always coming back to the starting point of all intellectual activity, namely, the lowly, broad basis of sense-experience.² Thus psychology's answer to the question of certainty is the feeling of belief, or conviction of reality, that attaches itself to and develops with the intellectual consciousness. There is no real thing for us men until we can bring it within a consciousness glowing with the feeling that it *is* real. Here also is one of the most obvious relations that obtain between two of the so-called faculties, and a fact which makes intelligible this necessity of ours that we must have come up through a long development before we posit the realities of common or cultured experience. The feeling elements must intertwine all cognition and be the supporter and conservator of all that is gained in knowledge. The Kantian psychology cannot remain justified in the antithesis it affirms between faith, opinion and knowledge,³ and the scepticism which flourished on that stalk can not be philosophically removed by inquiry into the realm of ethical faith.⁴

¹ Cf., Sully, *op. cit.*, I., p. 483 ff.

² Cf., *Critique*, II., 85; Lotze, *Microcosmus*, I., 563 f.; Sully, *op. cit.*, I., 495.

³ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 703-713; *Werke*, IV., 351-2, V., 492, 148 f., VIII., 66 ff., 559 f.

⁴ The consideration of the content of Critical philosophy from a psychological point of view must break off here. A treatment of its ethical and æsthetical portions cannot be given even in the condensed form promised above, pp. 89 f.

CHAPTER V.

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Empirical psychology relates itself in various ways to the positive or constructive aspects of Critical philosophy, and especially to that portion which treats of speculative reason. The theory of knowledge and the system of *a priori* principles represent the experiential side of Criticism. Rational psychology, on the other hand, is the first realm of supposed knowledge against which Criticism hurls itself with destructive force. Empirical psychology relates itself to the Analytic in its making, while the results therein attained are turned upon the rational science. Thus psychology relates itself to Criticism in two ways: 1. in building itself up; 2. when it struggles to clear the ground, that room and defense may be had for its own standing. Kant himself, however, would doubtless deny such relations, especially the former; for Criticism, basing itself on logic, was (supposedly) far removed from psychology—that anthropology of the inner sense.

What Kant means by rational psychology, and how it separates itself from, as well as approximates the empirical science, we have already seen.¹ The requirement here is merely to state what that discipline contained and to estimate the famous criticism of it.

Rational psychology is one of the three metaphysical sciences which erect themselves upon the ground of reason alone. This is a faculty of principles which has nothing to do with objects directly, much less any concern with intuitions.² It is sharply distinguished from understanding in the Critical philosophy, and from Kant's notorious attempt to split them off from each other came not only many of the essential psychological tenets which suffuse Criticism, but also, many of the criticisms against Kant

¹ *Supra*, pp. 38 f.

² *Critique*, II., 258-262.

himself for this procedure, take their point of orientation here, especially that of Schopenhauer.¹ Kant did not make the distinction first in the *Critique* nor in the important *Dissertation* of 1770; but yet a decade earlier is found the first distinction between 'Verstand' and 'Vernunft,' which he attempts to do away with, in that both are 'Grundfähigkeiten' whose effort is 'deutlich zu erkennen' and 'Vernunftschlüsse zu machen.' As he advanced in his thinking, however, there came the noteworthy recognition that perception, or knowledge, involves immediate activities of the understanding. Its functions alone make experience, and certainty is confined to this. As he attempts to define reason on the basis of this acquisition, he began 'to feel considerable misgiving.' Whereas understanding is the faculty of the mind immediately concerned with objects and the rules of nature, reason tries to reach the unconditioned and is distinguished as a faculty of principles. Understanding works with judgments of twelve kinds; but the syllogism is the instrument of reason. It arranges judgments so as to bring out of them a new judgment, which is properly called 'a conclusion of reason.' Of these syllogisms there are as many kinds as there are possible relations expressed in the major propositions. Categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments are the three and no more, which express the relation of knowledge in the understanding, and accordingly there are three kinds of syllogisms differing from each other as those judgments.³

Reason manipulates bare concepts through the machinery of these syllogistic forms until it attains those bodies of rational knowledge known as psychology, cosmology, and theology. The various 'Ideas' of reason are appropriate to the respective syllogisms; why, nothing but his 'pedagogic primness' can explain,⁴ so that the categorical syllogism finds the unconditioned

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² *Werke*, II., pp. 52-68, especially 66-67.

³ *Critique*, II., 263, 289, 343.

⁴ Since existence is given us in three different ways, *viz.*: change under the law of causality *within us* as internal phenomena; a spatial and temporal series of existence *without us*; and an existence *in general*, a clue to the explanation of the applicability of the several syllogisms to the respective existence may be found in such facts as these. Assertory propositions may be made concerning ourselves, the phenomena of mind are given immediately (*cf.* Kant's utterance

synthesis in a subject; the hypothetical, the ultimate synthesis of the members of a series; the disjunctive, the ultimate synthesis of the parts of a system.¹ The first comprehends our knowledge of the nature and destiny of our soul; the second presents us with the limits of the world and the character of its events, while the third contains the final relation of all things and beings to the Ultimate Being.

These presumed triumphs of reason, Kant says, are illusions through and through. They rest on sophisms that belong to the very nature of reason and can no more be dispelled than many of the illusions known in optics. It is the duty of dialectic to expose the falsity that lurks within the grounds on which one rests his conviction that he does know aught of any unconditioned.

It is not merely the impulse of architectonic which added the Transcendental Dialectic. The adoption of pure logic as the basis of the larger portion of the *Critique* merely contains the formal demand that a dialectic should be appended. But the very content of the Critical philosophy in its speculative half demanded that a dialectic be given. In the *Æsthetic* was laid the broad basis whereon the Copernican reform was to plant itself and from which a reconciliation between the opposing developments would be effected. Empiricism and scepticism have their severest criticism in the Analytic where it is shown that reason *has* a modicum of knowledge given only in experience, but not coming out of experience in the ordinary sense. Only half the task of Criticism is here accomplished. Dogmatism and superstition might still be rampant in their flights to-

on the nature of perception, of the two sorts). Of external existence we must be more doubtful, since it is farther out in the fringe of consciousness, so to speak. While the existence in general, or absolute being, is still less intimately given in the immediacy of consciousness, *i. e.*, the respective syllogisms thus depend on the degree of mediacy in our so-called knowledge of the objects. On the other hand, a general objection might be raised with the query, whether reality is to be given by mere reason as a logical form, a presupposition which has had a mighty commentary within this century. Kant seems to confound metaphysic from the very start when he affirms that it is the work of reason which has to *construct* the unconditioned by a *deductive* process in order to get at it.

¹ *Crit.*, II., 280, 290.

wards the supersensuous. But the Dialectic appears with its harsh and almost conceited rebuke, checking the asseverations of those who would not 'taste of criticism.'¹ They went headlong in gathering *quod-est-demonstrandum* 'trash,' while critical dialectic brought them to a sudden halt in showing how illusory is any possible knowledge of God, the soul, and the world.

Dialectic was also demanded by the peculiar tenets of Criticism within itself, besides the exoteric attempt to reconcile contending teachings. Its great doctrine up to this point was that knowledge has significance only as it comprehends intuition and thoughts. Judgments alone, nor mere sensations, were not knowledge. But even back of this, we might say, for it is the chain binding all parts of Criticism into a systematic whole, lies the distinction between phenomena and noumena of which transcendental idealism is its expression, both positive and negative. He first tells us what knowledge is and how it comes about, and then proceeds to point out its insular limitations. The phenomenality of knowledge is announced already in the *Æsthetic* when it is maintained that those things which become 'objects' for us receive their characteristic forms from the sensing mind. Kant, however, did not propose to remain a dogmatic idealist; and the statement that objects are not things in themselves, but are only as they appear to us—obviously reclining on some doctrine of representativism—would not suffice. It remained to show in detail why such is the truth, culminating in the affirmation that nature is a creature of understanding. All the while there are volcanic tremors, now near the surface, then receding into the depths which supported Criticism. Only when the Analytic had completed its task were the pietistic bands loosed and the nursling of Criticism broke forth in the retarded chapter 'On the Ground of Distinction of all subjects into Phenomena and Noumena.'² Kant is the model of patience. He can maintain a speculative coolness and withhold metaphysical clamorings until reason's 'patient search and vigil long' have ended in the demand for some philosophic assent.

¹ Cf., *Werke*, IV., 113.

² *Critique*, II., 205 ff.

Then, with the powerful sweep of a speculative conviction, he clears the field of dogmatism by his elaboration of the doctrine of phenomenalism. With the demarcation of the *negative* concept of noumenon, so far as it struggles to creep into experience, he at once turns to expose that immense mass of misconceived opinion.

If, then, the interpretation be true and dialectic and noumenon are synonymous terms, much of Kant's own vagueness will be cleared away, when for 'the unconditioned' there is substituted 'noumenon' or 'transcendental object.' Kant's criticism of the three spurious sciences really means so much, and the fancifulness he exhibits in referring each science to a corresponding syllogism really comes to light; and queries as to the legitimacy of such references disappear as it is learned that all the legality is derivable only from Kant's utter disregard of psychology as suggesting the problems which philosophy considers, and accepting logic as the organon of transcendental truth. Kant was true to his propaedeutic. He discovers truth, but lets go reality. For truth and reality are not one and the same for philosophy, Hegel notwithstanding. Though Kant disheartens reason by revealing in the Analytic that knowledge, such as falls to our lot, deals only with phenomena, manufactured articles, and not with those bearing the stamp of pristine reality; yet, in his careful examination of the dialectical sciences, Kant gives an expression of his obeisance to what is 'natural' to man, and therein shows the sincerity of his wish to best serve the philosophic mind. The verbosity of the third section of the *Critique* reveals, as nothing else, the humanness of Criticism and its readiness to step from the realm of transcendental insight to cast its attainments in a pedagogic mould.

Rational psychology can no longer erect itself with logical legitimacy. It always has an essential defect, not in its content, but in its former faultiness. It is paralogistic. In its constructive attempts its procedure vitiates its character as truth expressing, by being peculiarly fallacious, and brings itself to that bar of applied logic where fallacy and dilemma are shown up in their true character. What Kant means by the mistaken logic which rational psychology applies he tells us in his

Logik.¹ As a correlative of this form of logical fallacy, there is also 'the transcendental paralogism' which leads a subjective, rational necessity to formally false conclusions. That is, rational psychology arises from inevitable, yet entrapping snares.² Though the illusion is transcendental and inherent, his placing it under dialectic shows that it is not irresolvable, at least, in the Kantian sense.

We have already seen that rational sciences deal with concepts, and not objects in experience, and psychology can draw out its wisdom from only one concept, *viz.*: 'I think.' This does not appear in the formal exhibition of the categories; nevertheless, it partakes of their nature as a necessity of possible experience. It even passes beyond them in value, for it is the 'concept' or 'consciousness' which must attend them all.³ And, of course, since any knowledge, true or false, must be an embodiment of the categories, rational psychology puts the 'purely intellectual intuition' into the categorical hopper, and receives in open bag the grist of supersensible knowledge. Thus is possible that arrangement which gives 'the topic' of this science which begins with 'relation,' since it is a thing or substance which is given in this *cogito*: 1. (relation) the soul is *substance*; 2. (quality) as regards its quality, *simple*; 3. (quantity) as regards the different times in which it exists, numerically identical, that is *unity* (not plurality); 4. (modality) it is in relation to *possible* objects in space.⁴

Kant's discussion hints also at a fifth 'topic'—a class of facts relating themselves to the paralogism which expresses the commerce of body and soul. It would properly come under the group of 'relation,' either as 'causality,' or 'community.' But he had already exhausted 'relation' on the substantiality of the soul and his architectonic would not allow him

¹ *Werke*, VIII., p. 131, § 90. "Ein Vernunftschluss, welcher der Form nach falsch ist, ob er gleich den Schein eines richtigen Schlusses für sich hat, heisst ein Trugschluss. Ein solcher Schluss ist ein Paralogismus, insofern man sich selbst hintergeht * * *." He distinguishes it from the Sophism, which is of the same character, but 'mit Absicht.'

² *Cf.*, *Critique*, II., 296, 256 f.

³ *Crit.*, II., 297; *cf.*, I., 434-440, 450 f.

⁴ *Crit.*, II., 300.

to find room for it in the topic. In the first edition the relation in question is discussed under the fourth paralogism as an appendix; while in the second edition it is banished from psychology as an improper task.¹

Such is the elemental reduction of rational psychology into terms of the Analytic, which is always Kant's point of orientation. The science which combines these elements attempts to secure, with *apodicticity*, a series of conclusions regarding the subject-matter, such as its immateriality, incorruptibility, and personality which fuse in the conception of spirituality; and furthermore, to set the soul free from a dependency on matter as the ground of life, and thus secure immortality. Kant, thus epitomizing this psychology, exhibits four syllogisms as expressive of its entirety, and sends the sun's ray of criticism through them, which causes this body of supposed knowledge to lift and float away like morning mists.²

First paralogism: That which is represented as the absolute subject [metaphysical or real substance], of our judgments, and cannot be used, therefore, as the determination of any other thing, is the substance [metaphysical or real].

I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject [logical substance, not as inherent thought, nor as the object of thought] of all my possible judgments, and this representation [predicate] of myself can never be used as the predicate of any other thing.

Therefore, I, as a thinking being [Soul], am [metaphysical or real] substance.

Substance is not a metaphysical core belonging to things, as dogmatical realism would have it; but substance as a reality may be either noumenal or phenomenal. "What applies to a thing by itself * * * does not apply to what is called substance as a phenomenon. This is not an absolute subject, but only a permanent image of sensibility, nothing in fact but intuition, in which nothing unconditioned can ever be met with."³ If phenomena were independent objects we would never be able to

¹ Cf., *Critique*, II., 334, I., 506; Erdmann, *Kant's Criticismus*, etc., p. 58 f.; Krohn, *Die Auflösung der rational Psych. durch Kant*, p. 70.

² What follows is a summary of *Critique*, II., pp. 303-350. The bracketed phrases help indicate Kant's meaning.

³ *Critique*, II., 454.

judge how the series of the manifold in time is connected with those objects. But we have always to deal with intuitions only, which are related in a changing, temporal series that demands something permanent which 'is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself.' This permanent is the object itself,¹ or the permanent is a concept having validity only as intuitions are given on which it can rest.

Now the only substantial element of the *ego* of which rational psychology can make use is that permanence of a logical sort, which is inherent in all thoughts and makes them possible internal objects; but it itself is an epistemological substrate which is never an intuition. It must be distinguished from the 'empirical *ego*,' which 'cannot be admitted as a thing by itself because it is under the condition of time, a form that can never be the determination of anything by itself.'² Thus psychology gives itself no demonstrative right to speak of the substantiality or existence of the soul. Its proof must use the middle term paralogistically, *if they are to have any meaning*.

Second paralogism: Everything the action of which can never be considered as the concurrence of several acting things is simple. Now the soul, or the thinking I, in such a thing; therefore, the thinking I is simple.

This is 'der Achilles' of rational psychology—invulnerable, except at one spot. Dogmatists have great plausibility in maintaining the sympathy of the soul, since the necessity of the unity of the subject seems implicated in that varied whole which thoughts are. But the *nervus probandi* of this cardinal proposition of psychology lies in the statement that in order to constitute a thought the many representations must be comprehended under the absolute unity of the thinking subject. This is impossible of proof, for it is not an analytical proposition; nor does a deduction from concepts *a priori* avail. Identity in compositeness is a synthetic concept having concern with that which is presented in sensibility. Only as we have reference to 'objects' can we properly speak of a permanent simple which inheres in

¹ *Critique*, II., 160 f., 167.

² *Ibid.*, II., 427; *cf.*, 94 f., 108, 304, 305, 310, 315, 318, 331, 344, 347; I., 492., 502 f.

that whose action is referable to a unit, but not a unity of intuition.

The *ego* here, as in the first proposition, is intended to have metaphysical meaning. Herein lies the subtlety of the syllogism. Dogmatism would be secure in its pretensions if it were possible to use 'simple thing' in the minor with the same meaning as in the major. But here it must relinquish its claims, for the only possible meaning that can be put into this *ego* is that it is the logical subject, a verbal impersonation, a necessity of thought throughout. This so-called intuition of simplicity does not give 'the real simplicity of my subject,' but only the identity of that unity of transcendental apperception. 'I am simple' is the immediate expression of this apperception and truly means an absolute, non-manifold subject, but logical only, and as a proposition is tautological. If the empirical *ego* were the logical *ego*, much less the transcendental *ego*, then rational psychology would stand, but the whole teaching of phenomenalism would fall to the ground. Simplicity in the subject is no datum of the inner sense, and psychology can in no other way know the transcendental object of the internal sense.

Third paralogism: Whatever is conscious of the numerical identity of its own identity at different times [that it is always one and the same *ego*], is in so far a person. Now the soul is conscious, etc. Therefore, the soul is the person.

This syllogism is much like the first, in that it builds itself upon some permanent that is given in consciousness. The permanence is not that which I am to myself; but the permanence that I, as an object for another consciousness, am given by him as though I were an object of his external intuition. Thus only can be found any metaphysical meaning in the numerical identity of a consciousness! This is, my identity within several times depends upon the functioning of the observer's understanding according to the first Analogy of Experience,¹ which finds in his temporal apprehension of me the necessity of some permanent which is the measure of and comparable with the flow of the manifold he perceives.

Now the minor seeks to put that meaning into the conscious

¹ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 160 ff.

identity of the soul, but surreptitiously. For, it is true that I do have an identity in my consciousness, but an identity that is not at all like that which comes with the perception of myself *in* time. It is only the numerical identity of the 'I think' which is a formal condition of my thoughts and their inherence. Identical apperception is always given first; but from it we cannot infer the personality of that *ego* which is given in time. Thus the statement of the numerical identity of the real *ego* becomes only the tautology of the transcendental or formal unity which is always nothing but a pre-condition of any synthetic judging.

Fourth paralogism: That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a doubtful existence.

All external phenomena are such that this existence cannot be perceived immediately, but we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions.

Therefore, the existence of all objects of the external sense is doubtful.

The fault in this paralogism¹ turns upon the expression 'outside us.' It involves an inevitable ambiguity which Criticism alone has been able to resolve. The major regards the objects 'outside us' in a transcendental sense, and dogmatic idealism posits things as occurring in a space of independent existence. Thus our perceptions are merely effects of something which the understanding calls their cause as corresponding to them. But the minor takes 'external *phenomena*' to be of the same character; and, overlooking the second meaning possible in the 'outside us' which recognizes objects as empirically external, leads psychology to the conclusion of problematical idealism.² The conclusion of this argument is false, because it *fails* to take this ambiguity in its genuine possibility and *to make itself paralogistic*. It is criticised because it is *not* guilty of some formal fault, but for another reason very curious in connection with the method of Criticism.

¹ *Crit.*, II., 323 f.

² It is difficult to represent the paralogical fault of this syllogism, for Kant's criticism of it has taken a very surprising turn, as we shall see later.

Such is the exhibition and treatment of the chief psychological doctrines as found in the first edition. Whatever may have been the inducements, Kant issued the second edition which has caused so much confusion and often been the source of misinterpretation. No doubt, the tone of the revision is considerably changed, the general doctrine of transcendental or sceptical idealism is less palpable, and many passages seem to contradict flatly the earlier conviction which accompanied the negation of 'the unknown X.' Schopenhauer, after Jacobi, performed a service to the philosophical world in calling its attention to those changes and modifications, but surely enlarges his data when he accuses Kant of retrenching. Possibly, Kuno Fischer¹ expresses more truly the relation of the two editions and the influences operating upon them when he writes that the first is the work of Kant and the second and following that of the Kantians.

Rational psychology was one of the two sections which received the greatest revision (the other being the Deduction of the Categories).² It is notably shortened, the logical formulæ of the syllogisms are omitted, and the running criticism attempts, in each of the four instances, to reduce the paralogisms into terms of the great problem as it is stated and analyzed in the 'Introduction' to that edition,³ viz., 'How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?' The possibility of such judgments lies 'in the consciousness of a determining self'—a definite expression of that concept *cogito* which lies at the basis of the science. But the dogmatists seek by an analysis of the determinable self, which forms the object, to attain metaphysical knowledge. They fail, however, in that their conclusions are based on propositions that are identical or analytical, and are thus an analysis of thought in general. This *sophism per figuram dictionis* is resolved as it is seen that the science employs no synthetical *a priori* propositions, but mistakes its logical analysis of thinking in general for a metaphysical determination of the object.

¹ A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 174. Cf., Drobisch, Kant's Dinge an Sich, etc., p. 30; Erdmann, Kriticismus, p. 203, 223.

² Crit., I., 492.

³ Cf., Crit., I., 408 f.

How completely the refutation of rational science rests on the Transcendental Deduction will be readily granted, as Kant rests 'the whole of our critique' on his denial of a possible scientific conception of personality. The only objection to it can come through an *a priori* proof that thinking beings are simple substances. Herein he is right in so far as the logical *ego* is the keystone of the whole Analytic and the key that solves the mysteries of noumenality. The long excursus in the first edition on transcendental idealism and its agreement with psychological perception is replaced in the second by two widely separated passages: one, the famous note in the preface,¹ and the addition in the text on the 'Refutation of Idealism.'² There is also added a refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the soul's permanence, and a clearer recognition of a possible *fifth* parallogism. With this brevity of treatment and these additions, there is yet no change so far as psychology is concerned. There is no rational psychology as a *doctrine*, furnishing any addition to our self-knowledge, but only as a *discipline* fixing impassable limits to speculative reason in this field.³ If there be any change, it is only the growing recognition of the articulation of the first two *Critiques*, the second of which was soon to appear, and *whose speculative basis is laid in the criticism of transcendental dialectic*. The rational sciences must be removed before an ethical noumenality could be established. But for psychology and speculation it remained the same. Thus ended the great tragedy of Criticism whose first act was performed so many years before when its undogmatic doubt fell on the world's great clairvoyant. About spiritual beings 'kann man vielleicht noch allerlei meinen, niemals aber mehr wissen.' "Lasst uns demnach alle lärmende Lehrverfassungen von so entfernten Gegenständen der Speculation und der Sorge müssiger Köpfe überlassen. * * * Es war auch die menschliche Vernunft nicht genugsam dazu beflügelt, dass sie so hohe Wolken theilen sollte, die uns die Geheimnisse der andern Welt aus den Augen ziehen; * * * denn es wohl am rathsamsten sei, wenn sie sich

¹ *Critique*, I., 280-281.

² *Ibid.*, 475-479.

³ *Ibid.*, 502.

zu gedulden beliebten, bis sie werden dahin kommen. 'Lasst uns unser Glück besorgen, in den Garten gehen, und arbeiten.'"¹

It has been a mooted question as to the sources of the rational psychology which Kant criticizes. Since Kant, as is well known, was no thorough student of philosophy in its historical development, being much rather an independent discoverer in the field of speculation, it becomes a doubly important query in the history of philosophy itself in so far as his criticism was epoch-making in its own realm, and also stimulating in that of the positive sciences.

Kant, as a student, was nurtured in the Leibnizo-Wolffian philosophy which was regnant throughout German universities. These methods and doctrines were accepted for the most part until the influence of materialism and scepticism awakened him to original and profound inquiries. As Criticism was developed, it appeared against dogmatism, and especially against its method.² And where the knowledge of reality was claimed, he subverts the doctrines of dogmatism. In the preface to the second edition however, Wolff is highly estimated and his method is given great value.³ It was also Wolff who rationalized voluminously in the two departments into which he divided psychology, *viz.*: empirical and rational. Thus it would naturally seem that Kant was representing Wolffian tenets and arguments. That this is *not* what Kant had in mind, will be seen from what follows. In the *Psychologiæ rationalis prolegomena*, (sec. 3) is briefly stated what Wolff understands by that science and the sources of its proofs: "Anima humana cum actu existat (sec. 20, *Psych. empir.*), in numero entium est (sec. 139, *Ontol.*) consequenter ad eam tanquam speciem applicari possunt, quae de ente in genere demonstrata sunt (sec. 360, 361, *Psych. empir.*). Quamobrem cum in Ontologia demonstrantur, quae de ente in genere praedicanda veniunt (sec. 1, *Ontol.*); in Psychologia rationali principia demonstrandi petuntur ex Ontologia." Wolff, as a psychological idealist, arrived at most of the conclusions which Kant exhibits, but by a far different

¹In 1776, *Werke*, II., 359, 381.

²*Crit.*, I., 383; *Werke*, VI., 43 f., 491 f; VIII., 84.

³*Crit.*, I., 384.

method. It was through ontology that certain essential conceptions were deduced and with them fused *ex notione privativa* of the soul, thus reaching the conclusions which are chiefly given in sections 44 ff. of the *Psychologia rationali*. The soul is an immaterial, simple substance to which the properties of material things are repugnant. By means of the body, the soul is able to express its essence, which consists in the representation of the universe (sec. 62, 66). It is hardly possible that Wolff is Kant's model; the former developed his proofs so differently from the latter. Scarce can Baumgarten have been the immediate source. His *Metaphysik* Kant selected for the basis of his lectures because of its 'scientific wealth and precision';¹ but the popular work does not depart from the author's master in metaphysic.²

It has been suspected that under the title of 'rational psychology,' which had been swung with scholastic triumph for half a century, Kant places tenets which had a much greater warmth in his consciousness by reason of their nearness in time, place and friendship. Martin Knutzen, the one among Kant's university teachers, who could influence his genius,³ is the first who has been mentioned as the one having had most influence in erecting some form of psychology against the materialism which was prevailing at that time.⁴ Reimarus, of whom Kant says,⁵ his work has not yet been superseded, secures⁶ the coveted tenets of rational psychology, but not *per viam ontologicam*, and

¹ *Werke*, II., 316, 43.

² Cf., Baumgarten's *Meta.*; *Die vernünftige Psychologie*, sections 547, 558, 560, 576 f., etc.

³ Reicke, *Beiträge zu I. Kant's Leben und Schriften*, pp. 7, 31, 48.

⁴ Cf., Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-228. Knutzen's work appeared in 1744 with the title *Phil. Abh. von der immateriellen Natur der Seele*, etc. I have not been able to see this work. Cf., Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.*, II., 174; Krohn, *op. cit.*, 70 note 4; B. Erdmann, *Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit*, p. 145 ff, contends with Meyer, Ueberweg, Bergmann and Jahn, that the question can have no pertinence, either as to the form or content of Criticism, for (p. 148) 'die allgemeine Färbung seiner Darstellung, ihr wesentlich psychologischer Character, ist durch die erkenntnisstheoretischen Entwicklungen, die zu ihr führen, von selbst gegeben.' Cf., Lange's *Hist. of Materialism*, II., pp. 124 ff, 153 ff.

⁵ *Werke*, V., 491.

⁶ In his work, *Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion*, 1754, 5th ed., Tübingen, 1782.

leaves off the scholastic dress of the syllogism. On the principle that 'niemand kann sein Bewusstsein verläugnen,' he affirms the simple substantiality of our soul that is given us immediately in consciousness. 'Allein, die Seele, das Wesen in uns, das sich bewusst ist, kennt sich innerlich;' and, 'ist also keiner blossen veränderliche Beschaffenheit eines andern Dinges, sondern eine Substanz.' 'Dergleichen Substanz die eine Bewusstseins besitzt, ist in jeglichen einzelnen Menschen nur eine.'¹ Mendelssohn, also, receives special recognition from Kant, who gave his arguments for the continuity of our soul life a special section in the second edition.² The logical and enlightened Jew justly deserved this acknowledgment. In his *Phaëdon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (1767), he argues for the simplicity of the soul on the grounds of the contradiction which inheres in the proposition that thought is the result of compositeness, using the exact figure which Kant reproduced fourteen years later.³ 'Es gibt in unserm Körper wenigstens eine einzige Substanz,' whose nature is arrived at by deduction from that which is given in consciousness. Basing his 'whole proof' on the dilemma of compositeness in the permanent, he puts his opinion in the questioning words of Socrates: "Diese einfache Substanz die unausgedehnt ist, Vorstellungsvermögen besitzt, die vollkommenste unter den denkenden Substanzen ist, die in mir wohnen, und alle Begriffe, deren ich mir bewusst bin, in eben der Deutlichkeit, Wahrheit, Gewissheit u. s. w. in sich fasst, ist diese nicht meine Seele?—Nichts Anders."

It can hardly be agreed with Erdmann that Kant is all the while trying to strangle an effigy of his own pseudo-exaltation. That would be casting back into Kant's deeply-rooted intention an insincerity, which Erdmann, least of all, would think of doing. Nor does his explanation of the 'Färbung' of the exhibition sufficiently harmonize matters. Yet it is true, the famous paralogisms are to be found no where else. But this does not

¹Vith. *Abhandlung vom Menschen und dessen Seele*, secs. 4-6.

²*Crit.*, I., 497 f.; cf., *Werke*, IV., 343 f. note, where the method of Mendelssohn is approved as over against the dogmatism of the Wolfian school.

³Cf., Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II., 155, 158, 194, and *Crit.*, II., 306, I. 497.

deny that the criticism of them finds Wolff and all the others reprehensible in their metaphysical attempts. Wolff is attacked in so far as the form is concerned, for his method is reducible to that of the syllogism, and rebuked in spoiling the purity of the rational science by invoking all sorts of 'unsinnliche und abstractesten Begriffe'¹ to reach its conclusions. The later psychologists who were contending against the varied forms of materialism, receive indeed the edge of the criticism. They took only the data of consciousness and from it evoked all their wisdom, thinking all the while that the *ego* which came with every moment or thought, was the *ego* of reality—that which conditioned all the phenomena of the internal or external senses. The whole criticism turns upon this very point, that an error in the supposed fact introduces the fault in the syllogism. They employ a presumable empirical *ego* which turns out to be the *ego* of apperception. Thus, in agreement with Meyer, it appears that the psychology Kant exhibits and criticizes, is that which was prevalent in his hour. Still one must admit, with Erdmann, that the solitariness of the paralogisms comes from the touches of Kant's own hand. But this can only mean that to him and his purpose, it was privileged to so exhibit what was rampant, in a form suitable to the limits of his space and conformable with the logical basis of Criticism.

In his meta-critique of Kant's rational psychology, Herbart² contends not only that Kant misrepresents the Leibnizian doctrine of the monads or spiritual substances, but, also, that the errors of rational psychology cannot be clothed in paralogistic form, and the fault in Kant himself lies in his conception of the *ego*. It has already been seen how much truth can be admitted in Herbart's first objection. Nor is the second objection valid. Rational psychology, as understood by Kant, was not guiltless in its proofs. The old metaphysicians had somehow wandered far away from psychical reality. Their tenets could be properly presented by the paralogisms. Meyer also confuses matters in his criticism³ that Kant's errors lie in 'the form' given to the para-

¹ Baumgarten, *Metaphysik*, sec. 1.

² *Psychologie als Wissenschaft, etc.*, *Sämm. Wk.*, V., 249 f.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 228 f.

logisms. It is not necessary that the syllogisms be rearranged, for in the Kantian sense of substantiality, *etc.*, the conclusions, excepting one, are properly drawn to show the illogical nature of the science.

But this does not say that Kant's criticism is faultless. He believed in the conclusiveness of his objections and felt a triumph over the rational giant. On the contrary, the criticism has not logical perfection, and curiously lacks harmony with the Critical method. For instance, the paralogism of substantiality is itself guilty of a *petitio principii*. According to his own conception of this fallacy,¹ the major premise is condemned. The substantiality of the subject is the very thing demanding proof which the paralogism purports to give; whereas, the major makes an affirmation of that which itself stands in need of proof.² It involves an existential proposition in order to get over from the given subject to its permanence. But such propositions are either 'nothing but a miserable tautology,' or, 'as every sensible man must admit, synthetical.'³ For the concept of a thing tells us nothing of its possible existence. Kant falls into the same error in his refutation of Mendelssohn's argument. The latter seeks to prove the soul's permanence by showing the impossibility of the soul being liable to a 'vanishing.' From the Critical standpoint, Kant must maintain that 'the permanence of the soul as an object of the internal sense, remains undemonstrated and undemonstrable,' and, from the same standpoint, he dare not attempt to prove the opposite, *viz.*, that the soul, as a simple being, can be changed into nothing through 'elanguescence.' But to attribute an intensive quantity to the soul,⁴ and to affirm of consciousness that it has degrees of reality, without a presupposition from experience, is to fall into the same error of which he accuses rational psychology—that it hypostasizes phenomena.

Again, the formal procedure of Criticism must be questioned

¹ *Werke*, VIII., 131, sec. 92: "Unter einer 'petition principii' versteht man die Annahme eines Satzes zum Beweisgrunde als eines unmittelbar gewissen Satzes, obgleich er noch eines Beweises bedarf."

² *Cf.*, Meyer, *op. cit.*, 229 f.; Krohn, *op. cit.*, 29 f.

³ *Crit.*, II., 513 f.; *cf.*, 196 f.

⁴ *Crit.*, I., 497 f. II., 147 f. I., 465.

as it occurs in the fourth paralogism, not so much as to the consistency of the paralogism (?), but whether Kant has remained true to the method which he elsewhere champions as the new step taken by metaphysic. "All objections may be divided into dogmatical, critical and sceptical. The dogmatical attacks the proposition, the critical the proof of the proposition. * * * The critical objection, as it says nothing about the worth or worthlessness of the proposition, and attacks the proof only, need not know the object itself better, or claim a better knowledge of it. All that it wants to show is, that a proposition is not well grounded, not that it is false."¹ Kuno Fischer² goes so far in his vindication of Kant's criticism, as to say that it "is not dogmatical. It is far removed from asserting the reverse of the doctrine of the soul held by metaphysicians, or even favoring such a reversal. * * * When Kant refuted rational psychology in all its details, his objections were neither dogmatical nor sceptical, but merely critical." That the historian's opinion needs modification appears from a consideration of the criticism of the fourth paralogism, which begins thus: 'We shall have to examine the premises.'³ What follows is *not* a criticism of the *proofs*, but an examination of the *worth* of the propositions, and especially of the minor premise.⁴ Thus is offered an opportunity to present the doctrine which had been clearly expressed once already, and the criticism becomes the *second* exposition of what transcendental idealism teaches. The minor affirms that 'external phenomena' cannot be 'perceived immediately,' for they are something extra-mental which are said to underlie our perceptions. Descartes is justified in affirming that immediate perception is of that only which is within me. Psychology clings to this doctrine of 'representative perception' and becomes unable to know the existence of things. In the first three paralogisms there was shown the logical defect of *quaterni terminorum*, and the

¹ *Crit.*, II., 336.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

³ *Crit.*, II., 319.

⁴ *Cf.*, Hippenmeyer, Art. in *Zeitschrift für Phil. und phil. Kritik*, vol. 56, p. 114; Krohn, *op. cit.*, p. 69 ff.

conclusion is false because of the absence of the complete identity of the middle term in its two uses. So far Kant is true to his purpose, and he remains strictly critical. But the minor of the fourth is *false*. For it was irrefutably shown in the *Æsthetic* that space and time dwell in us as forms of our sensuous intuition, and objects are only empirically external, whose reality is given immediately in that perception. Thus something real in space always corresponds with our intuitions, and the strictest idealist cannot demand a proof from us that objects are out in space. The criticism allows to psychology a dualism, but such as must say that the existence of objects is given immediately in the sensations which beget their reality. Kant has become 'dogmatic' in his criticism—dogmatic after his own definition. The syllogism remains as to form; for as we saw above, it could not be illogical, and the impossibility of psychology at this point lies in the falsity of its premises. There is no Kantian criticism of the last paralogism. It is displaced by an exposition of Critical idealism so far as its content relates to perception and the reality of its objects.

There has already been intimated the relation which the criticism of rational psychology holds to the Critical philosophy, chiefly in its speculative half. Metaphysicians, especially the Scholastics, had long played with psychological doctrines. *De Animæ Natura* was the frequent theme of learned disputations. When that new race of scientific minds had sprung up, there rang out the jubilee through England and the Continent that the mathematical formulæ of forces would explain all that might be given in consciousness, and surely that which empirically underlay its manifestations. Materialism became rampant. But in the German mind it was current with many a fluctuation. The home of the Reformation was still too fond of religious ideas to admit the strange guest. Materialism did take root early in Germany, but chiefly in connection with medicinal and scientific inquiries. There came the reaction, and a versatile Leibnitz would banish it all with the one stroke of a genius. Instead of his pre-established harmony marking no progress in psychology,¹ his whole philosophy is much rather only psy-

¹Hippenmeyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 88.

chology.¹ And the determinations of the monadological principles comprehended psychologic insight into the universe:—for all substances are souls. From this center radiated the reaction which contended against the adoption of scientific empiricism, until the lines of divergence led to points so antipolar as are baseless pneumatism and soulless materialism.

The spirit of the Enlightenment expressed itself in the metaphysic of psychology. The constant wrangle was over truly disputable points. Criticism, in shaping its problem, had an eye to the philosophic needs of the day, and maintains that on the basis of what is given in experience and its rational or *a priori* implications, neither party is given any right to defend its case before the bar of man's reason. A philosophy of mind is impossible. Experience limits us to phenomena. Nor is it permitted us to *know* possible reality. For metaphysic can never be constructed on a *a priori* ground. The limit of reason is self-knowledge—to know that it cannot know. Even the polymathic Faust soliloquizes not only the outcome of speculative criticism, but also sees what must be its relation to the ethical life:

“What we know not, is what we need to know;
And what we know we might as well let go.”—*Blackie's Tr.*

Men would know the ground of immortality and sought to refute materialism, not leaving the idea of a somewhat beyond on the slippery foundation of a faith. We cannot know the nature of the thinking being; but *that* knowledge, it seems, is our need. No, replies Criticism, enough ground is yet left for practical purposes. Indeed the value of dispelling ‘the idle dream’ of self-knowledge is to turn us within and seek ‘the consciousness of righteous,’ an inconsistency in the face of which Criticism blindly thrusts itself. Whereas it sought to let go, yea, even pass beyond that which we do know (Kantian), that questions concerning our own being are not to be answered.

Thus the refutation of rational psychology bears a three-fold relation to the Criticism in which it stands as a link. The age did not care for God. He was thrust out as far as possible

¹ Cf., Kirchner, *Leibniz's Psychologie*, p. v, 3, *et al*; cf., Sommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 50, 213 f., 252, 439, No. xxx.

from the world of experience. Even Kant abides the tendency, and his God is merely the last link in that chain which anchors in the individual for whom its sole and degraded function is in securing happiness for him who has respect for the moral law.¹ It also relates itself to the age in so far as it enters into Kant's solution of the problem which he proposed to himself—a solution he intended as a reconciliation. Moreover, the refutation, and that which it concerns in the lives of men, is most important for Criticism. The Analytic was possible itself only with the insight that reason has faculties which contribute to cognition. From the positing of activities it was but a psychological step, which we have already seen as receiving Kant's recognition, to seek into the nature and source of those activities. From those early assumptions, based on logic, came the refutation based on that self-same Criticism which grew up out of the former.

But only as the rational science of the soul was removed, could there be erected those postulates of the psychological world of morality. Did we know the nature of that being which thinks within us, there could be no need of passing on to those practical needs which find sufficient ground in a silent disinterestedness in the possibilities of knowledge as it pries into the secrets of psychical life. Kant did not care for cosmology. He is triumphantly humorous in so armoring the giant physicists, that when one strikes the other equals his blow. He is liberal with theology; but a God is not his chief concern. Experience is possible without Him, as is well-nigh the moral law. In that infinite series, beginning with the non-moral, mechanical rise of 'experience,' to its consummation in the perfection of the ideal of humanity, He is given a modicum of reality in that now mysterious condition of how the *summum bonum* is to be realized in accordance with the mandates of the categorical imperative. On the other hand, What is man? is the chief question before Critical philosophy within which rational psychology and practical reason are the negative and positive allowances. They are the points of orientation, both of which swing on the pivot of 'the psychological idea.' For this Kant entertains a kindly feeling. When

¹Cf., *Crit. of Prac. Reason*, bk. II., ch. II., sec. V., "The existence of God a postulate of pure practical reason."

comparing the three rational sciences he throws his opinion to the favor of the first and third. "There is no such antinomy in the psychological and theological ideas." But the former yet has the precedent. "The transcendental paralogism caused a one-sided illusion only. * * * * All advantage is on the side of pneumatism."¹ While he remained dissatisfied with his criticism of rational psychology,² he abides with its outcome; but maintains rightly, in spite of all the objections and limitations which attend the applicability of regulative principles to experience, that 'nothing but good can spring from such a psychological idea.'³ He is rather lenient, on the whole, with rational psychology, not because it has a firm basis—on the contrary, it has only an apparent one; but rather, in that it embodies the 'psychological idea' which has a firm basis, as is seen in the fundamental postulate of the moral reason. The soul must be left over in some way. He would need it in the practical law which expresses the essence of man. Thus the criticism of rational psychology, while containing the essential entirety of the *Critique*, is a negation with that large and mental reservation which is later to break forth in the ethical noumenality where freedom is the great goal to be reached, in the race for which the 'critical' reality of 'the psychological idea' is the first laurel whose attainment cheers Criticism on throughout the course.⁴

Empirical psychology was denied any authority in shaping the conclusions of philosophy. Rational psychology, with the whole of metaphysic, has been swept into the lumber room of transcendentalism. What shall we think? Is Kant's criticism irrefragable? Has he merely restated the problem of psychology, affirming, from the standpoint of 'a fair but severe criticism,' its insolubility? Must it be agreed with him that we cannot know ourselves, and with *that* knowledge heap condemnation upon an irrational experience! Can we no more attempt to *know* in the name of rational necessity (= *a priori*) the 'na-

¹ *Crit.*, II., 711, 352, 577.

² *Werke*, IV., 129.

³ *Crit.*, II., 585.

⁴ *Cf.*, *Crit.*, II., 340; *Werke*, V., 4, 6.

ture' of that being which thinks within us? Has Kant said the last word that may be uttered with rational confidence (=knowledge)? Or, allowing full value to the refutation, may we not still seek to harmonize the facts of psychical experience, not only in a body of scientific explanations, but also so enable us to entertain theoretical views on the *Träger* of inner experience, as that we may build up a philosophy of mind? Such are the questions which confront the conclusion of our study. The opinions of such thinkers of the order to which Kant belongs should be treated with profound respect. It becomes an ethical maxim, based on the sincerity of their reflections and the value of their service to speculation, that deference be paid to their intellectual wares. Not only should these be shown in good light, but the mathematics of their perspective and the mixture of their primal pigments should be formulæ attending the exhibition. Still, we may say of the criticism of rational psychology, as Hume said of Berkeley, 'it is irrefutable, but it does not produce conviction.' The instinct to let philosophy draw back 'the pall' which science 'pulls over the psychic half,' is too strong, and we yet seek—yes, let it be 'transcendentally'—conclusions which the 'natural science' of psychology refuses to give. Nor is it merely theological interests as of old that lead us on. Rather do we seek to know ourselves by reason of that metaphysical impulse, which is larger and broader, engulfing all other unique goods. "The creed of a man," says Schopenhauer,¹ "is, that I must have a metaphysic." We all seek to go back of that which appears, to a somewhat comparable in its nature with the character of the appearance. The old psychology gave no less an expression to this impulse, but perverted it with theological squints.

It appeared in the exposition that Kant's criticism is not faultless. Even more defects might be pointed out. Yet it must be admitted that his attempt is successful. He did overthrow the old rational psychology—the psychology as he understood it, and from the arguments which in his time were generally adopted. They held that in consciousness there is an envisagement of an atomic simplicity and identity of the soul.

¹*Op. cit.*, II., 184.

They sought physical symbols, but so applied them to mind that it was conceived as an inert *thing* living through the ages. Adjectives they were, which might have had significance in molecular physics, and would fain have attached themselves to our own *ego*. We are substances. We have a core of permanence around which the ebb and flow of the restless inner experience clings. We are one—such an one that no edge of the physicist's or materialist's tools can affect us. We have atomic simplicity. It is a sort of psychic atom that we are, which has a consciousness that harks back to former experiences in which the same simple was found. Our personality is the conscious continuity of a potent 'mathematical point,' which the mechanical affinities of a chemical universe are unable to destroy. The relation of this psychic atom, with its essence *in vi repræsentativa universi*, to material extended atoms—that is the insoluble problem from Descartes downward. Dogmatic and sceptical idealism, or empirical idealism, is the only resource psychology leaves us as it plays tricks with our queries.

All this, says Kant, is floundering. Such terms have meaning 'in experience.' Only 'objects' can give validity to the categories. 'Ideas' are beyond their reach. The latter remain regulative principles. He made a psychological inquisition, banishing all except 'the logical *ego*.' This it is, says he, which the science is guilty of using. Into these abstract terms it tries to put experiential meaning. The impossibility of enlivening this highest of all the categories, since it must accompany them all throughout, is glaringly seen in the illogical nature of the argument brought forward in support of the conclusion 'that the soul is a simple, substantial personality.' They, says he, are dealing with abstractions, for the mind as known by itself is not a fit term in a syllogism of this sort. And that term which is used can never be an object of knowledge. His criticism is invincible, as he understood the science. And we have seen how great was his right to the form given it and the one fact on which it could rest. It is invincible by reason of two things: the form into which it was cast, and the basis of his argument, which he very properly drew from the Analytic. The glaring inconsistency that sprang from these roots make us desist. But

what must be given up? We have lost our perfectly demonstrable argument of the old theological science. No more may we deduce natural immortality by a series of concepts. Reason dare no more syllogize over what may be given in consciousness. Have we lost all? Has metaphysic been so refuted that we must not attempt again a philosophy of mind? No. Kant's criticism of rational psychology is perfectly harmless to a metaphysic of mind. Kant's criticism is invincible—the postulate of a soul and an effort to find out its nature is still our right—let it be paradoxical; it may be such only in appearance.

“Es kann gar nicht zugegeben werden,” says Herbart, “das Kant den Begriff des Ich richtig gefasst habe.” While the great modern realist may object to Kantian psychology, he is no better off in the end than the critical idealist. The latter maintains by his criticism that we are not to vex ourselves with the insoluble problem of the nature and essence of the mind, now and then, however, hinting at some sort of a spiritual monism. The former maintains that “das einfache *Was* der Seele ist völlig unbekannt, und bleibt es auf immer; es ist kein Gegenstand der speculativen so wenig, als der empirischen Psychologie.”² There is a manifest difference between the treatment psychology received at the hand of the great Königsberger and that given by his successor of a few years later. The one attempts to destroy, while the other started influences which have been greatest in the modern psychological world. Hence, there is undoubtedly a great difference in what may be their agreement or disagreement on central psychological questions. But both have been potent in their ways—one, the last of the scholastics, because he denied scholasticism; the other, the first of the moderns, because psychology was to be ‘founded anew on mathematics and experience.’ Herbart's criticism, however, will serve as an excellent starting point.

Kant's refutation is invincible, and removed the apodicticity of the science of the last century. It does not produce conviction and is perfectly harmless to a philosophy of mind. The former was accomplished from the standpoint of that psychology which Kant

¹ *Werke*, V., p. 251.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

himself adopts unwittingly in the Transcendental Analytic, chiefly his principle of 'pure apperception,' which gave him the clue to the paralogisms, the detection of which allowed him to make the formal exhibition. The latter is the outcome of the whole matter. Modern psychology cannot abide with Kant's doctrine of the *ego*, and the functions which it served for him, do not affect in the least any attempt to purify a metaphysic of the soul.

We will not give Kant the rejoinder, as is often done,¹ that in negating psychology, he has brought in an almost complete system of that science. It has already appeared frequently that psychology lies close to his undertaking. The solution of his problem could be carried no great way without dependence on psychological principles. He is not dealing with a description and the sequence of mental phenomena. He must be granted that much.² Although he is constantly exhibiting the contents of the mind under the *a priori* laws of their function and appearance, his is truly a psychological task. This retort, however, would never permit such a critic to construct a metaphysic of mind. His 'psychology' would be the very negative of that. The repartee might be a scholastic pleasantry, but helps not one jot towards the existence and nature of that which is the supporter of this inner play of states. Indeed, the kernel of the whole *Critique*—the Analytic—is one stupendous hypothetical judgment; and Kant himself has withdrawn that portion of empiricism from which he can select the buttments which are to keep the theory of knowledge from tottering.

Kant's strength against the psychologists lay in his 'logical *ego* of apperception,' and in that same weapon is lodged the inapplicability of his criticism to present day attempts. It is thus we allow validity to *all* his psychological strictures except the content of his argument, or the epistemological foundation to which he constantly refers it. Here is the great sin of Kant. He did a service in the history of psychology by frightening away to their death the scholastic ghosts of abstraction. He turned upon them in the same unearthly shroud, and by the most figur-

¹ Cf., Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 59; Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I., p. 245 ff.

² Cf., Bax, *Prol.*, tr., p. lxxvii.

ative abstractness in the logical *ego* cleared the vanguard of modern mental science from the harassing brigands that hid in Neo-Aristotelian caves. But in his splitting up of the *egos* we cannot follow him. There is so much psychological slag about Kant, that the present day charge against the old psychology, that it cast everything into severely speculative moulds, is too true at this point. In the two preceding chapters we saw much that shows Kant's effort to get away from positive schemes into which the mental facts were to be fitted as if in the Procrustean bed. But in rational psychology he himself is guilty of hypos-tasizing figurative expressions, and in the criticism he is wont to let steel cut steel, abstraction meet abstraction. At this point modern psychology must rightly refuse to allow his claim. The psychological coins of transcendentalism are spurious and the arrest of their philosophical circulation must follow forth-with.

Any criticism of Kant's refutation can have its validity established only in some theory of knowledge. It must meet him on his own ground. His denial of metaphysical science is grounded in the Analytic and *Æsthetic*. Those dealers in theoretical knowledge who will not send noëtïc merchandise through the straits of Criticism are contrabandists and their polemical wares must be confiscated. It is not necessary, however, that a whole campaign be struggled through in order to gain a height whose outlook grants a detection of the opponent's weaknesses. This can be mounted at once, surreptitiously to all appearance, but really with the manifold presuppositions of hard won conquests. And criticism demands only so much. Still, Kant is right. Pure reason is such a perfect unity that it stands or falls together.¹ The completeness is so interdependent that a flaw at one point injures the whole.

Kant makes fearful havoc of man when he comes to the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. *His doctrine, rather doctrines, of the ego is the pernicious taint of the whole criticism.* This we indicate as the chief defect of the entire analysis. The nature of necessity, the necessary machinery that is to grind it out, the dependence of 'Nature' on understanding, the demand

¹*Crit.*, II., p. xxiii, I., 494.

that science shall finally submit itself to the keen analysis of metaphysic, that fact that so much naïvete prevails as to produce a 'natural delusion' which philosophy must seek to remove, the whole outcome that ours is an intelligible world whose expression finds adequacy only as ethics becomes the complement of metaphysic—all this and more may be granted to Criticism. But that ideality which was consequential in its absolute scepticism, the readiness to expunge the mind because the knowledge of it could not be reduced to the same formulæ expressing the cognition of a thing, the denial that we are entitled to a rational conviction as to the nature of our own being, the getting away from so-called reality and the prepositing of an unknown X, whose confusion becomes worse confounded on later explanations—these are the logical attachments of Criticism which show how far it has wandered from an expression of reality, to what length its adherence to logic has led it astray, and how defective were the psychological implications whose rectification entitles us to eliminate its unworthy results.

We repudiate the scepticism of Criticism and maintain our right to a metaphysic of mind, on the ground of its ideality of time and unpsychological doctrine of the *ego*; but not on the immediate basis of such conceptions that in consciousness we have an envisagement of 'objective' reality—for Kant allows so much.¹

Objection against Kant's ideality of time is not taken because we conceive time to be some sort of an independent thing which gets perceived or empirically intuited like things. 'We have no primary and proper perception of time at all,' says Lotze,² in protest against the view which has prevailed since Kant, of regarding time as 'an intuition.' Kant himself, however, is not guilty of regarding time in that fashion. It is merely the 'order of relation' in which internal determinations must be represented.³ He makes the distinction between the psychological and ontological question of time, but confusion of interpretation came because he uses epistemological phrases

¹ Cf., Stählin, *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl*, tr., p. 44; *Crit.*, II., 320-329, I., 475 f.

² *Meta.*, I., 315.

³ *Crit.*, II., 20, 88.

with reference to the latter. Whatever else time may be, it is certainly a mental form. It has reality only as a relating consciousness sets the flow of events under the temporal cover. Even the reality of change, which comes as an objection, need not deter us from some sort of an ideality to time. Change is real, but its reality comes in the reality of time. Change is significant, however, only in a knowing consciousness. Change the fact, and time the condition, have no deeper reality than that which can come out of what contains the one and posits the other.¹ It must be admitted, however, that Kant has employed unhappy expressions in expounding his ontology of time. The sceptical confusion which confounds the first and second 'Analogies of Experience,' and the proof and counter-proof of the first 'Antinomy,' are the ripe fruits of his inapt language.

Of more value at present is his psychological use of time in the perception of a self. As to his ontological time, it must be objected without further debate that he places it so far out of reach that when it attains an experiential expression, it must always be dubbed phenomenal. We mean to say that Kant's conception of the 'internal sense' is faulty and with it *that* ideality of time which took its empirical rise from the former. The point in question is thus rather a medley of the two considerations of time which should be separated—and Kant has done this, but not in the doctrine of inner sense.²

The division between the external and the internal sense is an old one.³ It is also one of the first to spring up in the untutored mind. We have sights, sounds and touches that correlate themselves through the special senses to the 'objects' that are without us. There are, on the other hand, thoughts and ideas, images, feelings, desires and strivings that spring up seemingly out of and are related to ourselves only. These belong to the internal sense. The mind, they say, is affected some way, and

¹ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 32; Ladd, *Introd.*, p. 253; cf., Lambert's letter to Kant, Dec., 1770, *Werke*, VIII., p. 667, where the writer insists on the reciprocal character of 'time' and 'change.'

² Cf., *Werke*, VII., 453 f., 473, 550; VI., 365; *Reflex.*, 82 f.

³ Locke (*Essay, etc.*, II., 1, sec. 2 ff.) was the first to give philosophical expression to this sense; cf., also Vaihinger, *Commentar*, II., 126 f; Volkmann, *op. cit.*, II., 180 ff.

what it perceives are these various forms of consciousness. Kant makes this distinction, but carries with it much of the old-fashioned belief that the mind is affected—that something ‘is given’ from which, by the constructive and recognitive activity of ‘understanding,’ it builds up the phenomena of the inner sense. He proceeds *ab extra* to get the principle whereby he classifies the two forms of sense:¹ objects which come to affect the body, and the mind which affects itself. But psychology, as it is feeling the influences of evolutionary theory and looks upon the development of consciousness, must seek elsewhere the basis of a division. So far as psychology is concerned, it regards consciousness as dirempting its own states into those belonging to selves and those belonging to bodies or objects, things. (Of course, cerebral psychology will look for the principle of division in the direction of nervous currents, whether peripherally or centrally originated.)

What Kant means by ‘inner sense’ is not easily determined.² Without squeezing the text on this point, Kant gets at the internal sense by way of analogy with the external, and means by it a special faculty of perceiving the changes that go on in ‘empirical consciousness’ where we have an *ego* of apprehension, which is the *object* of this inner perception and contains a manifoldness of determinations which make possible (the content of) an inner experience. It is also to be sharply distinguished from the apperception, either of an empirical or transcendental nature. The latter is the pure understanding which makes the very concept of succession (time) possible, or produces it ‘by affecting the internal sense.’³ The analogy is carried so far as to make the mind *passive* in the internal sense as well as in the external. On both sides it is the victim of something that preys upon it, while it is the mere gazer upon what may arise. Hence, one reason why time, as a form of sensibility, is put in the *Æsthetic*.

¹ Cf., *Werke*, VII., 465, sec. 13; also *Reflex.*, I, No. 70.

² Cf., Greene’s *Phil. Works*, II., pp. 65–71, 252–257; cf., Vaihinger, *Commentar*, II., 480.

³ Cf., *Crit.*, I., 434–437, 450–453, a passage aiming to make the distinction clear between ‘the internal sense’ of the *Æsthetic* and the logical apperception of the *Analytic*; cf., *Werke*, IV., 361; V., 62; VII., 444 f. note, 452 f., 465, 473 f.; *Reflex.*, 87 ff.

Kant also represents himself as instituting this distinction between internal sense and apperception. "The founders of the systems of psychology have preferred to represent the internal sense as identical with the faculty of apperception, while we have carefully distinguished the two."¹ The probable fact is that this doctrine of internal sense, with its very close accompaniment, was taken from the psychologist Tetens, whose book² was very pleasing to Kant and was often seen lying open on the latter's table.³ The consequence or accompaniment of this theory of the internal sense is, in Kant's own words,⁴ that the internal 'sense represents to consciousness ourselves not as we are by ourselves, but as we appear to ourselves, because we perceive ourselves only as we are *affected* internally.' How closely allied Kant's view is to that of Tetens is seen in the passage quoted.⁵ Tetens means to say that we never are conscious of ourselves in a state of thinking or feeling, but what we *do* catch is something that lingers in memory which represents the former given experience. We are dealing with 'Nachempfindung.'⁶ An excellent theory from which the ideality of time might spring! We never get a consciousness with any immediacy, but we always find it in a change, passing various states in view, which, when settled in the form of a representation (memory image), become the empirical *ego*. As we know things as we are af-

¹ *Crit.*, I., 450.

² *Phil. Versuche ueber die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*, 2 Bände, Leipzig, 1777.

³ *Cf.*, Erdmann, *Geschichte der Phil.*, II., p. 356.

⁴ *Crit.*, I., 450.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, vol. I., p. 50: "Wir haben Empfindungsvorstellungen von den einzelnen Thätigkeiten unsers Denkens, in eben dem Verstande, wie wir solche von den körperlichen Gegenständen haben, die auf unsere äussere Sinnglieder wirken. Hier befindet sich das selbstthätige Princip des Denkens, von dem die Seele modificiert wird, *in der Seele selbst*, bey den äussern Empfindungen kommt die Modificatione von einer äussern Ursache. In beiden Fällen aber wird die neue Veränderung aufgenommen, gefühlet und empfunden; in beiden besteht sie, und dauert einen Augenblick in uns fort, und muss wenigstens alsdenn fort dauern, wenn sie bemerkbar seyn soll. Diese macht eine Nachempfindung, oder die erste Empfindungsvorstellung aus. In diesem Stande kannsie gewahrge-
nommen, mit Bewustseyn empfunden, mit andern verglichen und von andern unterschieden werden." *Cf.*, *Vorrede*, p. xvii, and Sommer, *op. cit.*, p. 283 f.

⁶ Compare Kant's and more modern objections against Introspection as a psychological method.

fectured by a possible transcendental *x*, so we know ourselves only as we find an affection 'im Gemüthe gegeben.' Our self-consciousness rests entirely on this affection. It and the mental forms lie between what is known internally and 'das Was' which corresponds in the temporal connection of a causal sequence. It would, without doubt, be a true substitute and adequately express Kant's own psychological meaning, if, wherever he says we know ourselves only as we appear to ourselves (and this is the keynote to the whole Critical philosophy), we should read, we know ourselves only as we remember ourselves to have been affected—a position even worse than that famous one of Hume's, that in looking inward he always found himself with some perception or feeling. Against all that view, however, it must be maintained that, unless consciousness and its content come with an immediacy, there is no possibility whatever of a 'Nachempfindung' rising up in memory claiming a reference to a recent past which was once a state of that same consciousness to which the memory is a part.¹

This strange psychological doctrine and its consideration really belong to the empirical chapter; but from its intimate association with and influence upon Kant's conception of the *ego*, it was left over to this point. Kant accepts the thesis from Tetens and moulds it into the internal sense which gives us only a subjective 'Blendwerk'—including sensations and feelings. These we have already seen Kant to maintain as subjective, non-cognitive, hence expelled from the special province of Criticism. It is concerned with 'die Erkenntnisvermögen.' But there can be no 'objective' character to the knowledge of a self; and the whole critical analysis, as is often justly claimed, becomes nothing more than an attempt to reduce the knowledge of sense-things to a universal formula. Whatever cannot be fitted to this, is exiled, 'removed' from knowledge. This empirical notion of the inner sense is undoubtedly the source of that *a priori* principle called the 'Anticipation of Perception.'

¹This, however, permits full credence to the results of recent investigations that a measureable time is involved in getting sensations above the threshold of consciousness, and that the temporal factor conditions the variations possible between mere precept-having and clear apprehension.

That consciousness has degrees, is a cardinal Kantian doctrine which is often called upon in a refutation of systems which teach the reality of the conscious *ego*. But the internal sense is important in Criticism, since it contains all representations. Even external phenomena in the last analysis fade away into a temporal series,¹ and all experience must be qualified by 'my.' Thus time, a universal form of cognition, must go into Criticism, as well as the 'my' to which every representation must be referable. In this manner the internal sense contributes two of the most important objects upon which the Critical method settles itself. From its analysis of both spring that scepticism which is its outcome.

The internal sense, the subjective, illusory knowledge of empirical phenomena, and time, the one pervading form of all experience, have their highest development in the doctrines of the *ego*. This likewise is the high-water mark reached by Criticism.² 'Pure consciousness' is Criticism's best word in its explanation of the world. But back of that, as the psychological scaffolding by which it may have mounted to the keystone of the Critical edifice, are the various conceptions of the *ego*. Some seem to have been the presuppositions on which Criticism rests, while others appear to be the accomplishments of its profound task. Altogether they are yet the sources of those differentiations which make Criticism the idealism that it is.³ And in the second edition the distinction between a 'pure consciousness' and the indefinite 'internal sense' is more rigidly drawn, especially in the revised 'Deduction.'⁴

On the basis of the inner sense Kant, at first sight, makes a distinction between two *egos*, or affirms a 'doppeltes Ich,' the empirical *ego*, that which appears, and, that which has a noumenal correspondence to this experience. This has been the general acceptance.⁴ The 'Ich als intelligenz' and 'Ich als ge-

¹ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 88, 128, 156, 167 f.

² Cf., *Crit.*, II., 94 f.; I., 434 f.

³ A fact which should be given full weight in estimating the character and idealistic bearings of the changes made by Kant in 1787, especially the 'Refutation of Idealism;' Cf., Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 149 f.

⁴ Cf., Krohn, *op. cit.*, p. 35 f.; Vaihinger, *op. cit.*, II., 125 ff., 477 f.; Volkelt, *Kant's Erkenntnisstheorie*, pp. 118 ff.

dachtes object' would be the generous characterizations of the two species of the *ego*—alone enough to incur a psychological condemnation. But it appears, on the other hand, that Criticism regards at least *four* kinds of *ego*.¹ There is the *empirical ego* which is 'lediglich das Bewusstsein,' and must be carefully distinguished from the *ego* of experience or the phenomenal subject. It is that broad substrate, as it were, of the whole of experience—the 'Schauplatz' of all that occurs, whether mere phenomena, conditions of knowledge, or the possibly inherent noumena.² It is the one characteristic which must be possessed by any element, process or product of which psychology or philosophy takes account. Secondly, there is the *Ich als Erscheinung*. This is the psychological subject, the true object of inner experience, and 'nur Bezeichnung des Gegenstandes des inneren Sinnes.'³ This is often taken as *the* reality of the subject and thus becomes the source of confusion in empiricism and paralogistic dogmatism. Without criticism, we are wont to hypostasize this which is 'given us' from 'the inner sense,' but becomes an object of perception only under the aspect of change. That which is the *a priori* kernel of such an object, is the mental form of time. This is the *ego* known in experience, from which Kant most commonly distinguishes the transcendental *ego*.⁴ Psychologists usually called it 'empirical apperception,' from which he widely separates *the ego* which is most potent in Criticism. Thus far Kantian students are justified in interpreting Criticism as recognizing only two subjects or a 'doppeltes Ich.' The third *ego* which figures in Criticism is the 'transcendental subject' or the *logical ego*. The appellations vary so that at one time it may mean the extra-mental reality, or at another the epistemological condition of any *ego*. It is the latter sense in which it is taken here. It is 'transcendental apperception,' the '*ego* of pure apperception,' 'the original synthetical unity of apperception,' 'the one consciousness of permanent identity,' 'the *objective* unity *versus* the subjective

¹Cf., Mellin, *op. cit.*, III., 367 f., art. *Ich*; B. Erdmann, *Kant's Kritikismus*, etc., pp. 52-58.

²*Crit.*, II., 103, 105.

³*Werke*, IV., 82.

⁴Cf., chiefly the 'Deduction' in both editions and the 'Paralogisms.'

unity of consciousness,' the 'I think,' 'the pure understanding itself.'¹ This is the logical *ego*, the one self-consciousness which is the very foundation of all our knowledge, in that its logical possibility rests on a necessary relation to this apperception.² It is the transcendental consciousness which consists merely in 'der Vorstellung des Ich.' It is neither an intuition, (for all intuition belongs to 'sensuous' condition, as shown in the *Æs*-thetic; there is no 'intellectual intuition'—a psychological defect which appears glaringly in the epistemological necessity that falls upon Kant, of representing at least three working *egos*), nor a concept (*Begriff*), but the bare form of consciousness, the supreme category which is no longer a true transcendental category and does not appear in 'the apostolic band' of the Deduction—since it must accompany *each* one of them, and thus sublimates all representations into knowledge. It is the proposition, *I think*, and must accompany every possible judgment of the understanding as the only vehicle that passes on the highway to knowledge.³ Its representation cannot pass beyond that of the grammatical subject of all predicates (=x).⁴

From a comparison of the 'empirical and transcendental' *ego* of the Analytic with the 'phenomenal' *ego* and the *ego* 'an sich' of the *Æsthetic*, there comes an intimation of a fourth

¹*Crit.*, II., 94, 108; I., 434, 435, 440.

²*Crit.*, II., 103 note.

³*Crit.*, II., 302 f, 310, 315, 331.

⁴Kant's meaning would have remained much clearer if he had not made such wayside expressions as these: "Wäre die Vorstellung der Apperception, das Ich ein Begriff, so würde es auch als Prädicat . . . gebraucht werden können." Rational psychology would then be justified in its syllogisms. The empirical *ego* would be one and the same with the logical *ego*. But, 'es ist nichts mehr als Gefühl eines Daseins'—only a representation to which all thinking has a 'relatione accidentis' (IV., 82 note). "Das Erste, was ganz gewiss ist, ist das: dass ich bin, ich fühle mich selbst, ich weiss gewiss, dass ich bin." "Ich bin, das fühle ich, und schaue mich unmittelbar an." (The posthumous *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik*, 1821, quoted from Krohn, *op. cit.*, p. 34.) The expression 'Gefühl eines Daseins' undoubtedly means something which is made no-wise intelligible by any explanation found in the *Critique*. Erdmann conjectures that it intimates a view that this apperception is no longer the pure and highest category; for, then it becomes absurd. (*Kriticismus &c.*, p. 96). The expression, however, in so far as it attempts to describe this pure apperception, is a flagrant contradiction of the whole attempt of Criticism to expunge from its data all that has subjective reference. Cf. above, discussion on Kant's negative conception of psychology, pp. 21 ff., 49 ff.

ego. Mere consciousness is not the condition of experience objective and universal. For this the express synthetic unity of the logical *ego* is necessary. But the logical *ego* of the Analytic is not the empirical or phenomenal *ego* of the Æsthetic. This is a manufactured article bearing the impress of the pure understanding under the form of time. It is a moment in this unsubstantial pageantry which all experience is. But Criticism in these earlier stages implies a somewhat of reality which is not included in the logical and the phenomenal *ego*. The latter is opposed to the *ego* in itself. What we know of ourselves is a representation of some object which 'corresponds' to our internal perception. The *ego* 'an sich' appears in a negative manner in the refutation of rational psychology. This science supposed itself to know the soul as it *is*. Experience, however, gives the soul as it *appears*, and the refutation reveals that the science was dealing with a logical subject—the transcendental *ego* as the *condition* of all knowledge. Thus the noumenal *ego* is negatively recognized in the *Critique*. We can make no metaphysical determination of this object of the inner sense.¹ In the *Practical Reason*, however, this 'Ich an sich' is the first attainment by way of the moral law. That is, the imperative demands freedom; but freedom becomes an absurdity without the postulate of the metaphysical correspondence of the object of the inner sense. Omitting mere consciousness, Kant has, then, *three working egos*. The one, the self we all know, but always undergoing mere kaleidoscopic changes, varying with those infinite permutations that are possible from the three primal elements of knowing, feeling and desiring. The second is the self that is substantial, simple, an identical unity and the correlate of existence.² The third is the speculatively negated

¹ *Crit.*, I., 494.

² *Crit.*, II., 303 f., 308 f., 313, 347. Here appears one of the distinctions between the logical or 'transcendental' (conditioning, determining) *ego*, and the *ego* an sich, or noumenal. To the latter *none* of the categories are applicable. These modes of the understanding's functioning are limited only to sensible objects—and as Kant develops his doctrine of substance, they are applicable only to the presentations of sense. Cf., *Crit.*, I., 482 f. This is the great teaching of Criticism, notwithstanding the doubtful interpretation that Criticism presupposes a multiplicity of noumena. Cf., *c. g.*, Krohn, *op. cit.*, p. 53. But to this logical *ego* there is applicable at least *two* particular categories, *viz.*: reality,

'transcendental object of the internal sense,' which has its ontological reality established in the *a priori* determinations of a will that is law-giving. The first is the subject matter of anthropological psychology. The last is relegated to practical philosophy. While metaphysic proper considers only the second or logical *ego*—the central point in the subjective conditions of knowledge. This logical *ego* must do the whole business of Criticism. It is the monster engine that drives the machinery turning out experience. It is not only the highest category which contains all the categories of understanding, recognizing them through itself¹ and thus supporting the grounds of truth and certainty;² but even space and time, the forms of intuition, are based with all their 'necessity' in the inmost nature of this ideating subject.³ *On his supposition of the psychological presence of this logical ego, Kant refutes sensualistic scepticism. When he wishes to check the rationalists, he rushes back to the Deduction for the logical ego—a condition of knowledge which can never come within knowledge.*⁴ It is the constructive climax of his theory of knowledge. What precedes it can only be understood in the light of this 'unity of apperception.' When once attained, he uses it as the weapon of defence keeping back all psychological speculations from the limits of experience. In the first instance it is opposed to the empirical apperception. In the second, or dialectical instance, it is op-

a species of 'quality,' which conditions its simplicity; for it is 'single in all respects.' *Crit.*, II., 330. It also claims to be 'applicable to all thinking beings' and expresses itself as 'I am.' This, however, implicates the category of existence—'Wirklichkeit'—for it is the correlate of all existence, even of the categories themselves. *Crit.*, II., 308, 347; I., 454 note. And yet, this 'highest' of the categories must have even its theoretic and abstract validity established in such a contradictory resort to those very forms of mental life whose activity it supports. Kant's criticism against rational psychology, that it becomes absurd in trying to take a 'condition' of knowledge for knowledge itself, might, it seems, be turned on Kant himself, since this plays with him the trick in the same way, as his 'Refutation of Idealism' juggles with the imposition of problematic idealism. Cf., Erdmann, *Kriticismus*, &c., p. 54 f.

¹ *Crit.*, II., 347.

² *Ibid.*, 109, f.

³ *Ibid.*, 95, 97.

⁴ Cf., *Crit.*, II., 301, 302 f., 305, 310, 315, 318, 331, 334; I., 492, 502 f.

posed to the 'Ding an sich' which corresponds to the object given in the internal sense.¹

The mere exposition and an apprehension of Kant's doctrines of the internal sense and its objects are almost sufficient to understand the psychological errors which underlie doctrines so vital to speculative Criticism and which were doubtless suggestive when transcendentalism began its constructive undertaking with the practical reason. Psychology recognizes no such intermediary form of internal perception as the 'inner sense' seems to demand. Whatever may be the metaphysics of consciousness, psychology must regard the having of states, or the possession of ideas which succeed each other and become related, as the general equivalent of consciousness. It is not susceptible of a definition. And when Kant defines consciousness as 'the idea that we have an idea,'² he has wandered far away from the right given him by his own frequent æsthetical and sensational observations that consciousness is to be known only in its possession. The attempt to pattern consciousness, even self-consciousness, after the model of the physiological conditions of certain so-called external forms of that consciousness, is to supplant a whole by a part, and mistake the essential element which makes external senses what they are. Psychological inquiry must regard individual things or objects as no more than factors or events belonging to the constant activities of a consciousness.³ To designate a certain class of these states as coming by way of an

¹ There are times, however, when this logical *ego* is represented as the real subject of inherence, and is taken as the name for the noumenal soul, that transcendental object of the internal sense. (*Crit.*, II., 313, 305.) It would doubtless afford an interesting parallelism to trace the corresponding expressions in the progress of the *Critique*, in reference to 'things' and *egos*. With reference to the source of 'that which is given,' the phrases vary as 'Ding an sich,' 'transcendental object,' and 'Dinge überhaupt,' in the three sections of the *Critique*, respectively. As to the *egos* we find 'Ich an sich,' 'das logische *Ego*,' and 'transcendental Ich.' This, however, would lead into a consideration of Kant's doctrine of noumena and thus carry us beyond the limits of our study. There would be no special gain as to interpretation, for beyond this the correspondence is fanciful, unless one concludes that Kant theoretically posits noumena in their various phases. Cf., Drobisch, *Kant's Dinge an sich*, &c., pp. 28, 38, who denies, and Krohn, *op. cit.*, p. 353, who affirms such an interpretation.

² *Werke*, VIII., p. 33.

³ Cf., Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, p. 599, sec. 12.

internal sense which intimates itself as being some cerebral or psychical precondition of certain subjective or reference-to-self-alone states of consciousness, is bad psychology and worse metaphysic. Whatever may be the manifold mysteries connected with the rise of consciousness and its succession of states, psychology takes it as the given datum; and, relying solely upon the method of introspection, proceeds to sort things and minds according to the grouping which comes through the dirempting development of that consciousness. In some such manner it must be indicated that the internal sense is a psychological fiction which had its pernicious effects upon Criticism. Philosophy, too, instead of starting with the individualities thrown up by that consciousness as its own qualitative states, takes the datum of the unity of consciousness—a self-reference from state to state. So far forth the Transcendental *Æsthetic* becomes philosophical in an unpsychological manner. That consciousness *may* be called the internal sense should never be so misunderstood as to imply that in its self-perception it 'must experience *quasi*-sensations.'¹

The consequence of this sublimation of a 'sixth sense' is the degradation of consciousness, and especially in its developed forms. This was the accompaniment of Kant's disregard for psychology, and out of it came that metaphysical gradation of *egos* for which psychology can never give warrant. It is true, psychology does recognize a variety of selves.² There is 'the material self,' 'the social self,' 'the spiritual and pure *ego*.' But these have been rightly called the 'constituents of the self.' The self which psychology seeks and attempts to account for is the spiritual self—'the self of selves.' It is on the search for that central principle, or datum, around which all else clings, to which all else becomes referable. It is that unity of consciousness in the circle of which all other forms of self come to have meaning. This is the psychological starting point which it is the business of a metaphysic of mind to accept and properly account for in its way.

This duty of psychology as a science appears in its definition as having to do with the states of consciousness, as such, or

¹ Cf., Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 85 f.

² Cf., James, *op. cit.*, pp. 291 ff.

phenomenally considered. It starts with these and gets to the individual things and selves that every-day practical life regards as individual and classifiable, not because of their inherent likenesses or unlikenesses; but, because the phenomena are 'plainly classifiable.' We all compare and group our psychical states without disputing the right. We do it in immediacy, as it were. But the classification of these states, as undertaken by psychology, can proceed on no 'other foundation than the simple one of how I, the conscious subject, am affected.'¹ Only groups acquired from that principle consider 'the phenomena as to what they really *are*.'

Now Kant admits this principle in one sense, and finds in the consciousness of one's self the basis of all phenomena. Even the characteristic of the 'immediate awareness' of the states of consciousness, is the key to his whole criticism of the fourth paralogism. The determinations of our own apperception, or, what is found in our perception can be perceived immediately.² But this is the trick transcendental idealism plays against problematical idealism. It is the humor of the moment and not the cardinal psychology of Criticism. Against it rises up the curious doctrine of the internal sense which was so influential as to strike the one key note which perdures in the strain, 'I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear to myself, nor as I am by myself.'³ This was the extreme to which Kant went in his opposition to 'intellectual intuition' which posited a knowledge of ourselves as we really are. We do not propose to replace Kant's 'internal sense' with this 'intellectual intuition.' He is right as to the latter. We have no intuition of a punctual simplicity which is to be called an *ego*. But between these two extremes lies a mean which more nearly expresses the psychological truth in regard to the *ego*. We do have an awareness of a self which finds itself to be the subject of all its states. This is the unique characteristic of the subject-matter of the science of psychology. Only as there is a reference to a one consciousness is their possible any psychical series whatsoever. Even in the weird phe-

¹Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, 601 f.

²*Crit.*, II., 318 ff.

³*Ibid.*, I., 453, 'Deduction,' 2nd. ed., sec. 25.

nomena of double personality, which bring many lacunæ into the life history of the individual, the doubleness has a significance only as there is attained a unity of consciousness in either series of states, as A, A₁, A₂, A₃, or B, B₁, B₂, B₃. Either series does not pass over into the other, does not destroy the integrity of the unity which is characteristic of each series, and even makes it such a series.

With the foregoing remarks there has been in mind the view which modern psychology has arrived at respecting the nature of self-consciousness and the evolution of the *ego* in the life of the individual. The *ego* is not a 'primitive notion' such as the old rational psychologists would have it. It is not a static unity of metaphysical intuition. On the contrary, the *ego* is a product. Selfhood is an acquisition. Its presentation is not a datum of sense, and the objections of metaphysicians that the logical simplicity of the *ego* defies any analysis, is an instance of a psychological fallacy.¹ This conception of a self which is so necessary a condition of all representations and is underivable from other elements, may be an attainment of a long psychological unfolding. The most abstract notion is often the last result of a complex development. "The idea of the *ego*," says M. Taine,² "is a product; many variously elaborated materials concur in its formation." Not only are abbreviated memories, a chain of recollections, and the ideas of a cause, a power, and 'a stable within,' intellectual factors entering into this product;³ but the growth of the emotional, and active, struggling sides of mind life enter into and promote the acquisition of the conception of self. All of the states of consciousness in their progressive development contribute to that ideal product of reflection, the central point around which the whole of the intellectual life swings. Not only is the basis of its unity laid in the facts of memory, but the function of apperception, as provoked by the varieties of feelings, brings it into an empirical prominence which finds its culmination in the feeling of self-control over

¹ Cf., Ward, *loc. cit.*, p. 83, note 4.

² *On Intelligence*, II., p. 110.

³ These are all that M. Taine recognizes; James, *loc. cit.*, Sully, *Human Mind*, I., 475 ff., Ward, *loc. cit.*, Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 136 f., call attention to the value of other factors that contribute to the growth of the conception of self.

the muscular adjustments and chiefly in conduct as imputable to an 'inner self.'¹

Kant recognizes the complexity which enters into the *ego* of experience. With him, too, it is a slow product. Maturity is necessary before 'das Ich' is properly recognized by the faculty 'Verstand.'² But, according to the psychological presuppositions of Kant's criticism, 'Ich' is not merely an experiential product as psychologists now recognize it to be; but, rather, a *quasi*-sensational 'Vorstellung' that is constantly changing. For it comprehends the relations of the determinations of the inner sense only as they occur in time. As implied in the *Analytic*, apperception is the ingredient not only of a cognition of objects, but also of selves.³ Had he not succeeded this claim by his commentary on the apperceptive *ego* in the refutation of rational psychology, much would be in his favor. Apperception is the act of mind common to its treatment of all psychical data. It is the relating activity of attention, a synthesis which constructs the material into higher relations and is the last stage in the development of that unique life whose mysterious beginnings lie in the physiological unconscious.⁴ But Kant's view is guilty merely of a limitation. He represents the one activity as doing it all; whereas we saw above that all the primal psychic elements enter, even much more than the mere data out of which the *ego* arises. *E. g.*, it was seen in the previous chapter how the phenomena of memory were slighted (of course, imagination is the comprehensive term which stood for all that representation which is necessary to knowledge). But in the very fact and nature of memory, as referring over lapses of times to a past which *is my* past, is given the primal basis out of which the intellectual character of a unitary consciousness can arise. He also leaves out the specially characteristic elements, other than bare cognitive consciousness, which make empirically for the *ego* of experience. We are the phe-

¹ Cf., also Baldwin, *Senses and Intellect*, pp. 66 f., 143 f.

² *Werke*, VII., 438, *Anthropologie*, sec. 1.

³ Cf., 'Deduction,' 2d ed., I., p. 453, note 3, where 'every act of attention gives us an instance' of our internal perceptions as we are determined by the spontaneity of the understanding.

⁴ Cf., Baldwin, *op. cit.*, p. 63 ff.

nomenal, kaleidoscopic *ego* that we are, not because time is a form of the inner sense into which the relating activity of attention, as it is *a prioristically* determined by the possible categorical forms, constructs the feelings and sensations that come out of nothing, into the object; but, in that, consciousness emerges *pari passu* with the integration of the three classifiable variations of its own states as knowing, feeling and willing. The psychological oracle reveals the impossibility of a purely cognitive consciousness, and philosophy does well with the reality it seeks, if it abides this finite wisdom, remaining partial to none of the so-called superior faculties of man.

But the fault of limitation, which attends a possible interpretation of Kant's views of the nature and development of self, becomes an error as we turn to what seems to be Criticism's last word on the nature of the *ego* which is to have in it the self-sufficiency of knowledge. The former might have been permissible in view of the state of psychology in his time, when it was considered as a department of natural history. Even the discovery of apperception as conditioning the knowledge of self as well as of things, is commendable in so far as the Critical method proceeds psychologically in order to refute sensationism.

Kant, however, aggravates our confusion as he gives his own commentary to the Analytic in the Dialectic, and in his criticism of rational psychology adds foot-notes, as it were, explanatory of his conception of the *ego*—a subject of thinking which signifies the pure apperception. These explanations take all the life out of us, if we ever had any. The transcendental *ego* is absolutely nothing. In the Analytic we thought we were getting to the very root of the matter only to find ourselves implicated in it all. The reality of a cognition of 'objective' things turns upon the unifying *actus* of a-to-itself-relating activity which wandered among the manifold that comes to us because of our psycho-physical organization, but coming out of nothing. Here in the Dialectic, however, where the *ego* is pruned and all hindering growths are removed that it may stand out in its own integrity against all the prevalent notions of the self, it becomes woefully reduced. *There* we learned

that the unity of a one consciousness was the determining element in the orderly array which experience is, and makes it so different from 'the whole crowd of phenomena that rush in upon us.' It is the intense activity of an agent,¹ which gives coloring to the whole of experience. But *here* it is nothing more than the 'vehicle' of what is thrown over the manifold. In the intellectualism of Criticism it withers into a logical *ego*. The pure apperception becomes a 'cheap and second' edition of the spontaneity of mind. The agent of the Analytic is the head of a constructive operation. The *ego* of the Dialectic is the pre-existent, unpredicable condition of that which the old psychologists supposed was in their possession. It is a logical presupposition which can never be turned to the content of a judgment. It is a static form, absolutely given.²

If the foregoing reduction of the Critical *egos* remains justifiable, there is obvious at least two errors in the notion of the logical subject which can never become a predicate. First, this *ego* is represented as given absolutely; *i. e.*, it is a formal condition attending all cognitive consciousness. Without it we can never judge; and in attempting to categorize its nature, we constantly turn in a vicious circle—it always remains a pre-posed 'representation.'³ Now, whatever may be the epistemological mysteries concealed in the rise of a cognitive consciousness, it is a psychological fact that the logical *ego* is a

¹"As regards the soul * * * the whole drift of Kant's advance upon Hume and sensational psychology is toward the demonstration that the subject of knowledge is an *agent*." G. S. Morris, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, second edition, p. 244.

²The difficulty of throwing a search light on Kant's benighted expressions concerning the various phases of the logical and psychological *egos*, is seen by comparing the Analytic and the Dialectic with the following foot note found in his *Anthropologie*, VII., p. 445. After distinguishing the respective subjects of the perceptive and apperceptive consciousness (and noting that the distinction is an apparent contradiction), he says: "Die Frage ob bei den verschiedenen inneren Veränderungen des Gemüths der Mensch, wenn er sich dieser Veränderungen bewusst ist, noch sagen können; er sei *ebenderselbe* (der Seele nach), ist eine ungereimte Frage; denn er kann sich dieser Veränderungen nur dadurch bewusst sein, dass er sich in den verschiedenen Zuständen als ein und dasselbe *Subject* vorstellt, und das Ich des Menschen ist zwar der Form (der Vorstellungsart) nach, aber nicht der Materie (dem Inhalte) nach *zweifach*."

³*Crit.*, II., 301.

product of that very experience which Kant claims it to condition. Whatever may be its ontological simplicity as a logical notion, it is a late development in the mental life and bears with it all that complexity which characterizes the products which come in with the unfolding of the intellectual processes. Only as the fundamental traits of mind, such as attention, discrimination and comparison, develop into the thought aspects, which are no special faculty or power, and result in such products as the concept or universal image, the judgment or the perceptual aspect of comparison which develops into one of the highest ideals of rational thinking, *viz.* : the principle of identity, which harks back and claims to underlie all conscious activity and thus is truly the universalized form of comparison—only in such an evolution, we affirm, can there arise that concept which is the corner-stone of all absolute idealism, the laying of which is so ceremoniously performed in the chief psychological sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Such an *ego*, however, only plays the lie with our metaphysical instincts. From it we can get a formal reality only. Kant was right in repudiating, from his foundations, the claims of the dogmatists. But he slurs over the principle of becoming and squashes the postulates which *do* integrate even into our so-called abstract conceptions. This is only another instance of how illusory is the propædæuticity of logic and the necessity which constrains philosophy to turn to psychology when it would fain understand even what *is*. As elsewhere, Kant is logical in the inconsistency of his presuppositions.

Furthermore, there is another deficiency in the logic, or psychology—call it what you please—of Kant's conception of judgment. An error here has been magnified into a grievous falsity in the psychological scepticism into which Criticism developed. There is a failure to distinguish properly two sorts of judgments, and he starts out with the old-time notion of the function of a judgment and the source of its materials. It is not the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, which is so fundamental to Criticism, that is here in question. Since all judging is a developed synthesis, a unification, psychology very properly considers this aspect of the thinking

process not, however, with reference to the validity of the comparison and integration, but with distinct reference to the individual, its growth and relation to his previous knowledge.¹ But back of these logical judgments lie the psychological judgments. The former are 'secondary and artificial.' They deal with concepts. Their comparisons are apparently not of things. Were this all that might be said of judgment, the supposition of an ever non-predicable subject would be the only possible view, and one would needs be shut into the Kantian conception of the *ego*. So long as such judgments are true to their function, we are left in abstractness, for no intuition is permitted among them. They are regardless of reality and deal only with ideal thought products. Kant's treatment of the judgment implies so much. But there are other judgments, 'primary and natural. These are they by which concepts are formed' and are known' as the psychological judgment.² On such previous acquisitions in the individual are founded the abstract, comparative judgments with which logic deals. The *quid juris* of the logical judgment has apparently been overlooked by Kant. It was taken as the ultimate expression of the nature of understanding, or the apperceptive process grown big under that grave name.

And yet, the entire right of comparing concepts as though they were things, is derivable from the psychological judgment, or that integration of perceptive images developed into a totality which becomes the representative of a group.³ Concepts are not ready-made stuffs which are woven into the fabric of experience. Nor does Kant mean as much, even though in the *Critique* he circles about in the astounding phrase of the transcendental *a*

¹Cf., Sully, *Human Mind*, I., 438 f., 452; Baldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-275, 292 f.

²Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 432.

³Kant has recognized two sorts of judgments which bear the real distinctions which are noted in the text. Cf. his very important distinction between 'Wahrnehmungsurtheil' and 'Erfahrungsurtheil'—the former arising first in the individual, and out of which come the latter objectively-referring judgments. Cf., *Werke*, IV., 46 f.; V., 296; VIII., 110 f.; Watson, *op. cit.*, 63 ff. Thus Kant might be said to acknowledge the psychological implications which attend all his treatment of judgments; but when he comes to the synthetic *a priori* judgment concerning the subject, he passes beyond those empirical implications and treats it with utmost abstractness, from which his scepticism might be said to take its rise.

priority of the categories.¹ Concepts are formed, even the *a priori*, out of the perceptual bits on which the unfolding thought process expends itself. Kant does not claim that the categories are 'innate,' but are 'erworbenen' in the process of experience. But the *Critique* seemingly overlooks the great fact of development and pronounces categorically upon the peculiar forms of thinking. Though there be a multitude of 'synthetic judgments *a priori*,' they all must come in with that struggling unfolding, which psychology is compelled to describe. That *a priori* concepts are not ready-made, but are mysterious psychological acquisitions, does not detract in the least from their critical purity.

These natural, or psychological, judgments are the point where 'sense' and 'understanding' really fuse. They are the go-between of ideation and intellection. It is true that ideation is only one species of cognitive activity of which intellection is the more comprehensive term. There is no proper image or idea without its net of relations. But the adjustment of these relations to sense data is made by the natural judgments. Concepts, anyway, are nothing except as they have come up out of representative materials.

Here it is where Kant seems to depart from the psychological nature of judgment. Our concepts are conditioned upon percepts. Since judgments are said to deal with concepts only, it is easily seen what relation perception and conception hold. Subject and predicate do not stand in quite the same logical relation as Kant's logic would have them. "Our perception of what (an object) is," says Mr. Hodgson, "and what its relations are, as a precept, determines our choice of the predicates; is their *conditio existendi* as predicates; while conversely their application as predicates is the *conditio cognoscendi* in our logical or reasoning cognition of (the object)."² This is particularly true of objects and thoroughly in harmony with the Kantian view of our knowledge of things. "Thoughts without intuitions are empty." But it must be maintained that this log-

¹Cf., his popular exposition of how 'die reinen Verstandesbegriffe in den Kopf kommen.' *Vorles. üb. Psych.*, pp. 18 f., 24 f.

²*Op. cit.*, 386.

ical and psychological reciprocity is just as true of the subject which is perceived in every psychical state. There can be no percept without a referableness to a 'my,' to the perceiving 'thought,' or whatever name any species of psychology may offer as a substitute for the supporter of psychoses. That is the unique character of consciousness. Out of the multitude of these subject-wise perceptions, concerning which Kant may be allowed his view, that this is no 'intellectual intuition' revealing an atomic subject—there arises the notion of a self. Psychology knows no 'pure-thought' *ego*. The conceptual *ego* which we all recognize has its varied sources laid in the bits of a transitory experience. Unless there is some discrimination of a subject in every conscious, presentative state, the grammatical *ego* could never have come. This interrelation between the perception and the conception of the subject is also expressed by Hodgson, whose statement is especially apt against Kant, since the latter refers rational psychology to that very species of judgment which the former has analyzed. Every categorical proposition begins with a percept changed into a concept, and ends with a concept which can be changed into a percept again. The first of these is the subject and the last the predicate of a proposition.¹

Thus the 'logical *ego*' of Criticism is a highly complex

¹*Op. cit.*, I., 332. Kant's attempt to draw a hard and fixed line between 'intuition' and 'concept' incurs psychological disapproval. The very function of the psychological judgment shows, that, with reference to the activities of the individual mind, they almost indiscernibly shade into each other. In the essay, *Ueber Phil. überhaupt*, he says, "Anschauung und Begriff unterscheiden sich von einander specifisch; denn sie gehen ineinander nicht über, das Bewusstsein beider und der Merkmale derselben mag wachsen oder abnehmen, wie es will." (VI., 391, note). The fact is, the discovery of the categories after the guiding principle of the logical judgment was too good a thing, and Kant really overworks them. Yet, when he comes to the most difficult of his problems, *viz*: how the categories get applied, he tones down the rigid demarcation which the discovery sets up. These modifications come in those passages where the Deduction is ejected, passages other than that which occurs under that special title. Cf. the whole 'Doctrine of the Schematism' and the 'Analytic of Principles.' In a little essay of 1786, he begins, "Wir mögen unsere Begriffe noch so hoch anlegen und dabei noch so sehr von der Sinnlichkeit abstrahiren, so hängen ihnen doch noch immer bildliche Vorstellungen an, etc." IV., 539. Cf., *Logik*, VIII., 33 f.; *Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaph.*, etc., VIII., 584 f.

product, though no more than a rational figment which contains more or less of the content that may be given in perception. Its psychological history demands that it be a subject which *can* become a predicate. It is a concept made up of many perceptions, in whose *empirical* reality are found transcendental or ontological implications which it is the privilege of a philosophy of mind to explicate. The conceptual self, thus 'naturally' derived, is the *ego* of reflection, and becomes the logical subject which is given in every cognitive or propositional consciousness. It cannot, however, be admitted with Kant that it is the *a priori*, static subject. While it is the rational self in the fullest meaning, it becomes enlarged, as it were, in every additional state of knowing, feeling and willing. A metaphysic of mind is thus permitted to develop itself, only profiting by the warning which Criticism has given. It is not to hypostasize highly abstract terms, nor is it to find in any rational or logical development a sceptical negation of the metaphysical virtue given in every perceptual reality.

Our consideration of speculative Criticism, as it centralizes itself in rational psychology, has led us far from that apodictic science. This necessity has its valuable indication in showing that rational psychology is not so widely separated from empirical psychology as Kant would have us believe.¹ Philosophy aids us in coming to rational views—concepts, if one pleases; but concepts that are to have their vindication in the facts of experience. Rational psychology does not build itself on concepts alone, but is related to the empirical science as the very next link in the chain of causal and ultimate explanations of what is given as the phenomena of consciousness. The one begins where the other ends. Kant might be heard to say that an infinite logician could have a rational psychology. Out of his tutorial Criticism has come the modest opinion that only man, as he has a multiplex psychical experience, can come to a rational science of the perceptual self which is his constant attendant. Rational psychology no longer cares for the necessities of the logician, but endeavors to satisfy, in terms of reality, the belief of every common man that in his feeling and willing, as well

¹ Cf., Meyer, *op. cit.*, 293 ff.

as in every cognition, there is a being which shares in those phenomenal occurrences, and whom he calls himself.

The purposes of this study feel satisfied when the criticism of rational psychology has been reviewed in its relation to the Critical philosophy, the question of its historic right has been inquired into, and an indication of its vulnerable points has been given. The general significance of the whole can be quite adequately designated by noting its bearing on two of the problems which properly fall within the inquiries of theoretical psychology, *viz.*, a conception of the mind as a real being, and the vexed question which has provoked all sorts of ingenious attempts at solving the relation of mind and body. When defensible conclusions on these two points are in the hands of a philosophy of mind, it can very safely supplement its speculative knowledge of that being with an insight into ethical and æsthetical influences which help to determine its relations to other finite beings, and finally, reach the goal of all inquiry by constructing in philosophical fashion the relation of this finite reality to the being whose reality it implicates. They are problems which any school of philosophy must take up, and in their tendencies, they are the realism which posits the physical and ends with explanations turning on forces and laws, or the idealism which posits the reality of the ideating subject and finds in it a microtheos. This is the peculiarity of philosophical discipline, of whatever tendency, that the execution of its departments surge with a common, wave-like motion, and no conclusion is left to its own seclusion, but is caught up and carried away in the multitude of rational convictions crowning speculative inquiry. On one problem Kant is not altogether faultless. On the second problem it may appear that the last word of Criticism and its occasional outstretching intimations have been only a re-statement of the real question.

The relation between psychology and philosophy has been constantly re-appearing, either as a caution under some historic instance, or at particular points where the empirical notion may be said to completely mould the philosophical conviction. The most obvious point of contact in these scientific and rational endeavors is at the theory of knowledge. The empiric investigation re-

sults in a description of the rise of knowledge and hands over to epistemology the problem whose presence in the philosophical consciousness is the *raison d'être* of that department of philosophical inquiry which had its beginning in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Noëtics is called upon to validate, in the terms of rational analysis, that product whose constituents are exhibited in the science of mind. To remain rational it cannot present some factor or relation as true which is psychologically false. They are, as it were, two forces emerging into their new resultant. It is one of the splendid acquisitions of recent philosophy that it is recognizing the partnership of observation and experiment on the one hand, and reflective analysis on the other, whose great struggle is to increase the capital stock of human reason in its unending competition against the 'riddles of life' that hedge our ways.

It is not only to this philosophical equipment that psychology specially relates itself. Certain phenomena which the science considers under the one leadership of the causal sequence have the universal significance, which entitles them to the analysis of philosophy, as it ventures to sweep over the world for its factual material. Psychology can be a 'natural science' only to feel the burden of problems insoluble so long as it struggles to keep back in the company of physicists and physiologists. Up to that point where such a psychologist believes in the reality of the unique elements upon which he must make heavy drafts for explanations, and where he refuses to give answer to interrogated relationship, the remaining whole of psychological considerations become philosophical. The reality of mind and its phenomena are *posited* by the scientist. They are his working hypotheses, employing which he feels content in articulating groups of facts to their phenomenal antecedents. The conclusions to which he comes, as well as his prepositings, are also material for the analysis of him who feels oppressed by the mysteries of real being.

Thus psychology becomes one of the special departments of philosophy, as well as being the proper propædæutic in all fields of ultimate inquiry. It comprehends a unique class of facts which are objective to science and belong to the real, which

forms the content of metaphysic. The world, or nature, and minds or selves, comprehend all that experience yields to which ontological principles must be fitted for rational explanation, yet not in such a manner as to distort the 'facts' as they are given. Those principles, however, as taught us by the history of metaphysic, are none other than mental forms which are regulative of all that we know as real. It is from this upper story of the psychology of intellect that metaphysic derives its material. Thus the philosophy of mind comprehends a class of phenomena whose ultimate problems have been suggested by psychology, and the epistemological terms into which philosophy attempts to convert the knowledge of the object of that science are discoverable in that self-same science of mind. Psychology, in its rational stages, is not entirely progressive, but constantly returns to the experience whence all mysteries take their rise. It must also submit itself to the metaphysical judges of the categories, whose existence it first reveals, but whose validity leads beyond its proper domain. The alpha and omega of such psychology are the conception of the soul's substantiality and the physical basis of mental activity. Between the discovery of some notion of the soul's unitary being and the philosophical reduction of 'mind and body,' are articulated the peculiar ascertainments of this science.

Kant's criticism of the old-time theory of the substantiality of the soul apparently rests upon his ideality of time, the peculiar internal sense, and the limitations of the judgment. We tried to show the defective source whence Kant drew his criticism, and to free psychology from the inadequate rebuke he attempted to give. But it really implies a negation of the adequacy of self-consciousness to get at the real being whose substance is called mind. The illusoriness of Kantian self-consciousness is not due to the non-psychological interest on the part of Criticism; but, rather, is to be accounted for in its too naïve conception of substance, notwithstanding its being made a category, and to the insufficient theory of knowledge which affirmed a cognition of 'things' only.

According to Criticism, thinking can have 'necessity' only as representations are given in *both* space and time. The

soul has no spatial relations—position being the only extensive adjective attributable to it. Hence, whatever may be given in time cannot be ‘known.’¹ We can know the permanent—the substantial core which corresponds to our ‘concept’—only as we have ‘external intuitions.’ “In order to give something permanent in intuition, we require an intuition in space, because space alone can determine anything as permanent, while time, and therefore everything that exists in the internal sense, is in a constant flux.”² Criticism would pattern the knowledge of self after the model given in the knowledge of things, whereas the truth may appear that the knowledge of things is patterned after that of selves. ‘Substance’ was an *a priori* figment, since in his application of it to experience, there goes with it an implication of the common sense view that things are substances—masses which cannot be known since the ‘qualities’ are in the way of immediate intuition.³ It was the metaphysic of a molecular age when things were given supreme reality. The heritage of Criticism as it has been nurtured in this psychological age is, that, substance is what Criticism would have it—a concept which we externalize, as it were, in our natural but metaphysical perception of things—a mode of our thinking which attempts to reduce the infinitely various behavior of things to some limitation which becomes a law regulating the ‘nature’ of that which behaves.

Kant, however, believed in a soul—a being which is the subject of our inner experience, but on moral grounds. It was only an implication of the categorical imperative that gives us

¹On this very ground it might be shown that Criticism labored in vain—for the modicum of knowledge it left to reason rests on an inconsistency. Space is not time—but there are instances where Kant is on the verge of reducing every form of representation to the Heraclitic principle of ceaseless change and becoming. *Critique*, II., 88: “All our knowledge must finally be subject to the formal condition of that internal sense, namely, time.” Cf., the ‘Schematism’ and its one form of time, pp. 126 ff; ‘the third necessity’ which makes possible all synthetical judgments,’ p. 137; the function given to time in the first and second ‘Analogies of Experience,’ pp. 160 f., 167 f.

²*Critique*, I., 482 f.

³The doctrine of noumena is not quite so thoroughly idealistic if one considers in connection with it the ‘category’ of ‘permanence’ and the treatment Criticism gave it.

a critical right to a mere faith in our own existence. This shifting of the philosophical ground on which the existence of a one real being could rest, was intended by Kant as a real service to cultured reason as it attempts to systematize its body of truths. Against this necessity as Criticism exhibits it, we must cry out with all *its* vehemence against 'psychological idealism,' and slightly changing the famous sentence which was thrust at Jacobi and threw Fichte into indignant consternation, let it read: It remains a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of *that thing within* us on faith only, unable to meet with any satisfactory proof an opponent who is pleased to doubt it.¹ In order to prove the existence of things, Kant searches the principles of conscious thinking and the nature of representations. But the existence of a self finds a so-called proof (= the warrant for a transcendental postulate), in a non-empirical law—the chief point in the intelligible, but unknowable world. In all this Kant cannot be vindicated except as we take him in reference to the cosmological metaphysics which preceded 'the age of criticism.' Unless philosophy can find in some other fact, given in the totality of rational experience, a ground of proof for the unitary being of what is the metaphysical confidence of every man, then, indeed, sceptical idealism does remain a scandal.

Now it is the peculiarity of the metaphysic of psychology that the ground of belief in the reality of mind cannot be sought elsewhere than in consciousness. The proof for the existence of the objects of other knowledge may be a long chain of circumstantial evidences. Realism may even appeal to the existence of objects as the ground of proof that our ideas of them are real. But the philosophy of mind can proceed by no other means than the datum of self-consciousness. Psychology, as a science, ventures consciousness as the one mark of its data. When it comes to affirm the reality of the soul, no round-about way of evidencing its postulate will suffice. Psychology is so metaphysical a science that it must find implicate in a one consciousness the proof (?) of the being whose consciousness it is. With one grasp, as it were, it endeavors to secure the substan-

¹ Critique, I., 386 note.

tial simplicity of the *ego* for the acquisition of which Kant represents two paralogsisms, or one-half of rational psychology, as necessary.

In modern times, it is Hermann Lotze in particular, who has found in the unity of consciousness the fact from which is argued the unitary existence of the being called mind.¹ According to Lotze, it is 'the unity of consciousness' which compels any explanation of the mental life to find some immaterial form of being as the subject of the phenomena. Without this decisive fact of experience the total of our internal states could not even become an object of self-observation.² Now, no tenet of psychology has been more abused than the conception of self-consciousness. It was a violent and unwarrantable use of this against which Kant contended. But when it is said that Lotze has 'revived' the old argument of the existence of the soul from the data of self-consciousness,³ there is a culpable failure to appreciate Kant's objection to the employment of self-consciousness, and to realize the shifting of the ground when

¹The views of Lotze were submitted to several restatements, each modified to harmonize with the immediate discussion before him. In his popular exposition of the *Microcosmus*, (I., pp. 143-167 and other corresponding sections) it appears essential in his description of the little being which is a little world in itself; in the *Metaphysic*, (II., 163-198) the considerations of theoretical psychology are presented in their metaphysical connections; *cf.*, his *Medicinische Psychologie*, pp. 9 ff., 135-151; *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 91 f., 119 f.; *Outlines of the Phil. of Rel.*, pp. 58-66, etc. Though starting from other presuppositions, Ulrici has come to the same conclusion as Lotze; *cf.*, *c. g.*, the following: "Die Einheit des Bewusstseyns ist nicht zu verwechseln mit dem Bewusstseyns der Einheit unseres Wesens." "Die Einheit des Bewusstseyns, d. h. die Thatsache, dass wir nur *Ein* Bewusstseyn und nicht mehrere neben oder nach einander haben, lässt sich schlechterdings *nicht* leugnen und bestreiten." Out of this identity which we all recognize, 'sobald wir darauf reflectiren,' "folgt allerdings, dass auch das Wesen, welches seiner selbst und des Bewusstseyns sich bewusst ist, ein einiges, mit sich identisches seyn muss." *Leib und Seele*, 1866, pp. 314 f.

²*Microcosmus*, I., 152. Kant has an important statement of nearly the same import: "Only because I am able to connect the manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations." *Crit.*, I., 435. Yet *wie himmelweit* are the 'unities' in these instances it is hardly necessary to show. That they differ completely is merely to express the difference between modern metaphysics of mind and the psychology of Criticism.

³Meyer, *op cit.*, 250 ff., 310; Krohn, *op. cit.*, 38.

Lotze makes an appeal to the apprehension of self for the proof of his belief in the existence of the mind. What Kant criticises is not what Lotze invokes. This sober worker in the field of philosophy was acute enough to heartily enter into Kantian criticism and to keep shy of reproducing the arguments of Knutzen, Reimaruss and Mendelssohn. Kant, so far as there is discernible any taint of a rational psychology to his critical scepticism, seems to believe, in common with his time, that the soul has being which afterwards comes to be observed or known. If only the mind could *be*, as the substance deeply hidden within the phenomenal appearance of consciousness — that was the one admitted ontological principle upon which Criticism sets an epistemological limit. We may *be* five hundred substances. Yet, while it is inconceivable how a unity of one experience can arise from the interaction of a plurality of elements,¹ we cannot even know of them so as to permit us to affirm the simple identity of our soul.

In Lotze's treatment, however, there disappears the presupposition of a psychical molecular unity, where the problem is, how such a pre-existent object can be known in the terms of self-consciousness. That he really abandons this old-time view is implied in his protest against a possible misconception of his position, saying: "I do not mean that our consciousness of the unity of our being is in itself, by what it directly reports, a guarantee of that unity."² "I repeat once more, we do not believe in the unity of the soul because it appears as unity."³ In these statements, in which he guards his own views, appears also a second point of difference between the Lotzean 'revival' of the Kantian off-cast of psychology, namely, the nature of self-consciousness as to the existence of the being which it purports to envisage. These changes entitle Lotze to reconsider anew the basis of that argument which Criticism showed to be faulty (but from entirely different psychological grounds). Kant had to struggle against the monster of an ontological psychology.

In the modern view of self-consciousness the aim is to har-

¹ Cf., the Second Paralogism.

² *Microcosmus*, I., 156.

³ *Metaphysic*, II., 176.

monize a mental experience with a psychological metaphysics, and the problem for argumentation becomes: Can we infer from the unity of our consciousness the unity of a real being conscious of itself? or, Given the unity of human consciousness, can we argue to the degree of metaphysical demonstration (not mathematical) the reality and unity of the soul? To the question of introspection, whether the beholder in each state of so-called self-consciousness really gazes upon that substantial unity which is the creator and supporter of all states of consciousness, a negative answer, undoubtedly, must be given. This, we take it, is the point of Kant's criticism, but not the nerve of Lotze's argument. Kant, however, is psychologically culpable in apparently passing over that indescribable feeling which expresses itself in the trite phrase, 'Ich bin hier und jetzt.' This is the point of departure in the modern conviction of the soul's being one. A necessary distinction must not be overlooked as is frequently done in what might be called realistic psychology (Herbart excepted).¹ This felt-cognition of selfness is mistaken for an atomic envisagement; whereas it, too, is a unique conscious state and must be treated as all other states in the stream of consciousness. Its uniqueness properly entitles it to the appellation of self-consciousness, and is the basis of the argument. Herein appears the distinction that must be made between consciousness and self-consciousness. States of consciousness are not *referred* to a unitary subject in every such state. The common assertion that in consciousness we have given the immediate reality of the subject knowing and the object known, passes beyond the psychological warrant of any psychosis. These states are never simple, but emerge into each other so that the current of mental life at any one point partakes of a kaleidoscopic complexity. This succession of complex fields are not referred to a perduring subject, but they *are* conscious states only in their virtue of being *referable* to a self. Even in the beginnings of mental life, where the most incautious would hesitate to affirm a consciousness of self, there is not

¹ Cf., Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 95, ff.: "Of the *ego* itself we are also directly conscious. The states we know as varying and transitory. The self we know as unchanged and permanent."

given, as a fact, any sensation or perception without a subject.¹ Any psychosis is inconceivable without there being a somewhat which has it. This, however, is far from affirming that in the infantile, or even adult state, there is also given that whose state it is. But in this consciousness there lies a possibility of an immediate awareness of its present reality which expresses itself as 'Ich bin hier und jetzt.' This acquisition of the mental life gathers up all that is implied in the subject-ward referableness of all the states which are attributable to the self. But the 'bin hier und jetzt' no more explains the 'Ich' than the subject apprehended in other states, and is *itself* only referable to a subject. This is all that can be meant by any self-consciousness. It does not intuit a unitary being. Even the most successful, determined effort to shut out all sensuous content of consciousness in order to open the way for the immediate intuition of a self as it is in itself, gets no farther in its possessions than a conscious state, however free of objective content, which in turn becomes referable to a subject whose state it is. This merely adds another instance vouching for the unity which consciousness has, and brings us around to the datum on which any argument for the soul's unity can base itself. The problem remains: What do we mean by 'Ich'? and what is there in the phenomenal expressions concerning itself which warrants metaphysic to affirm the substantial unity of that which becomes conscious of itself as the subject of all its states? This aspect of the question Kant's criticism does not affect, and herein is found Lotze's real advance and right in 'reviving' the old time argument of the unity of consciousness.²

In the foregoing statement of what appears to be the real nature of the problem and the material with which the metaphysician can deal, there comes to view the necessity of bringing in other clarified conceptions, whose considerations profoundly affect the conclusion of rational psychology. Any completely intrenched speculative decision as to the unitary ex-

¹Cf., Lotze, *Metaphysic*, II., p. 169, sec. 241.

²Cf., Prof. Ladd's reply to Mr. G. F. Stout's strictures on his argument 'from the unity of consciousness to the existence of a real unitary being as the subject of consciousness,' (as briefly presented in pt. III., ch. IV., of his *Phys. Psych.*), *Mind*, vol. 13, p. 627 ff. Mr. Stout's criticism, *Ibid.*, p. 466 f.

istence of a being called mind is not acquired until we agree with ourselves as to what we shall mean by 'unity' and by 'being.' The intuition of a permanent, identical existent by the realistic consciousness overworks the to-a-self-referable phenomena. "We can never envisage any unity or being." Were perceptual apprehension the mark of reality, the human mind would never have conceived the need of a metaphysic. Aristotle could not have ventured the foundations of a τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά were the Berkleian tenet of 'Esse est percipi' true. But this itself is a naïve, unsubstantiated metaphysics and vaults into a conclusion that may come only as the conceptions of a 'prima philosophia' are fitted to the facts of experience. Thus our psychological adjectives can have no meaning until we have analyzed ontological conceptions, and, as it were, got them ready for some meaning. None other than the inadequacy of mere intuition can be the intent when Browning says:

"Whether after all, a larger metaphysics might not help our physics."

Lotze's belief in the soul's unity 'rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, but on our being able to appear to ourselves at all.'¹ It is not what it may appear to us to be. But back of all appearance lies a synthesis integrating any manifold, in which is found proof (?) of a one being. "The mere fact that, conceiving itself as a subject, it connects itself with any predicate, proves to us the unity of that which asserts this connection."² The mere ability to manifest itself in *some* way, not necessarily in that formal unity which Kant implied and demanded, is a sufficient guarantee for the existence of the mind. Whereas, Lotze at times labors in the interest of this view as though it were a proof, a demonstration, he yet intimates that, like all explanation of whatever sort, it is a mere juxtaposition of facts. "The fact of the unity of consciousness is *eo ipso* at once the fact of the existence of a substance."³ And if we are 'a substance' it is just such a factual existence that we desire, and not an inscrutable perdurance which has its ideal

¹ *Microcosmus*, I., 157.

² *Metaphysic*, II., 176.

³ *Meta.*, II., 175.

reality far away in the mysteries of mathematical demonstration.

What we are, is not told us in this guarantee of the existence of a somewhat that appears. It is the fact of this seeming and not the fact our consciousness directly reports the unity of our being, on which Lotze has justly based his inference to the existence of the being which appears in all its states. To stop here, however, is to lose all that has been gained in this re-statement of the validity of the unity of consciousness. It must be supplemented by some meaning being put into 'reality' and 'unity.' But what I am, can have no meaning unless reference is again made to the self-same consciousness. Now the only what-ness that any of us care for, is just such as we appear to ourselves to be. Unless I thus am the subject of all my states, no substance behind all the states can affect me in the least. I am just such a being as knows itself as apprehending, as striving, and moved by feelings. That, indeed, is the highest meaning that can be put into the words 'being,' 'substance,' 'reality.' That soul *is* which shows itself in any mode of being affected which psychology may reveal. 'Being' other than for my self-apprehension, is the substance for which the child is searching when he seeks back of the mirror for what appears in it, but remains something always out of his sight. It is only 'being for self,' says Lotze in another place,¹ that is 'reality.' It is not their possession of 'a core' of reality which make things have being; but they are substantial and belong to the existent only as they in such a manner appear to us to have a substance present in them. "To 'be really,' and to be the one permanent subject of changing states are but different ways of expressing the same truth."² What things are, is told in an enumeration of their attributes; but to look for a somewhat is to hypostasize a query and to forget what one already has. The same is true in regard to the mind. What it is, is told in no less a manner than the expression of the modes of its appearance. And for myself really to be, is to be myself as remembering, as suffering, as perceiving, and all those various states

¹ *Outlines of Metaphysic*, p., 138.

² Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, p. 679.

with whose description psychology is replete. Criticism did not overlook such an *ego*, but mistook the meaning of reality when it implies that there is a psychical thing by itself—existing in the solitary blessedness of unknowability.

With the assurance of the substantial existence of the mind, there is also desirable an answer to the question of its numerical qualities. The old psychology thought the soul is one because it perceives its identity, and also on account of the incompatibility between a plurality of substantial elements and the unity in the subject which is reported upon in self-apprehension. Modern psychology also finds a multiplicity of modes of mental affections, each referable to one of three great groups, yet each one of us affirms his own identity—apparent let it be. To be, to be substance, to be self-apprehensive, and to be a unity are one and the same with Lotze. The unity of consciousness is the great fact to which he appeals for the guarantee of them all. But such a unity needs farther explication. I am not one because I am an identical somewhat back of knowing, feeling and willing. Much less am I one because I had a physical, atomic identity before I became conscious of the unity that I now attribute to and affirm of myself. But I am one only as I make myself one. Unity is not for me except as I am one to myself. Much rather of its unitary, than of its substantial being, can it be said that such is a mental achievement. The unity of the atom is a unit conceived *ab extra* by the physicists, and then only as a unity in multiplicity. Such, too, is the only unity Kant would allow to the soul, (as implied in the subjectivity of the categories of quantity.) But the only unity it would be a hardship to forego is just such a unity as I make good to myself in all my conscious states. Such is 'the most indivisible unity there can be.' One 'does not care whether he be reckoned as one, or more than one, according to the reckoning employed by the student of physics in counting up his atoms, or of the housewife in counting up her things. Thus to be a unitary being (if it were possible) would be no boon.'¹ Nor is an *a priori* identity any advantage to my integral reality. For only as I can fill up all the interstices of my conscious existence by inference

¹Ladd, reply to Stout, *loc. cit.*

and an effort of memory to connect my present with yesterday and a past of representations, and believing in my identity on the morrow, have grounds for a hope in the future of an experience that shall be amenable to the my which now is one to itself—*i. e.*, only as I have a conscious empiristic unity, is it a simplicity attributable to that self-existent as the subject in every state of consciousness. Moreover, the *ego* is just our own natural way of analyzing our states of consciousness. That we recognize a self is an attestation to our metaphysical nature whence springs that postulate that we are. It is not merely an ethical postulate, but a product of cognitive faith which Kant attempted to rule out. Without feeling a belief in our reality, we could never have come to such a cognition. The *logical ego* and the moral *law* are supreme instances of how metaphysical Criticism is, but naïvely. Both are hypostasizations—impersonations of late developments in the rational life.

With such an interest in our unitary substantiality, we could affirm that Kant's refutation of rational psychology was harmless to rational views on the nature and being of mind. What he criticised and the implications he carried into his criticisms, though bearing the same linguistic stamps, do not effect the meaning we hold in honor. Yet it would be an unkindness, coming out of historical ignorance, not to say that Kant's trenchant criticism really prepared the way for such opinions which the modern philosophy of mind attempts to vindicate for itself.

The second problem need not detain us so long. The relations of body and mind have given rise to no little dispute. Indeed, the belief that the body or brain, is *the* reality, has been so common, that materialism has now a history almost as voluminous as any other form of scientific doctrine. We do not propose to go into a scientific consideration of the issue. The entire achievement of physiological psychology, and especially in its highly specialized modern developments, is that the interaction of body and mind really is the causal modes of their behavior. It must affirm that mind and body are tied both ways.¹

¹ Cf., Ladd, *Phys. Psych.*, pt. III., ch. III., especially p. 667.

If this is materialism, well and good. Nevertheless it is the scientific conclusion warrantable by the facts of experience.¹

There remains, however, a rational reduction of the relation in question. As a philosophical consideration it is one of the most interesting problems, if not *the* most, connected with a meta-empirical analysis of the *real*, and is the high-water mark of philosophy's attainments wherein it deals with the facts of life. In its solution is comprehended not only all of noëtics and metaphysics, and the earlier conclusions of rational psychology regarding the nature and being of the mind; but, from the solution offered to this question stream out influences that will, *must*, profoundly affect our consideration of *all* the ideal phases of the great problem of reality. It is so significant, embodying the choicest work in the philosophy of the real and reaching up to the first factor wherein is given intimations of the ideal, that it can be called the point of orientation in any system of philosophy.

Whatever may be the result of 'scientific' explanation—and there can be no doubt as to that—the problem changes entirely when brought before philosophy. Not only does it become the query as to the 'seat' of the soul, and *how* the brain and mind

¹What can be meant by a 'causal relation' between body and mind, is something mysterious. We express it by such terms as 'connection,' 'seat,' 'organ,' *etc.* Such expressions do not clear up matters. I do not know by any special, immediate intuition that such a relation exists. I know nothing whatever in the act of vision that certain occipital centers are specially active; nor in hearing that the conditions include the neural activities of certain centers of the convolutions of the temporal lobe most adjacent to the Sylvian fissure. So long as we persist in retaining such terms and their empiric meaning, neither psychology nor philosophy explain matters. That the brain and its organs are given functions in our sentient life is a most pleasing instance of how meta-physical we are, and by a series of inferences seek to fill up gaps in the explanation of our experience.

In this connection it should be noted that Kant admitted the causal relation of brain and conscious states in that crude way in which the state of physiology and anatomy permitted him (*cf.*, *Werke*, II., 217, 224, 'Condition of the mind dependent on the body;' V., 387, 'Union of the soul with matter;' VII., 390 f., *Vorlesungen*, 47, 71 f., 'Commercio of the soul and body;' Erdmann's *Reflex.*, 92, 122, 128, 222). It also appears that Kant would banish the problem from psychology and anthropology; *Critique*, I., 506 f., VIII., 696: how the body is united with thought not to be answered by anthropology; *cf.*, also, the criticism of the fourth paralogism where the question is taken out of the hands of the dogmatic psychologists.

It is also interesting to compare Kant's empirical view of regarding the

are related;¹ for this is still a point of physiological import, or must be banished to the limbo of unwitting speculation. But when it has reached the point of a rational reduction, the question has been so transformed as to have lost all significance. Long before the relation in question is submitted to reason, one party has become a materialist out and out, and the other confirmed in his spiritualism. The one has negated the independent reality of brains, and the other has seen no need of asserting anything else but the 'epi-phenomenal' reality of consciousness. *The literal question has no meaning*; the materialist has nothing *in reality* to be juxtaposed; and the spiritualist has nothing with which the mind can have a spatial relation. With the reality of matter, or the ideality of space, neither party can contend as to the views of the other. So far, then, Kant is right. "The question is no longer as to the possibility of an association of the soul with other known and foreign substances

brain as the seat or organ of the soul with the conclusion of physiological psychology as it has made such rapid achievements in this century. In his special communication to Sömmerring, 'Über das Organ der Seele,' (which the latter so honored in his book, appearing under that title, as to crown his 'Arbeit mit seinen [Kant's] eigenen Worten,') he says, in effect, that after all else has been attempted, the special problem is not solved; nor is it merely physiological, for there yet remains 'die Einheit des Bewusstseins seiner selbst,' which must be made representable or imaginable in a spatial relation of the soul to the organ. This, however, is not only an insoluble problem which is properly 'eine Aufgabe für die Metaphysik;' but it is also contradictory in itself. To apprehend self-consciousness under some relation to its physical organ is to give it a spatial significance and try to make it an object of the external sense. Nor less is it that this problem of the place of the soul 'führt auf eine unmögliche Grösse ($\sqrt{-2}$),' VI., 456-461; cf., Kant's letter to Sömmerring, August 10, 1795, VIII., 800. Cf., Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, p. 544 f.: 'As to a special organ of consciousness in the brain, it is not proper to speak.' 'If the question is pressed as to the *physical basis* for the activities of self-consciousness, no answer can be given or even suggested.' 'From its very nature, * * * it can have no analogous or corresponding material substratum.' It must also be noted that Kant not only empirically recognizes a dependence of the mind on the brain, but the causal relation works in the opposite direction, cf., V., 471, 342 f., VII., 409 ff.: 'Power of mind over bodily feeling and diseases,' summing up autobiographic experiences. Cf., corresponding topics in the *Anthropologie*, VII., 518 ff., II., 211 ff.

¹ Cf., these phases of the question in the seventeenth century philosophy, viz.: the 'physical influence' of Descartes, the 'divine mediation' of Malebranche, the 'occasionalism' of Geulincx, the monism of Spinoza, and the 'pre-established harmony' of Leibnitz.

without us."¹ Up to this point, Criticism has thrown its influence in favor of the spiritualist. The 'coarse dualism' which science follows in its affirmation of a causal relation between brain and mind has been removed. It was an achievement of the Transcendental *Æsthetic*.

Yet we are not out of the difficulty. The facts of experience out of which the problem takes its rise are not removed. There persists this feeling of 'being in the body,' an in-ness so unique that it is utterly unlike the spatial meaning implied in the saying, our soul is not in a tree. There constantly surges upon us those waves of sensations—some highly specialized, others more massive and of an organic sort—which we fabricate into the objects of our knowledge, but constantly reminding us that things are as if there were real afferent nerves and real cortical centers. The problem of objects and apprehensive minds still remains. We have the data of so-called senses and the constant flow of cognitive experience. It is at this point, we affirm, Kant has *restated* the famous problem of the body and mind.² The question is no longer that which confused

¹ *Critique*, II., 334.

² Mention must be made of an apparent monistic reduction of body and mind which appears at times in the Critical philosophy. By 'monistic' we mean the attempt to harmonize the two orders of phenomena, giving them each equal validity. Such is the monism of substance. "No doubt I, as represented by the internal sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are two specifically different phenomena, but the foundation of external phenomena, and the other which forms the foundation of our internal intuition, is therefore neither matter, nor a thinking being by itself, but simply an unknown cause of phenomena that supplied to us the empirical concept of both." (*Crit.*, II., 329.) "If we consider that both kinds of objects thus differ from each other, and that possibly what is at the bottom of phenomenal matter, as a thing by itself, may not be so heterogeneous after all as we imagine, that difficulty (of the community of soul and body) vanishes, and there remains that one difficulty only, how a community of substance is possible at all." (I., 507, 2d ed.; *cf.*, II., 311, 332, 341, *Werke*, IV., 439 f., V., 182, VIII., 570 f., Bernard's *trans.* of *Crit. of Judgment*, Preface xxxviii f., Bax's *trans.* of *Prolegomena*, xci f., Höffding, *op. cit.*, 69.) With this intimation of the 'identity-hypothesis,' there was scarce any acceptance of it, unless we take his comparison of the mechanism and the teleology of nature as maintaining that 'all nature is the mere development of freedom' (*cf.*, V., pp. 417-423). If, on the other hand, we look to the whole drift of the *Critique*, Kant found no necessity of a substance-wise identification: Matter is only a hypostasized form of representation. He taught that idealism which 'besteht in der Behauptung dass es keine andern, als denkender

the seventeenth century philosophy and disturbs the modern mind because of the convictions of scientists; but is now as to the possibility of the 'connection of the representation of the internal sense with the modification of our external sensibility, and how these can be connected with each other according to constant laws, and acquire cohesion in experience.' "The notorious problem comes to this, how external intuition, namely that of space, (or what fills space, namely, form and movement) is possible in any thinking subject."¹ How can 'sensibility' and 'understanding' be united, or from the receptive beginnings of sentient life, how can it be that a knowledge of things arises? This is Kant's psychological innovation and must be awarded philosophical merit in having removed the old meaningless question, replacing it with the real point at issue.

Rational psychology thus ends in epistemology.² But the *crux metaphysicorum* has been as little solved by Kant as by his perseverant predecessors. "To this question no human being can return an answer."³ Criticism had edge keen enough, however, to hew this Gordian knot of the dogmatists, *i. e.*, how to untie the knot from their view point was an insoluble problem. His criticism of the fourth paralogism removed the insoluble aspect presented to his age, but left the knot *in itself* as

Wesen gebe,' though he repudiated such a scepticism, and maintained on the contrary, 'es sind uns Dinge als ausser uns,' but only as phenomena, (IV., 37). At any rate, Spinozism produced rather a weird effect on Kant, who is careful to differentiate the methods of substantial monism and idealistic scepticism. "Die Kritik beschneidet dem Dogmatismus gänzlich die Flügel in Ansehung der Erkenntniss übersinnlicher Gegenstände, und des Spinozismus ist hierin so dogmatisch, dass er sogar mit dem Mathematiker in Ansehung der Strenge des Beweises wetteifert." (IV., 349 f., note; *cf.*, II., 118; IV., 465; V., 106, 404, 434; VI., 367, for the general estimation of the doctrine of a one substance.) If the ideality of space and time is not adopted, nothing remains but the Spinozistic mysticism. With the change in methods there comes different results, so that the identification of soul and body in one transcendental substance is nothing more than a wayside obstacle which Criticism sweeps away, passing on to that ulterior reduction of the problem as stated in the text.

¹ *Critique*, II., 334, 339 f.; *cf.*, VI., 67; IV., 81, 85.

² Kant distinctly removes the problem from psychology: "The difficulty of explaining the (apparent) community of the soul with the body is not the business of psychology to solve." The analysis of the *Analytic* shows it to be an insoluble problem. *Critique*, I., 506 f.

³ *Critique*, II., 340.

firm as ever. Sceptical idealism prevents us from the attempt by removing the *crux* out of our reach.

In the same sentence, Kant seems to forget the significance of his own work in the *Analytic*. He goes back to his cosmological metaphysics and supplements his theory of knowledge with that weird ontology that is constantly reappearing in the doctrine of the extra-mental realities. "Instead of attempting to fill this gap in our knowledge, all we can do is to indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a transcendental object as the cause of this class of representations, but which we shall never know, nor be able to form any concept of." If Kant means to interpret the problem as inquiring *why* it is that things have being, or more pertinently, *how* it is that anything can be, and *how* it is that 'thinking beings' know some spatial realities at all, he is right in regarding it insoluble. Human reason is not to struggle with the problem of creating a universe. The task of philosophy is to so understand the juxtaposition of primal elements as to make the rise of experience intelligible and to get at the meaning of the course of the world. No one has emphasized this more than Lotze who conducts us far into the intelligible order and value of all experience. "*How* things can exist and can manifest themselves anyhow, is the universal enigma."¹

But if Kant reduces 'the notorious problem' to the questions: Why is it that our knowledge is partly of so-called objects? and, What is the *rationalc* of that illusion which leads the scientific psychologist to affirm a causal relation between a brain and an ideating consciousness? then he must be represented as outwitted by a confusion of 'dogmatic' psychology with absolute speculation, and as failing to appreciate his own labors in the *Æsthetic* and *Analytic* which were 'to supply the key to the solution of every metaphysical problem.'² It is hardly a mark of wisdom to charge Kant with such turmoil and forgetfulness when the doctrine of phenomenality always furnishes the key to the solution of every 'natural' illusion, yet the whole criticism of the fourth paralogism savors of just such embarrassments. For us men, however, an insight into the enigmatical relation of

¹ *Microcosmus*, I., 192.

² *Critique*, II., xxiii.

body and mind, or the more pertinent implications in the rise and nature of knowledge, of which the former is a complex and highly developed phase—can come only by way of some such procedure which was first brought to the world by Criticism. Through an analysis of knowledge, we do come to a satisfactory solution of why it is that we ‘know’ things as they appear to be and ‘posit’ those relations of them which come back to us as consternations through their hypostasization by science. When the form or the conditions of knowledge are traced back to the subject, as well as the materials or content-wise factors are seen to be mental factors, then does it dawn upon us that ‘experience’ is one great mental product. It is not as we stand aloft and watch, as it were, the epistemological unfolding of mind, but only as we go and toil within that knowledge, do we have a right to assure ourselves of the validity of our analysis, and know in the name of rational coherence, that just such an analysis is adequate for the interpretation of experience.

The ancient saying, ‘That art thou,’ is true; and what appears to be set over against thyself is nought else than an unfolding of thine own being. But it is not as overthrown with the veil of *Maya* that we must affirm this unity of experience and the apparent sublimation of all that belongs to sensibility. It is only in the reality of experience that thou art thyself. The enigma of the union of sensibility and understanding is solved by the very fact of knowledge itself. *A priori forms*, synthetic *acti*, and the data of sense are the alluring snares of the metaphysic of a theory of knowledge. We must draw back the hand of Criticism when it holds up the *crux* of how ‘space is possible in any thinking subject.’ We can press on yet a little farther. If knowledge is made up merely of ‘space’ and ‘thinking,’ then there remains an insoluble residuum that must be labeled transcendental object. But Criticism cannot be justified. It put the epistemological residue in an influential reality,¹ and omitted a large psychological remainder. Only one-

¹We do not here have in mind such facts as those on which Prof. James bases his criticism of Kant. “In the function of knowing there is a multiplicity to be connected, and K. brings this multiplicity inside the mind. * * * We, on the contrary, put the multiplicity with the reality outside, and leave the mind simple.” *Op. cit.*, I., 363.

third of mental life has been given any noëtic virtue. Knowledge, however, *is*, only as it is the *developed reflex* of the *whole* of mind. Mere intellection, the discrimination and positing of relations is not experience. The mere envisagement of dirempted spatial form (if it were in any wise possible) is not intuition. But the whole being of mind is put into the fabric of experience. What activities *and* their products are to the psychologist, such is 'knowledge' to the epistemologist. We do not objectify things because space is a mental form, or *because* we have an external sense. We do not know ourselves as *egos* *because* we are *egos*. But we do have objects and are selves only as we struggle in a motor consciousness, or will ourselves to be. Without voluntary movement there is no world of perception, and if we never willed or felt a sense of innervation, we should never have awakened to the dignity of self-hood. In these widely dirempted products there is yet no disparity. The world of things, the range of non-*egos* is just as much mine as we figuratively express the possession of one's earned wage. The highest meaning that can be put into 'is' and 'mine,' is just such meaning as the diremptive activity of a developing consciousness puts into things and selves. Both are mine by the eternal right of a cognizing creation; I am not except as I am in them. 'That art thou.'

Some integrity can be gained in attempting the solution of the problem as Kant restated and left it. He stopped where his scant psychology brought him to the difficulty of how space is a form—an *a priori*, intuitive integer of thinking beings—such beings as we popularly designate by 'myself'—this varied course of ideas that is located in the head. Such distinctions, however, must be passed over, at least a little way. 'How space belongs to me' as a reflective being is told by my own activity and passivity in coming into a possession of what constitutes experience. But if we lop off, as it were, those springs of discrimination and categorization, as Kant has done in the psychological aspects of Criticism, then philosophy is utterly unable to make intelligible any *rationalc* of the speculative conviction: I am what I see, and in the totality of experience is found the progressive activity of myself whose product is Knowledge.


In the foregoing identification of self and the so-called world of things, which seemed to Kant to be an unreachable conclusion, it has not been thought that all the mysteries have been solved. Had 'the Child of Pure Reason' pressed on his way with greater integrity, he, too, might have found warrant for removing the grounds of explaining spatiality and its content from the unknowable *x* and placed them in the transcendental faculty of cognition. 'That art thou,' is a truth which finds complete guarantee in the facts of psychology and the necessities of noëtics. But there must be drawn back the veil of *Maya*. The conviction, that all is meaningless delusion, sins against the metaphysical postulates no less than does the scepticism of Critical idealism. In the 'That art thou,' lie implications of reality which give even seeming content to 'That.' In the 'Thou' and in all that enters into self-apprehension are tokens, as it were, of a somewhat that makes for the experience whose phenomenal totality makes the circuit of self. This is saying no more than can be meant if one says, "all the truth we know must be found in the primary facts of knowledge, in perception and self-consciousness." Both orientalism and speculative transcendentalism belie the conviction of reality. The one does not go far enough in the mysteries of knowledge, and cuts off a grasp for reality in its insufficient analysis on which it attempted to deny any identification of that which is, with that which is known. The other mistakes the one for the all, the individual for the whole, but rushes on to an identification of knowledge and being. The one was the careful treading of scientific demonstration, which wins for itself the true name of philosophy. The other is the groping of a religious instinct, springing from the smart of unending pain.

Though everything is given in that mighty forthputting of the individual which can most generously be called knowledge, yet the whole of reality is not therein contained. Absolutism and scepticism both err in either brushing aside, or not giving full weight to that conviction which is embedded in all experience that it is dealing with somewhat real. It is the acceptance of this incoherent demand of a real, manifesting itself in various forms all the way through experience, but seems most impera-


tive in all those states of consciousness having objective reference—which entitles reason to such an emboldened analysis of what may be the constituents of such a reality, as expressed in her choice off-spring, metaphysic. Here is not the place to explicate what interpretation reason shall best give of this vague message that comes, as it were, from another far distant world, but only to intimate the basis, there may be, of any right on our part to speak of a world ground. Admitting this claim of all life, that there is a reality known and a truth that may be expressed—both of which are the very core of any attempted reduction of the relation of body and mind—reason has left to itself a modicum of knowledge which it may progressively enlarge. But what shall be our final answer to the question Kant has left open, we cannot say. Under an elaborate analysis of knowledge it is found that the way in which Kant stated the question is not pertinent. The very life of knowledge itself shows *how* 'space is possible to a thinking being.' Yet, as the final problem of rational psychology is seen to emerge into a point for epistemological explication, the *crux metaphysicorum* becomes, *why* is it that we are so related to the world-ground as to give ourselves the peculiar reality that we do? *This* is the gap in our knowledge which cannot be filled. What correspondent relation the elements of our experience may have in the absolute, we do not know. Philosophy can do no more than take as given the so-called elements attained by its analyses. These can be given a rational coherence so as to make experience intelligible. Thus Kant's question finds its answer in the very knowledge which he so profoundly analyzed. But *why* we are as we are, *why* we develop such a self, such an unity of experience as we do, that is the ultimate enigma. This is the outcome of all explanation—to bring us to the unexplained. The recognition of the mysterious at some point is the profoundest result of an interpretation of nature. Whether philosophy may sometime have an insight into the *why* of experiential factors, or the *how* of the being of things, it is not for one to say. Let us return to the broad fields of experience, saying, with the spirit of Criticism:

"Lasst uns unser Glück besorgen, in den Garten gehen, und arbeiten."

DIAGRAM OF THE FACULTIES, cf., p. 68.





The following diagram represents what might be called the more anthropological view and division of the knowing faculty in which Kant takes empirical delight.



¹It is interesting to note that Kant avoids, we might almost say, all metaphysical implication in his empirical terms. 'Gemüth' may mean any state of mind, possibly corresponding to our 'consciousness as such.' In his psychological passages, he employs 'Gemüth' instead of 'Seele' or 'Geist.' This same effort to be non-metaphysical as far as possible, is apparent in the *Critique*, where he prefers 'Vernunft;' cf., *supra* pp. 123 f.

²The 'lower' are involuntary and against the will; the 'higher' are voluntary, are under 'free' will, *Reflexionen*, p. 70 f. The diagrams refer to the following citations: *Critique*, II., 109, 115; VII., 451 f, 465, 473, 481, 489, 512, 515; *Reflexionen*, 59, 65, 80 ff; *Vorlesungen*, 12 f.





One thing chiefly noticeable is, that the effectiveness of Kantian psychology falls away as it approaches the close of the analysis of consciousness. Its force was spent in validating the analysis of cognition or intellectual consciousness.





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